Immigrants Without Rights: Questioning the Role of International Human Rights Law in U.S. Detention and Deportation Policies by Provo, Kelsey
  
 
IMMIGRANTS WITHOUT RIGHTS: QUESTIONING THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN U.S. DETENTION AND 
DEPORTATION POLICIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
KELSEY LYNN PROVO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
Presented to the Department of International Studies 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts  
June 2014 
 ii 
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Kelsey Lynn Provo 
 
Title: Immigrants Without Rights: Questioning the Role of International Human Rights 
Law in U.S. Detention and Deportation Policies 
 
This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Master of Arts degree in the Department of International Studies by: 
 
Anita Weiss Chairperson 
Michelle McKinley Member 
Michael Fakhri Member 
 
and 
 
Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research and Innovation; 
 Dean of the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2014 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
© 2014 Kelsey Lynn Provo  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Kelsey Lynn Provo 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of International Studies 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Immigrants Without Rights: Questioning the Role of International Human Rights 
Law in U.S. Detention and Deportation Policies 
 
 
This thesis examines the role of international human rights law in U.S. immigration 
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CHAPTER I   
INTRODUCTION 
1. Sergio and Eduardo: Immigrant Stories from Detention 
 When I first met Sergio he had just turned 23 years old. I remember his age 
because while looking at his intake form, I saw that he was born on the same day and 
same year as my younger brother. Sergio had been detained by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) for over two years. He was born in Mexico but had lived in the 
United States for twenty years, almost his entire life. His mother brought him across the 
border illegally when he was only two years old. From the time he was two years old 
until the day I met him, Sergio had lived in the United States. Like any young person 
growing up in the United States, Sergio went to school, made friends and lived a 
relatively normal life; the only thing to distinguish him from any of his peers was the fact 
that Sergio and his mother had not been legally admitted to the United States. 
 At age 18, Sergio pleaded guilty to burglary; he and a friend broke into a 
stranger’s house. Sergio’s friend gave his name up to the police a year later and Sergio 
was arrested and charged. He pled guilty to second-degree burglary and was sentenced to 
eight months in prison. When he was released from prison, ICE immediately took Sergio 
into federal immigration custody. Because Sergio was in the U.S. illegally and because 
burglary is defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as a crime involving 
moral turpitude (CIMT), Sergio was placed in a privately run, federally funded, 
immigration detention facility and faced mandatory detention and immediate deportation. 
Because there is very little judicial discretion in immigration proceedings, Sergio 
has few options for fighting his deportation. Sergio had lived in the United States for over 
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twenty years and although he understands Spanish, does not speak the language. He has 
no family in Mexico; his mother and two siblings live in the United States, as do his 
grandparents. But the Immigration Judge (IJ) cannot consider all of Sergio’s ties to the 
United States. The IJ cannot take into account that Sergio’s mother and his two siblings, 
prior to Sergio’s arrest for burglary, relied heavily on Sergio to support them financially. 
The IJ cannot consider the fact that Sergio has not been to Mexico since he was two years 
old, that he does not know how to speak Spanish and that he has no family or friends in 
Mexico; he has no home, outside of his home in the U.S., to go to. Under immigration 
law, Sergio is a “criminal alien” and therefore cannot challenge his detention or his 
deportation. Sergio has lived in the United States for 20 years, almost his entire life; but 
because he was convicted of a CIMT, he is inadmissible to the United States and because 
he is inadmissible, Sergio will face certain deportation. 
Unlike in his criminal proceedings, Sergio is not eligible for parole because 
burglary is a CIMT for immigration purposes. According to immigration law, anyone 
convicted of a CIMT faces mandatory detention. Because the immigration laws require 
mandatory detention for individuals who have committed certain crimes, it doesn’t matter 
whether the IJ determines that Sergio is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. 
The IJ cannot take into account that Sergio was convicted only months after he turned 19 
years old, that Sergio has already served his time for his conviction and that Sergio has 
been rehabilitated according to the criminal justice system. The IJ cannot consider 
Sergio’s ties to his mother and siblings, or that Sergio if ICE were to use its discretion to 
release Sergio, he would attend all future immigration proceedings.  
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Sergio is held in a detention facility that is indistinguishable from federal prison; 
he wears a jumpsuit, lives in a prison cell and his freedom of movement is restricted. 
Sergio is allowed very limited time outdoors; only one hour per day, and he faces 
punishments, such as solitary confinement, for misbehavior. Sergio is detained with 
people who have committed violent crimes such as murder and rape. He is not allowed to 
see his family except on limited occasions during approved visiting hours. Sergio is 
escorted to and from his cell every day; he is constantly surrounded by guards and lives 
under constant supervision. 
Unlike in his criminal proceedings, Sergio does not have the constitutional right 
to a government-appointed attorney if he cannot afford one. Because Sergio cannot afford 
an attorney, he will have to represent himself pro se, against a Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) trial attorney, who is a trained lawyer and skilled in immigration law and 
procedure. Sergio will have to write all of his motions and his briefs on his own, without 
the help of anyone trained in immigration law. Sergio must do all of his legal research on 
his own and must collect all the necessary documentation to fight his deportation. He 
must also do so from within the immigration detention facility. The detention facility has 
few computers and Internet access is very limited. Detainees must pay for each phone 
call they make, and they must also pay to make copies of their documents for the court 
and for DHS.  
 Because Sergio’s detention is not considered ‘punitive,’ constitutional protections 
like the Eighth Amendment “right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment” or the 
Fourth Amendment “right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures” do not apply. 
The Fifth Amendment due process guarantees also will not apply to Sergio. He cannot 
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invoke any constitutional rights guaranteed to those in criminal proceedings because the 
Supreme Court has defined immigration proceedings as regulatory, not punitive, 
proceedings. Sergio is detained and facing permanent banishment from his only home, 
yet that isn’t “punishment” in the criminal sense of the word. Sergio cannot use the 
Constitution to fight for humane treatment and his right to freedom; he cannot argue that 
the government is violating his constitutional rights. Sergio is outside of the protection of 
the Constitution. 
 Eduardo has a similar story. Eduardo grew up in Mexico and entered the United 
States without documentation. Like Sergio, Eduardo had lived in the United States for 
over twenty years. However, unlike Sergio, Eduardo entered the United States on his 
own; he was not brought across the border as a young child. Unlike Sergio, Eduardo was 
not in immigration detention because of his criminal history. Eduardo has never 
committed a crime and has never been charged with committing a crime. Instead, 
Eduardo ended up in immigration detention because he was pulled over by a police 
officer while on his way to work. When Eduardo couldn’t present documentation 
demonstrating he was legally present in the United States, he was arrested and taken to 
the police station, where the officer checked his immigration status and determined he 
was in the country illegally. Eduardo was immediately turned over to ICE and placed in 
immigration detention. 
 Like Sergio, Eduardo’s deportation is inevitable. Eduardo had only recently been 
transferred to the ICE detention facility when I met him. When I first asked Eduardo if he 
was married or had any children, he told me yes. He told me his partner is a legal 
permanent resident and her daughter, who he has raised from a young age, is a U.S. 
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citizen. Unfortunately, Eduardo and his partner never formally married. And although 
Eduardo considers himself to be a father, he has never legally adopted his U.S. citizen 
daughter. Even though Eduardo and his partner consider themselves to be married, and 
even though his partner’s daughter considers Eduardo to be her father, the INA does not 
recognize these relationships. Because Eduardo, according to immigration law, has no 
formally recognized family in the United States, he is ineligible for any relief from 
deportation. 
 The IJ cannot consider the fact that Eduardo has a family and that he has never 
been arrested for violating a law in the United States. The IJ cannot take into account the 
hardship that Eduardo’s partner and her daughter will face should Eduardo be deported. 
Nor can the IJ consider Eduardo’s work history in the United States or that Eduardo will 
have to start over in Mexico. Eduardo’s long term presence in the United States as a 
productive, tax-paying individual and Eduardo’s family ties cannot be considered in his 
immigration case. The law is clear: because Eduardo did not formalize his relationship 
with his daughter or his partner, he is ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal. It 
doesn’t matter that Eduardo didn’t know he needed to formalize his relationship, nor does 
it matter that Eduardo and his partner are married in every sense of the word or that 
Eduardo is a father in every sense of the word. 
 Another difference between Eduardo and Sergio is Eduardo’s eligibility for 
parole. Unlike Sergio, Eduardo is eligible for bond. When he was first detained, ICE set 
his bond at $8,000. Considering that bond amounts are based on whether an individual is 
a flight risk or a danger to the community, $8,000 is very high. Eduardo has family and 
community ties, which means his flight risk is low; Eduardo has never committed a crime 
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and is therefore not a danger to the community. But ICE often imposes arbitrary bonds 
and ICE retains the authority to raise or revoke a bond at any time. Because Eduardo 
cannot afford to pay such a high bond, like Sergio, Eduardo must fight his deportation 
from inside a detention center, an environment that is like a prison in every way. 
 Just as Sergio is unable to challenge the constitutionality of his detention and 
deportation, Eduardo is unable to challenge his detention. Even though Eduardo’s ICE 
bond is absurdly high, ICE’s decision to set a high bond is not governed by the 
Constitution. In fact, although Eduardo can request a bond hearing in front of the IJ, if he 
does so, he faces the risk that the IJ will raise the amount, or even worse, completely 
revoke it all together. If Eduardo doesn’t agree with the IJ’s bond determination, he 
cannot appeal to a higher authority. The IJ and ICE have sole discretion in determining 
the bond amount. In fact, just as ICE has the discretion to lower Eduardo’s bond to the 
lowest amount, ICE has the discretion to release Eduardo without requiring him to pay a 
bond at all. 
As in Sergio’s case, Eduardo cannot challenge his detention or his impending 
deportation under the Constitution. His Fifth Amendment right to due process of law is 
limited; he cannot challenge his detention as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. Even if the police stopped Eduardo in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, Eduardo cannot challenge the stop (and resulting arrest and detention) as a 
violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search or seizure. The 
Constitution does not protect Eduardo. 
 How is it that Eduardo and Sergio fall outside of the protection of the 
Constitution? Citizens of the United States are afforded more individual rights and 
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privileges than most people in the world. Those who have grown up as citizens in the 
United States expect constitutional rights to apply in every context. Americans learn 
about the Bill of Rights, the Founding Fathers, and about the Separation of Powers, and 
how those aspects of the government distinguish the United States from authoritarian 
governments. In the Preamble, “the People” refers to U.S. citizens and to people 
physically present within the United States. Membership in that category provides 
inalienable individual rights that the government cannot take away and cannot violate. So 
how is it, that Eduardo and Sergio, and countless others physically present within the 
United States, are not members of “We the People”? Why can the government take their 
rights away without question? Why doesn’t the Constitution protect them? 
 
2. International Human Rights Laws in Immigration Proceedings and the Role 
of International Law in U.S. Immigration Policies 
 This thesis seeks to examine the role of international human rights law in U.S. 
immigration policies and, specifically, its role in U.S. immigration, detention and 
deportation policies. U.S. domestic immigration laws are complex and rigid, with limited 
judicial discretion in immigration proceedings and limited due process protections for 
immigrants. U.S. immigration policies prioritize detention, deportation and militarization 
of the border as the main mechanisms to control and regulate immigration. Because the 
U.S. immigration system is so rigid and the federal government has relatively unfettered 
control over immigration law, much of the academic legal literature (Kanstroom, Golash-
Boza, Acer and Goodman, Cook) looks outside of domestic laws to international human 
rights law as the solution to the incredible human rights abuses immigrants face in the 
United States. 
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 While the literature is clear that the United States is violating international human 
rights laws in the way it detains and deports immigrants, the United States federal 
government remains unwilling to change its deportation system. The Obama 
administration continues to focus on detention and deportation as the primary 
mechanisms for enforcing immigration laws and the government continues to increase 
spending for further militarization of the border and border enforcement. Even though the 
United States is violating its obligations under international law, and even though the 
literature is clear that the U.S. government must incorporate international human rights 
standards into its detention and deportation practices, the U.S. has yet to do so, and it 
appears it will not do so in the future. 
 The unwillingness of the United States to incorporate international human rights 
standards into its immigration policies led me to question what role international law has 
in immigration policy. Even though international laws governing the human rights of 
migrants apply to the United States (it is a signatory of a multitude of international 
human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the U.N. Refugee Convention), I 
questioned what role international human rights laws can actually play in deportation and 
detention proceedings. Although many scholars point to international law as a solution 
(Kanstroom, Golash-Boza, Gilman), very few provide any insights into how U.S. laws 
could incorporate it. This leads me to wonder whether there are domestic laws already in 
place that could enable the U.S. to incorporate international law without actually formally 
sign international laws into new domestic legislation.  
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3.  Methodology 
 For my research, I interviewed immigration attorneys working at a non-profit 
agency in Arizona, where I was also doing an internship in 2013. As someone studying 
the law in hopes of one day practicing law, I found that the literature lacked the valuable 
perspective of immigration attorneys. I conducted my research at a non-profit agency that 
provides legal services to immigrants in immigration detention who cannot afford an 
attorney. Because close to 86% of immigrants in detention are unable to afford a private 
attorney to represent them, the attorneys at this non-profit agency had a large caseload 
and considerable experience in immigration law. Through interviewing these immigration 
attorneys, I hoped to find concrete ways in which the United States could incorporate 
international human rights laws into its detention and deportation policies.  
 To fully understand the detention and deportation process, I applied for an 
internship with the non-profit agency where I planned to conduct my interviews. I wanted 
not only to gain valuable attorney insights into the detention and deportation system and 
the role of international law in that system, but also to learn firsthand about the detention 
system and the rights violations I had read about in the literature. Through the internship, 
I hoped to gain real-world experience in the way immigrants are treated in the U.S. 
detention and deportation system while, at the same time, learn potential ways to bring 
human rights protections to immigrants in this rigid and complex immigration system. 
When I asked the Executive Director if I could interview the attorneys, she said 
that I could as long as I didn’t use to the name of the agency. The non-profit agency has a 
crucial relationship with ICE and the detention centers. They are only allowed into the 
detention centers at ICE’s permission and that permission has been revoked in the past. 
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For that reason, I will not include the name of the nonprofit, nor the name of the attorneys 
I interviewed. 
 Initially, I wanted to know what immigration attorneys thought of international 
law and its role in immigration law and policy. Did these attorneys, who work within the 
law on a daily basis, believe international human rights laws could bring about some 
change the U.S. immigration system? Did they use international law in arguing for an 
immigrant’s release from detention or in arguing a stay of deportation? If the U.S. would 
not incorporate international human rights treaties like the ICCPR or CAT into its 
domestic laws, were there domestic legal mechanisms already in place that could be used 
to improve the human rights of immigrants in the United States? 
 I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews to answer these questions. I planned 
to ask the following questions: 
1. Why did you decide to get involved with the Florence Immigrant and Refugee 
Rights Project? 
2. What are some of your more frustrating experiences working in immigration 
law? 
3. Where do you see immigration law in the future? 
4. How do you think U.S. immigration policies could incorporate international 
human rights law? 
5. What does a typical case look like? 
6. Tell me about some cases that have troubled you or left you feeling 
discouraged. 
 11 
7. If you could change one thing to make immigration law work better in the 
justice system, what would it be?1 
Through these questions, I hoped to gather concrete ways in which international law 
could be used to humanize the U.S. deportation system. In my mind, attorneys practicing 
immigration law were the best situated to analyze the deficiencies of the immigration 
system and to highlight key ways in which the system could change to provide for greater 
human rights protections. 
 A week into my internship at the non-profit agency, and before I could even 
interview the non-profit attorneys, it was clear that international law, as discussed in the 
literature, had no place in U.S. immigration proceedings. The attorneys focus only on the 
INA and immigration proceedings are completely based on that statutory code. None of 
the attorneys used international law to argue for their client’s release, the IJ’s did not 
consider international law in deciding individual cases, nor did the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA), the Ninth Circuit Court, nor the Supreme Court use international law 
whatsoever. 
 My interviews revealed what I learned that first week. Immigration attorneys do 
not find international law useful; simply put, international law is not being used in the 
real world. I see this as an incredible gap in the legal (and social science) academic 
literature and the actual practice of immigration law. This realization led me to question 
not what role international human rights law could play in domestic immigration policies, 
but whether it had any role at all in changing current policies to be more humane and in 
line with international human rights standards.  
                                                
1 Appendix 
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 My internship experience working with immigrants in detention and the long 
conversations I had with the attorneys fighting for immigrant rights led me to question 
the role of international law in U.S. immigration policy. Therefore, rather than comparing 
U.S. immigration policies with international human rights laws and standards and 
pronouncing the U.S. immigration policies do in fact violate international law and that 
the United States should incorporate international human rights laws into its policies, this 
thesis seeks to shift the discourse. Instead it examines the historical roots of immigration 
law and policy, highlighting the racism and xenophobia that continue to underlie U.S. 
immigration policies today. It also examines whether international law can play a role in 
current U.S. policies as well as the role international law has played, if any, in creating 
the current, rigid immigration policies the U.S. has today.  
 
4.  Chapter Overview 
Although the United States prides itself on being “a nation of immigrants,” 
immigration policies are becoming increasingly restrictive and punitive. Current U.S. 
immigration policies focus on family reunification as the primary means for immigrating 
to the United States. Nevertheless, the country’s deportation policies are, at the same 
time, tearing families apart. Today, the United States government is detaining and 
deporting more noncitizens than ever before and the majority of those deported are 
people of color, specifically Latino immigrants. This thesis reviews the historical roots of 
immigration law and policy in the United States to illuminate why current U.S. 
immigration policies focus so heavily on detention and deportation, and why those 
policies disproportionately affect Latino immigrants and other immigrants of color. 
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Chapter Two acts as a framework for the subsequent chapters. It frames the issues 
this thesis addresses and the questions it seeks to answer. Chapter Two begins with a 
brief overview of U.S. immigration policy, detailing its historical roots and the current 
trend in U.S. immigration policy toward the criminalization of immigration, which is 
explained in later chapters. Chapter Two then briefly lays out the international human 
rights laws most relevant to how immigrants are treated within the U.S. detention and 
deportation system and questions whether international human rights laws are the 
solution to the human rights abuses immigrants face in the United States today. 
 Chapters Three and Four trace the history of U.S. immigration policy from the 
earliest immigration regulations to the current detention and deportation system. Both 
chapters explain the nativist and racist roots that underlie the changes in U.S. 
immigration law and policies. The first part of this history details the shift in immigration 
control from the state to the federal level and explains where the federal government’s 
power to deport and regulate immigration originated. While it is important to discuss the 
evolution of the legal components of the immigration system, these chapters detail the 
racialization that influenced virtually all immigration policies passed in U.S. history. To 
get a complete picture of U.S. immigration history, it is important to note the racist 
discourse influencing the trajectory of U.S. immigration law and policy. 
 Chapter Three explores the history of the federal government’s power to regulate 
immigration and the racist discourse used to justify exclusion of certain immigrant 
groups. Although U.S. immigration policy has changed drastically over the centuries, 
racism has played an influential role in these changes. This chapter begins with the first 
federal immigration regulations and ends with the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act 
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(INA), which eliminated the infamous national origins quota system – a race-based 
immigration policy promoting immigration from Western Europe while excluding 
immigrants from non-European, developing nations. The enactment of the 1965 INA 
illustrates a significant shift in U.S. immigration policy; whereas all previous 
immigration laws had explicit racial restrictions on immigration, the 1965 INA was the 
first comprehensive immigration reform to eliminate explicit racial restrictions. 
 After detailing the history of the federal government’s power to regulate 
immigration and the racist discourse underlying the creation of immigration laws, 
Chapter Four focuses on the ever-increasing convergence of immigration and criminal 
laws. After the 1965 INA, there has been an increasing tendency to conflate immigration 
with crime. This shift can be traced back to the beginning of U.S. immigration law and 
the Chinese exclusion cases; however, in analyzing the convergence of immigration and 
criminal law, this chapter will look primarily at immigration laws enacted in the 1990s, 
which drastically altered U.S. immigration policy as we know it today. Two laws enacted 
in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and 
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), set the stage for an 
immigration policy that focuses primarily on increased border enforcement, national 
security, detention and crime control as a means to regulate immigration into the United 
States. While the 9/11 terrorist attacks also drastically changed U.S. immigration policy, 
the IIRIRA and the AEDPA laid the foundation for an immigration system focused 
primarily on crime control and national security. 
 Chapter Four also discusses the post-9/11 era and how the War on Terror has 
created an immigration policy that focuses exclusively on detention, deportation and 
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militarization of the border as the exclusive means to control immigration into the United 
States. The War on Terror and laws enacted post-9/11 built on the foundations of the 
IIRIRA and the AEDPA. The Bush Administration used the immigration system, in 
which immigrants already had very limited constitutional rights and protections, to 
further its war on terror. The immigration system was a convenient mechanism allowing 
the federal government to detain those it suspected of terrorism without having to provide 
due process.  
Chapter Four concludes with the current U.S. immigration system, which focuses 
on detention and deportation of immigrants and militarization of the border. The racist 
and xenophobic foundations of U.S. immigration policy have contributed to the current 
immigration policies that deny immigrants vital constitutional protections. Immigrants 
facing detention and deportation in the United States cannot use the Constitution to 
challenge their detention or their deportation. The War on Terror and the earlier 
criminalization of immigration has led to a system where immigrants have few rights and 
where human rights violations run rampant. 
 Chapter Five focuses on the international laws governing the human rights of 
immigrants and U.S. obligations toward immigrants under international law. The last 
section of Chapter Five details the many ways in which the United States is violating 
international law though its immigration policies. Because the federal government has 
such power over immigrants and the regulation of immigration, and because the Judiciary 
defers to Congress and the executive in all immigration matters, immigrants cannot use 
U.S. constitutional laws to challenge their detention. As the limits on constitutional rights 
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in immigration proceedings are so concrete, many advocates and legal scholars look to 
international human rights laws as a means to challenge these human rights abuses.  
 Chapter Six analyzes international law and U.S. immigration policy from the 
perspective of international law’s contribution to the current U.S. immigration system. 
Rather than argue that the United States should comport with its obligations under 
international law, as many scholars and advocates suggest, Chapter Six focuses instead 
on how international law has contributed to the subordination of immigrants in the United 
States. Through my analysis of the use of sovereignty in U.S. immigration jurisprudence, 
I am attempting to shift the discussion from international law as the solution to the 
immigrant human rights abuses in the United States. 
 The final chapter, titled “Final Thoughts and Considerations,” incorporates my 
experience as an intern at the nonprofit agency in Arizona. These interviews changed my 
outlook on international law and its ability to help immigrants facing detention and 
deportation. This final chapter explains my motivation behind shifting the immigrant 
rights discussion away from promoting international law and questions how international 
law can help immigrants currently detained in the United States. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
FRAMING THE ISSUES: U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND  
 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS 
 
 
 Immigrants in the United States have historically faced discrimination and 
unequal treatment under the law and immigrants today still face discrimination and 
unequal treatment. U.S. immigration law and policy has a long history of racial 
discrimination, anti-immigrant sentiment, and xenophobia. Historically, U.S. immigration 
policy was also heavily influenced by economic concerns, such as labor demand and 
international concerns including, foreign policy. Throughout U.S. history, different 
groups of people, primarily immigrants of color from developing nations, have 
experienced harsh and unequal treatment by the federal government. Because of the very 
narrow conceptions of ‘white’ in early U.S. immigration history, non-white immigrants 
included those from Italy, Ireland and other regions that are often considered ‘white’ 
today. However, attempts to exclude immigrants of color today focus primarily on 
immigrants from Latin America and those from the Middle East and South/Southeast 
Asia. From the very first federal regulations on immigration to our current immigration 
policy, the federal government has sought to exclude certain immigrants based on race.  
The government has succeeded in excluding those it deems ‘undesirable’ in many 
ways. In the late 1700s, the government restricted immigration by refusing to admit 
people likely to become a public charge, those who were a danger to the public safety and 
those who were a threat to the public health. Of course, in denying entry to those groups, 
the government expressed a clear preference for white, Christian immigrants from 
Western Europe. In the 1800s, the government extended immigration restrictions to 
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people from specific countries, such as China and eventually extended restrictions on 
immigration from all of Asia. When immigration from other developing nations became a 
‘threat,’ the government extended immigration restrictions to other developing nations, 
creating a national origins quota system, with an express racial preference for immigrants 
from white, Western-European countries. The quota system was explicitly designed to 
keep the country ethnically ‘white’ and Christian. 
Eventually, the United States abolished the quota system, which explicitly limited 
the number of immigrants based on their ethnicity; however, the “race neutral” 
immigration system under the 1965 INA (the statute which forms the basis of our 
immigration laws today), continues to discriminate against immigrants (and citizens) of 
color from developing nations. Although no longer explicit, U.S. immigration policy 
continues to give preference to immigrants from white, Western-European nations. 
Current U.S. immigration policies continue to target non-white immigrants and citizens 
from developing nations, most notably, those who appear to be Latino and immigrants 
from predominantly Muslim or Arab countries. Although no longer racist on its face, 
U.S. immigration policy continues to disadvantage and exclude people of color from full 
membership in the American polity. U.S. immigration policies continue to erode 
constitutional rights of people labeled by the American public and the government as 
‘undesirable,’ ‘unassimilable,’ or a ‘threat’ to American values and way of life. 
Over the last 40 years, immigration policies have become progressively more 
restrictive and punitive. The War on Drugs and the War on Crime have contributed to an 
immigration system that heavily emphasizes crime control through the detention and 
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deportation of immigrants.2 The criminal components of U.S. immigration laws scarcely 
distinguish between those who are long-term legal permanent residents (LPRs) and 
between those who are in the country without documentation. The immigration system in 
place today puts national security above individual human rights and emphasizes 
detention, deportation and militarization of the border as the primary means for 
regulating immigration in the United States. 
The immigration system in place today, with its focus on immigrant detention, 
deportation and enhanced border security, is unprecedented. The United States is 
devoting more money and more resources to border enforcement than ever before. The 
current immigration system in the United States is becoming progressively more 
criminalized; immigration violations are now federal crimes that carry heavy prison 
sentences. Grounds for deportation are constantly expanding and include even 
misdemeanors such as shoplifting or possession of small amounts of marijuana. 
Mandatory detention is becoming the norm and Congress continues to expand the list of 
crimes that make an immigrant subject to mandatory detention and mandatory 
deportation. 
The United States is also detaining and deporting immigrants in unparalleled 
numbers. In 2012, over 400,000 people were deported from the United States.3 This 
number is staggering when compared with the 70,000 people deported in 1997.4 The 
                                                
2 TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA, IMMIGRATION NATION: RAIDS, DETENTIONS, AND 
DEPORTATIONS IN POST-9/11 AMERICA (Paradigm Publishers 2012). 
 
3 Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to Realign 
Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 245 (2013). 
 
4 GOLASH-BOZA, supra note 2 at 47. 
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Obama Administration has deported close to 2 million people: more people in six years 
than all people deported from the U.S. before 1997.5 The immense increase in 
deportations is a direct result of the government’s emphasis on crime control and national 
security. Congress has continued to expand the list of crimes that make immigrants 
deportable, while at the same time, Congress has severely limited judicial discretion in 
immigration proceedings.  
Not only is the government deporting more people than ever before, but the 
number of immigrants detained by the government has also skyrocketed. In 2011, the 
federal government detained 429,000 immigrants.6 When compared to the 209,000 
people detained in the year 2001, the number of immigrants in detention has more than 
doubled in the past ten years.7 And the average number of immigrants detained on a daily 
basis is also increasing dramatically. In 1994, the government detained an average of 
6,785 immigrants per day in detention facilities; by 2011, the daily average increased to 
over 33,000 immigrants per day.8 The number of detainees continues to increase as 
Congress expands the list of crimes making noncitizens deportable and expands the list of 
crimes requiring mandatory detention, while it also limits judicial discretion and limits 
the avenues for relief from deportation. 
Although the emphasis on detention and deportation as a means to enforce 
immigration policy and control the border are applied uniformly to all immigrants, 
regardless of their nationality, the impact of these enforcement measures disparately 
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6 Gilman, supra note 3 at 245. 
 
7 Id. 
 
8 Id. 
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affect Latino immigrants. Immigration enforcement disparately affects Latino immigrants 
as well as citizens with Latino origins who have lived in the U.S. for generations. Latinos 
are more likely to be targeted by law enforcement because they “appear illegal.” For 
example, approximately 93 percent of immigrants arrested under the Secure 
Communities program, a government initiative that requires the FBI send fingerprints 
through the DHS database, were Latino.9 And even though the government, since 9/11, 
has ramped up efforts to detain and deport people from countries the U.S. associates with 
terrorism, most people deported are from Mexico and other countries in Latin America.10 
Increased militarization along the southern border with Mexico likewise 
demonstrates the disparate impact U.S. immigration policies have on immigrants from 
Latin America. Although the United States also shares a border with Canada, the main 
thrust of border enforcement focuses solely on the U.S. border with Mexico. In the 1990s, 
the United States initiated a series of operations under the Secure Borders Initiative. The 
government aptly called the initiatives “Operation Gatekeeper,” “Operation Hold-the-
Line” (originally “Operation Blockade” – however the name was changed after it sparked 
some controversy), and “Operation Safeguard.” Through these operations, the 
government sought to physically deter immigrants from crossing the border from Mexico 
into the United States. The government’s militarization of the southern border has led to a 
high number of immigrant deaths; some estimate that between 1994 and 2009, as many 
as 5,600 immigrants died attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border. 
                                                
9 Julia Preston, Latinos Said to Bear Weight of Deportation Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/us/latinos-said-to-bear-weight-of-deportation-program.html. 
 
10 GOLASH-BOZA, supra note 2 at 36. 
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  Anti-immigrant and nativist sentiment in the public sphere also 
disproportionately centers on Latinos and those who appear to be Latino. ‘Illegal’ 
immigrants are often viewed by the public and in the media as Mexican or Latino. Not 
only does much of the immigration debate focus on the southern border with Mexico, but 
‘illegal immigration’ is primarily associated with Mexican migration and migration from 
Latin America. Anti-immigrant sentiment directed at Latinos can even be seen through 
state initiatives like Proposition 187 in California and English Language-only laws, 
which many southern states are passing in an attempt to discourage future immigrants 
from settling in those states. Much of the anti-immigrant laws and sentiment is directed at 
the Latino community and Latino immigrants.  
 
1.  Federal Control: Exclusion and Limited Constitutional Protection 
  Why does the federal government have so much control over immigrants? Why 
do immigrants of color have so few constitutional protections and how is it that law 
enforcement officials can enforce immigration laws in a way that disparately impacts 
people of color? How is it that Congress can pass immigration laws that, if applied to 
citizens, would violate the Constitution? The immigration laws in place today have 
evolved over time to further exclude immigrants from constitutional protections. The 
government has justified excluding immigrants, and in some cases citizens, from the 
protection of the constitution in a number of ways yet most of the case law explaining 
what rights immigrants have in the United States was developed in the late 1800s with 
the Chinese exclusion cases. Although the Chinese exclusion cases are infamous for their 
absolute denial of rights to Asian immigrants primarily because of their race, most cases 
decided in this era have not been overruled. The Court’s interpretation of Congressional 
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and executive power, as well as its classification of immigration proceedings as distinct 
from criminal proceedings, created a system where immigrants have few constitutional 
protections in immigration proceedings and judicial discretion in immigration 
proceedings is minimal. 
Because the Supreme Court determined that enforcement and regulation of 
immigration involved federal power over foreign affairs, the Court deferred to Congress 
and the executive in virtually all aspects of immigration regulation. This deference 
enabled Congress to enact overtly racist laws aimed at excluding immigrants based on 
their ethnicity and country of origin. Through its deference to the executive and 
legislative branches, the Court only examined the constitutionality of immigration laws 
with a low level of scrutiny. Because Congress and the executive were the branches of 
government best suited to passing laws to regulate foreign relations (and thus 
immigration), the Court would uphold laws passed by Congress so long as the laws were 
‘rationally related’11 to the regulation of immigration. According to the Court, 
“Congress... has broad power over immigration and naturalization and regularly makes 
rules regarding aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”12 However, laws 
that would be plainly unconstitutional as applied to citizens, may not be unconstitutional 
as applied to immigrants. 
 Additionally, constitutional due process protections do not apply to immigrants in 
deportation proceedings because during the late 1800s Chinese Exclusion era, the Court 
                                                
11 In constitutional law jurisprudence, the Court has developed three levels of scrutiny to 
determine whether a federal law that distinguishes between two classes of people is 
constitutional. The lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis, requires that a law be rationally related 
to a legitimate government interest in order for the law to be constitutional. More often than not, 
when the Court uses rational basis scrutiny, the law in question is upheld as constitutional. 
 
12 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976). 
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held that deportation was not punishment. This proposition that immigration proceedings 
are distinct from criminal proceedings because deportation is not punishment is a legal 
fiction that still exists today. The Court’s classification of immigration proceedings as 
legally distinct from criminal proceedings has led the Court to deny immigrants the 
constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants. Because the Court held that 
deportation is not punishment, it was able to justify denying due process protections to 
immigrants in deportation proceedings, even though Fifth Amendment due process rights 
are foundational to the U.S. Constitution.13 
 The Court’s classification of immigration proceedings as distinct from criminal 
proceedings and the Court’s deference to Congress and the executive in all matters 
concerning immigration has resulted in a rigid and complex immigration system. 
Constitutional protections that apply in criminal proceedings do not apply in immigration 
proceedings, which are administrative and civil in nature. There is little judicial discretion 
because Congress continues to legislate mandatory detention and deportation for 
violation of a wide range of crimes. Immigration Judges are therefore forced to apply the 
law, regardless of individual and unique circumstances. Working within the system to 
restore rights to immigrants in detention and deportation proceedings is increasingly 
difficult because of the rigidity of the immigration system. 
 
2.  International Law as the Solution to Immigrant Human Rights Abuses 
This rigid system and immigrants’ inability to assert their rights have led legal 
scholars to look to international human rights laws and the U.S.’s obligations under 
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international law as a way to restore immigrant rights in the United States. The domestic 
laws governing immigration law and enforcement are currently unable to protect the 
human rights of immigrants. It has become well established under U.S. law that 
immigrants have few constitutional rights in their immigration proceedings. However, 
while the federal government has the authority to regulate immigration, its enforcement 
policies and enforcement practices must comport with international human rights 
standards. The United States has signed and ratified several international human rights 
treaties and because of that, it has an obligation to comport with international law in its 
immigration policy. 
Of the treaties the United States has signed and ratified, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
and the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) are 
the ones that pertain most to immigrant rights in the United States. There are many other 
international treaties that govern immigrant rights: the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities. Each of these treaties have provisions that protect immigrant rights; 
however, the U.S.’s obligations under those treaties are less clear, as the United States 
has not signed and/or ratified them. 
The way the United States detains and deports immigrants is in direct violation of 
the right to liberty under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
 26 
ICCPR.14 While the UDHR is not a binding legal document, the U.S. has signed and 
ratified the ICCPR, which is a binding international covenant. It therefore is obligated to 
comport with ICCPR provisions respecting an individual’s right to liberty.15 The right to 
liberty also protects an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention and 
declares that no person can be deprived of his liberty without due process.16  
The way the U.S. treats immigrants in detention also directly violates 
international human rights laws that require the U.S. government to respect individuals’ 
human dignity. As a signatory to the ICCPR, the U.S. is legally obligated to protect 
individuals from “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”17 and it must 
treat all people deprived of liberty with humanity and human dignity.18 Similarly, the U.S. 
is legally obligated under CAT to protect individuals from torture or other “acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”19 Torture is explicitly defined under 
CAT, the ICCPR nor CAT define “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” 
(CIDT). However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has clarified the 
parameters CIDT as it relates to detained people. As a member of the Organization of 
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17 Id. at art. 7. 
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American States (OAS), the United States is, under international law, required to comply 
with IACHR decisions. 
U.S. immigration policy, as a whole, violates the right to family and private life 
under the ICCPR. The ICCPR requires all member states to protect individuals from 
“arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy [or] family.”20 International law 
recognizes family as the “fundamental group unit of society” and the law requires states 
to protect the family; the right to family and private life is a fundamental right just as the 
right to liberty and the right to be free from torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment are fundamental rights. The IACHR has explained 
and defined the right to family and private life and how those rights relate to individual 
rights. As a member of the OAS and signatory to the ICCPR and CAT, the U.S. is legally 
obligated to respect the right to family and private life under international law. 
 Finally, the United States has signed and ratified the Refugee Convention, which 
explicitly defines a state party’s legal obligations to all refugees and asylum-seekers 
under international law. These legal obligations expressly limit the ways and means by 
which a state can deport refugees and asylum-seekers, and the ways in which a state can 
detain refugees and asylum-seekers.21 Currently, U.S. immigration policy is in violation 
of the international laws governing refugees and asylum-seekers. As a member of the 
Refugee Convention and even more importantly, because the U.S. has incorporated large 
portions of the Refugee Convention into its domestic laws, the United States is in 
violation of international law. 
                                                
20 ICCPR supra note 14 at art. 17(1). 
 
21 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force 
(April 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
 28 
 
3.  International Law and Its Accessibility to Immigrants in Their Immigration 
Proceedings 
Eduardo and Sergio cannot challenge the constitutionality of their detention, nor 
can they claim they are entitled to greater due process protections in their immigration 
proceedings. However, even though U.S. case law clearly excludes Sergio and Eduardo 
from protection under the U.S. Constitution, both Eduardo and Sergio, as human beings, 
are thus protected by international human rights laws. The United States, as a signatory 
and member of the ICCPR, CAT, the Refugee Convention and as a member of the OAS 
and bound by the IACHR, is legally obligated to respect Sergio and Eduardo’s human 
rights as defined under international law. 
However, Sergio and Eduardo are protected under international human rights 
laws. If the United States is in direct violation of international law, and those laws protect 
individuals like Sergio and Eduardo, can they challenge their detention and assert their 
rights in U.S. immigration proceedings? According to the courts, the resounding answer 
is no, they cannot. IJ’s, DHS trial attorneys, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
U.S. Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court have continuously refused to acknowledge 
international law in immigration proceedings. The administrative and civil nature of 
immigration proceedings leave little room for international laws and at best, U.S. courts 
view international law as persuasive, non-binding authority. Attorneys practicing 
immigration law do not use international law to argue for their clients’ civil and political 
rights in immigration proceedings and IJ’s do not acknowledge international law in their 
opinions. Legal briefs and memoranda are limited to domestic U.S. law, where 
immigrants have few rights. 
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Not only are Sergio and Eduardo excluded from protection by the Constitution, 
but they are also excluded from asserting their human rights, rights that they are legally 
entitled to under international law. In a time when international human rights discourse 
has become a prominent means of empowering individuals, people like Sergio and 
Eduardo, and countless others facing detention and deportation in the United States, are 
unable to argue that international law protects them. The 400,000 people deported, or 
forcibly removed, from the United States in 2012 were unable to challenge their 
deportation or their detention. The 2 million people forcibly removed from the United 
States between 1997 and 2014 were left with no recourse, no means to challenge their 
imprisonment and their banishment.  
Arguing that the U.S. should comport with its international legal obligations may 
motivate Congress or the executive to change the way in which the government treats 
immigrants in the United States. However, international law has done little to help those 
currently facing deportation and those currently subject to deplorable detention 
conditions.22 Immigrants cannot use international law to challenge the legality of their 
detention in U.S. courts, nor can they use international law to claim the government is 
violating their human rights in U.S. courts.23 Simply put, although the United States is in 
stark violation of its obligations under international law, international law cannot help 
immigrants in their deportation proceedings. Continuing to call on the United States to 
                                                
22 Barbara MacGrady, Resort to International Human Rights Law in Challenging Conditions in 
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obey international law has not, and very likely will not, help people like Sergio and 
Eduardo. 
 
4. Shifting the Discussion: The Importance of History to Help Us Understand 
and Change Current Immigration Policies 
Instead of examining U.S. immigration policy by how it is violating international 
law, this thesis explores U.S. immigration policy from an historical legal perspective. It 
will examine the historical roots of immigration law and policy in the United States, 
placing particular emphasis on the role racism, nativism and xenophobia played in 
limiting immigrants’ access to their constitutional rights in immigration proceedings. 
This historical legal analysis will also explore international law and its relation to 
immigration policy, but from a slightly different perspective. Rather than portraying 
international law as a tool for challenging immigrant detention and deportation in 
immigration courts, this thesis will analyze how international law has actually contributed 
to the current immigration system, where immigrants have so few rights in their 
immigration proceedings. 
 Recognizing and understanding the role of racism, xenophobia and nativism in 
shaping our current immigration policy will demonstrate how racism, nativism and 
xenophobia continue to play an important role in immigration law and policy. All too 
often, proponents of stricter immigration enforcement through the further criminalization 
of immigration and greater emphasis on detention and deportation, claim their position is 
based on national security and economic concerns. However, racism and xenophobia 
continues to underlie anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States. Even though the U.S. 
prides itself on being a “country of immigrants” and a country that has abolished overt 
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racism, racism and discrimination continue to plague our immigration policies and 
continue to inform our perceptions of immigrants in this country. 
 In declining to analyze U.S. immigration policies as a violation of international 
law and in choosing not to argue that the U.S. government should comport with its legal 
obligations under international law, I am attempting to shift the discussion away from 
international law as the solution to this problem. Instead, this thesis portrays international 
law from a different perspective. It discusses how international law has played a role in 
shaping our current immigration policies and thus has contributed to the rights crisis 
facing immigrants in the United States. Although today, international law has little 
weight in immigration proceedings in the United States, in early U.S. immigration policy 
history, the Supreme Court (and the executive) used international legal principles of 
sovereignty to justify federal control over immigration and to justify the exclusion of 
immigrants from membership and constitutional protection. The government used 
international law very strategically and this paper will portray this particular aspect of 
international law in immigration policy. 
Through depicting international law as part of the problem, I do not mean to 
imply that international law has no meaning for immigrants in the United States. 
International human rights treaties and international law are vital to our understanding of 
human rights in an increasingly globalized world. The UDHR and human rights treaties 
like the ICCPR and the ICESCR provide a valuable framework for discussing and 
promoting the rights all human beings deserve. However, this thesis simply points out 
that people like Sergio and Eduardo cannot use international law to either challenge their 
detention or their deportation. Attorneys practicing immigration law do not use 
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international law to fight for their clients’ right to stay in the United States. I am 
attempting to shift the immigrant rights discussion to other, more promising solutions. In 
doing so, I highlight racism and xenophobia to remind us that the way we perceive people 
from other cultures and backgrounds still influences the way we treat each other and the 
way we determine who belongs and who is excluded. 
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CHAPTER III  
U.S. IMMIGRATION HISTORY: INITIAL FEDERAL IMMIGRATION 
REGULATION THROUGH IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (INA) OF 
1965  
 
1. Federal Control of Immigration Policy and Chinese Exclusion 
 From the U.S.’s birth in 1776 until the late 1880s, the United States had almost no 
immigration policy to speak of.24 Although there were no federal restrictions on who was 
allowed to enter the country, the states enacted laws directed at excluding certain groups. 
The first federal restrictions on immigration were passed in 1882 and until that time, 
immigration was primarily state-regulated and the federal government had a small role in 
regulating immigration. 25 Each individual state had the power to admit or exclude 
immigrants based on its own policies.26 Generally, immigrants were excluded on criminal 
grounds or due to poverty or disease.27 Typically, states attempted to keep undesirable 
immigrants out through these restrictions. Immigrants who were excluded because of 
poverty or disease were immigrants of color from non-Western European nations. These 
restrictions exemplify the early connections between race and immigration in the United 
States. 
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In the late nineteenth-century, the federal government began to take more control 
of immigration enforcement; it did so through its powers under the Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution. For example, in the 1849 Passenger Cases, the Supreme Court 
invalidated certain State laws that required immigrants pay a “head tax” upon entering 
the state.28 The Court based its power to invalidate state “head tax” laws on the 
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the sole authority to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce.29 Because the majority of immigrants during this time came as slaves 
and indentured workers, the federal government’s power to invalidate state head taxes 
was thus held by the Supreme Court to be constitutional.30 The 1849 Passenger Cases 
marked the shift toward federal control of immigration.31 
After the 1849 Passenger Cases, immigration policy was controlled at both the 
state and federal levels. While each State still had the authority to deny immigration 
based on criminality, disease and poverty during this time period, the federal government 
greatly encouraged immigration and few immigrants were turned away.32 The federal 
government took away more State authority to regulate immigration through the 
Immigration Act of 1864, which in addition to encouraging Chinese immigration, created 
the commissioner of immigration under the authority of the secretary of state.33 
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 Although immigration was encouraged during the 1860s to keep up with labor 
demands, by the mid 1870s immigrants were less welcomed.34 States became increasingly 
concerned with the growing number of immigrants, particularly those from China, and 
anti-Chinese/anti-immigrant sentiment led to the first federal exercise of its immigration 
exclusion power.35 California in particular, was concerned about the influx of Asian 
immigrants and pushed the federal government to enact laws restricting immigration 
from China and other parts of Asia. Anti-immigrant sentiment toward the Chinese and 
other immigrants heavily influenced immigration policies during this period.  
The Federal government responded to state concerns about Asian immigrants with 
the Page Act of 1875, which excluded people convicted of certain crimes, prostitutes and 
expressly excluded all Asian laborers who had been brought to the U.S involuntarily.36 
Underlying the federal government’s explicit exclusion of prostitutes was the attempt to 
prohibit Chinese women from immigrating to the United States. Excluding Asian women 
was an attempt to keep the United States demographically white, and many white 
Americans feared that allowing Chinese women to immigrate would lead Chinese men to 
establish families and change the “Western” culture of the United States.37 
 States with larger numbers of Asian immigrants were much more likely to resort 
to anti-immigrant violence and propaganda. Fears of the changing racial demographic led 
to virulent anti-immigrant sentiment, directed primarily at the Chinese and other 
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“nonwhite” immigrants.38 California, which had a large Asian population, lashed out 
violently toward Asian immigrants and the state legislature enacted laws aimed at 
curtailing Asian immigrants’ civil and human rights.39 For example, the California 
Supreme Court upheld the extension to Asian immigrants, a law that prohibited African 
Americans and Native Americans from testifying in criminal proceedings.40 Race played 
a prominent role in the decision; the court described the Chinese as “a distinct ... race of 
people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or 
intellectual development beyond a certain point.”41 The public perception that the 
Chinese were “barbaric” and “inferior” was prominent on both the state and federal level. 
Concerns over Chinese competition for American laborers and fears of an Asian 
“invasion” led the states to push the federal government to enact greater restrictions on 
immigration from Asia. 
 In 1876, the federal government took total control of the immigration system and 
States no longer had the authority to regulate immigration.42 The rationale behind 
eliminating individual states’ power to regulate immigration came from the Supreme 
Court, which held that immigration was a regulation of commerce and thus exclusively 
under federal control through the Commerce Clause.43 Because the mood in the United 
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States had shifted from pro-immigration to concern over the numbers of immigrants (and 
the racial composition of immigrants) arriving in the U.S., states petitioned the federal 
government to restrict the number of immigrants allowed to enter the country.44 The 
government responded with the Immigration Act of 1882, which was the first 
comprehensive immigration law in U.S. history.45 In addition to the first comprehensive 
immigration laws, the Immigration Act of 1882, the first of what are known as the 
Chinese Exclusion acts, was the first official race-based limitation on immigration. The 
Immigration Act of 1882, in essence, barred all Chinese immigrants from entering the 
United States.46  
In addition to severely limiting Chinese immigration, the Act established a return 
certificate system for Chinese immigrants already living and working in the United 
States. The return certificates were issued to Chinese men who wished to travel abroad. 
In order to reenter the United States, Chinese immigrants had to apply for a return 
certificate or they would be barred from reentry. This certificate system made it difficult 
for Chinese immigrants to leave the country to visit family members who were denied 
entry to the United States. Before leaving the country, a Chinese immigrant had to apply 
for and be granted a return certificate; he would have to present the return certificate or 
he would be denied entry along with all other Chinese immigrants attempting to enter the 
U.S. for the first time. The return certificate system was an attempt to further limit 
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Chinese immigration to the United States and was used as a means to deny rights to 
Chinese immigrants already admitted. 
 Two things occurred during this particular shift from state immigration control to 
federal immigration control. First, from the initial state regulations on immigration to the 
federal Immigration Act of 1882, immigrants could be excluded from entering the United 
States; however, there were no laws in place to expel immigrants once they had entered 
the country.47 Second, at this point in history the nation state’s sovereign power to 
exclude aliens from its borders was well established.48 In addition to the universally 
accepted international custom that a nation has the sovereign power to exclude anyone 
from its borders for any reason, the Supreme Court held in several cases that the federal 
government’s exclusive power to regulate immigration came from the Commerce Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution.49 In later cases, the Court moved away from the Commerce 
Clause as the rationale behind federal power to regulate immigration, however, 
sovereignty and powers inherent in sovereignty continued to play a key role in the 
expansion of the federal immigration power.50 
 With the Immigration Act of 1884, the federal government solidified the federal 
government’s sole authority to exclude immigrants from the United States. Although 
there was no question that the U.S. Constitution explicitly granted Congress this power, 
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the limits of that power had not been tested in the courts.51 In the Chinese Exclusion 
cases, decided in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court began to expand 
legislative and executive powers through the plenary power doctrine. The plenary power 
doctrine essentially granted the legislative and executive branches the power and 
authority to control immigration, with virtually no limitations or oversight from the 
Judicial branch. It was during this time that Congress began to not only pass laws 
excluding immigrants, but also began to pass laws that allowed the government to expel 
immigrants already admitted to the United States.   
In 1888, six years after passing its first exclusionary immigration act directed at 
curtailing Chinese immigration, Congress passed the Scott Act, which not only prohibited 
all Chinese workers from immigrating, but also eliminated all return certificates and 
cancelled all outstanding return certificates.52 Eliminating the return certificate system 
and cancelling all outstanding return certificates meant that any Chinese resident, who 
was abroad when the Scott Act was passed, would be unable to reenter the country with 
his return certificate, even though when he left the country, the law allowed for him to 
reenter the country with his return certificate.53  
The Scott Act was challenged for its constitutionality and the Supreme Court 
further expanded the federal government’s power to exclude in Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States.54 In that case, the Court addressed the issue of whether Congress had the 
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authority under the Constitution to retroactively terminate the right of an immigrant 
resident to reenter the United States.55 Chae Chan Ping had been a legal resident of the 
United States for twelve years. Prior to the enactment of the Scott Act, Chae Chan Ping 
had acquired a return certificate, allowing him to re-enter the United States after a 
temporary visit to China. While Chae Chan Ping was out of the country, the Scott Act 
was passed and as mentioned above, the act declared invalid all return certificates, even 
those still pending. When Chae Chan Ping arrived in the United States, he was denied 
entry. The Court held that Congress did have constitutional authority to expel a lawful 
immigrant resident. 
The Court’s decision in Chae Chan Ping also expanded Congress’s power to 
enact domestic legislation that directly conflicted with foreign treaties. The Court held 
that the Scott Act trumped any prior treaty-based rights of travel.56 This gave Congress 
the power to “legally abrogate a treaty by simply passing a contrary statute.”57 By giving 
Congress the power to pass a domestic statute and effectively override any treaty where 
there was a contradiction, the Court greatly expanded Congress’s powers in the realm of 
foreign relations. Additionally, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 
Interestingly, the Court did not rely on the Commerce Clause, as it had in previous cases. 
Instead, the Court held that Congress’s power to regulate immigration was “extra-
constitutional, plenary, and ‘inherent in sovereignty.’”58 This meant “that, unlike other 
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actions of the government, which must be justified by reference to a specific source of 
constitutional authority and must comply with constitutional standards, such as those of 
due process, immigration laws would receive only the most minimal sort of judicial 
review, if any.”59 
Racism directly influenced the Court’s decision in Chae Chan Ping. Justice Field 
“described at painful length how Chinese immigrants came into competition with ‘our’ 
laborers and artisans, competed with ‘our’ people and how their immigration had ‘the 
character of an Oriental invasion.’”60 Justice Field’s overtly racist depiction of Chinese 
immigrants was characteristic of the national discourse of immigration policy. Senate 
debates over further restricting rights for Chinese immigrants already admitted the United 
States demonstrate the racist ideologies that influenced immigration policies during this 
era. For example, Senator Felton from California proposed requiring all Chinese to carry 
certificates of residents and those found without a certificate after one year should be 
forcibly removed from the country. In support of resident certificates, the Senator 
explained “the Chinese come to the countries adjoining us, pass over the border, and the 
instant that they are here it is very difficult, almost impossible to distinguish one from the 
other.”61 He also asserted that “the Chinese have no morals, no regard whatever for the 
sanctity of an oath. With them the end justifies the means, and the end is to come in here 
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and possess themselves of what we have and return to their own country with it, and let 
another herd come and take their place.”62  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the 
federal government’s power over immigrants increased substantially. Congress enacted 
laws aimed at further limiting the ability of immigrants to enter the country and began to 
look for ways to take rights away from Chinese and other Asian immigrants already 
admitted to the Untied States. In 1891, Congress passed another Immigration Act which 
expanded the list of immigrants who were categorically excluded from entering the 
United States.63 In addition to the exclusion of Chinese immigrants through the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act, the 1891 Immigration Act excluded polygamists, people with 
contagious diseases and any immigrants “likely to become a public charge.”64 The Act 
also included the first reference to the federal government’s power not only to exclude, 
but also to expel, or deport noncitizens. The act provided that any immigrant who 
successfully entered the United States, but should have been excluded, could be deported 
if found within one year of entry.65 
Congress further expanded its power to expel immigrants through the passage of 
the Geary law in 1892. The Geary law required all Chinese in the United States to prove 
their legal status by applying for a certificate of residence.66 Anyone of Chinese descent 
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who was found without a valid certificate could be deported unless he could prove he was 
legally present in the country and that his failure to have a certificate of residence was 
reasonable.67 The Geary Act also required that to prove legal residence, every Chinese 
descendant must have one white witness testify on his behalf. Like the Scott Act, the 
constitutionality of the Geary Act was challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court.68 
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the white witness provision of the Geary Act. Again, the Court pointed to the inherent 
sovereign right to expel and deport noncitizens and Congress’s ultimate authority to 
determine who can enter the country and who can be expelled from the country.69 The 
majority concluded that “the power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest 
upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, 
and are in truth but parts of one and the same power.”70 In both Chae Chan Ping and 
Fong Yue Ting, the Court found that Congress has not only the authority to pass laws 
excluding noncitizens from entering the United States, but that power also extends to 
expelling (or deporting) noncitizens who have already entered the United States.71 
According to the Court, noncitizens “remain subject to the power of Congress to expel 
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them...whenever in [Congress’s] judgment their removal is necessary or expedient for the 
public interest.”72 
In addition to holding that Congress has the ultimate authority to exclude and 
expel noncitizens as it sees fit, the Court held that a deportation proceeding was by no 
means a criminal trial or criminal proceeding.73 This holding stretched Congress’s power 
over noncitizens even further than in Chae Chan Ping. A deportation proceeding, 
according to the Court, is not punishment and is “in no proper sense a trial and sentence 
for a crime or offense.”74 This is significant because defining a deportation proceeding as 
purely a civil proceeding, noncitizens do not have the same procedural or substantive due 
process rights that the constitution requires for criminal proceedings, such as the Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel and a trial by jury, the Eighth Amendment right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure.75 This is also significant because the Court’s decision in 
Fong Yue Ting could be interpreted to apply to legal permanent residents in the same way 
it applies to immigrants who are in the United States without documentation.76 A long-
term legal permanent resident would have virtually no constitutional rights in 
immigration proceedings, regardless of their ties to the United States.  
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 Like in Chae Chan Ping, the Court’s decision in Fong Yue Ting rested heavily on 
racist anti-immigrant ideology. The law at issue in Fong Yue Ting was facially racist; the 
law allowed only white witnesses to testify on behalf of a Chinese immigrant’s status as 
legal resident. Many in the legal community considered the law unconstitutional because 
it was overtly discriminatory.77 The Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the law was thus 
surprising and the precedent set in Fong Yue Ting has had great repercussions for 
deportation law even today.78 The Fourteenth Amendment was passed nearly a quarter of 
a century before the Court’s decision in Fong Yue Ting; however, the Court expressly 
held that Congress has the unbridled power to enact immigration laws it deems necessary 
to protect the public interest. This incredibly broad holding essentially removed 
noncitizens, whether legally present or not, from the reach of Equal Protection Clause of 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 Although the Court upheld the white witness provision of the Geary Act, it 
invalidated another contested provision of the Act in Wong Wing v. United States. Under 
the contested provision, any Chinese immigrant found to be in the country illegally could 
be sentenced up to one year of hard labor.79 The constitutionality of this provision was 
challenged due to the fact that an immigrant would be sentenced to a year of hard labor 
without a jury trial.80 The Court found that temporary confinement or detention of 
noncitizens was constitutional “as part of the means necessary to give effect to the 
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provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens.” But, the particular provision 
sentencing an immigrant to one year of hard labor was unconstitutional because it was 
not necessary. Rather, the Court labeled it “infamous punishment.”81 The Court 
distinguished between a detention that was necessary in order to give effect to provisions 
in the law that excluded or expelled noncitizens, and between punishment in the criminal 
sense. According to the Court, when Congress passes a law that subjects noncitizens to 
“infamous punishment at hard labor or by confiscating their property,” to be valid, the 
policy “must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.”82  
Although the Court attempted to develop a bright-line distinction between the 
means necessary to enforce immigration laws and “infamous punishment,” the Court did 
not resolve the question of “how to draw the line between what might be termed 
regulatory deportation procedures and those punitive deportation procedures that require 
constitutional protections” afforded to criminal defendants like the right to a trial by jury, 
right to counsel and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.83 The Court 
held that “deprivation of liberty, absent more, is not necessarily punishment.”84 The lack 
of a bright-line distinction between punitive deportation laws and regulatory deportation 
laws set the stage for the current convergence between criminal law and immigration law 
that we see today. 
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 One other case in this era deserves mention. In Yamataya v. Fisher, the Supreme 
Court established the basic due process required in immigration proceedings.85 The Court 
found that “an alien who has entered the country and has become subject to its 
jurisdiction and a part its population” deserves a process that complies with constitutional 
due process norms.86 It is important to note that the Court held that noncitizens have the 
right to procedural due process only.87 According to the Court, the deportation process 
“could not be ‘arbitrary,’ and the ‘alien’ must, at a minimum, be given an opportunity to 
be heard.”88 This case has not been overruled and today, immigrants facing deportation 
receive only procedural due process; they have no substantive due process rights in 
deportation proceedings. 
 Racism, nativism and anti-immigrant sentiments during this era all played an 
important role in the Court’s denial of substantive constitutional rights to immigrants. 
Chinese immigrants were initially welcomed because demand for low-wage labor was 
high; the discovery of gold in California and the building of a transnational railway 
system created a need for cheap immigrant labor. As the racial composition of the 
country began to shift, fears that nonwhite immigrants would outnumber white 
Americans influenced the racist overtones in immigration law and policy during this 
period. Economic recessions fueled anti-immigrant sentiment and white laborers 
increasingly targeted Chinese immigrants, who became scapegoats for the economic 
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recession. Virtually all immigration laws passed during this period facially discriminated 
against immigrants of color. This overt racism can be seen not only in Supreme Court 
decisions, but also in the public and political discourse surrounding immigration 
regulation. 
 
2. Twentieth-Century Immigration Policies: Extension of Racial Exclusion to 
Other Groups and Emergence of Deportation Regime  
 At the beginning of the twentieth century it was well established that the federal 
government had the power to deport and exclude noncitizens. Congress’s power to pass 
immigration regulations came from inherent rights of sovereignty and was an extra-
constitutional power. The Executive and Judicial branches of the government gave wide 
deference to any laws Congress passed regulating immigration. Although Congress 
passed the first exclusionary laws in 1882, it wasn’t until 1892 that Congress passed laws 
that enabled the government to deport greater numbers of noncitizens. Relatively few 
deportations were actually carried out until years later.89 Between 1892 and 1907, for 
example, the federal government deported only a few hundred people each year.90 That 
number increased dramatically between 1908 and 1920, when the government deported 
between 2,000 and 3,000 people per year.91 The numbers of deportations continued to 
increase as Congress passed more restrictive immigration policies and by 1929, the 
annual deportations had risen to over 38,000 people.92 
                                                
89 Id. 
 
90 Id. 
 
91 Id. 
 
92 Id. 
 49 
 As the U.S. began to develop a more regulated immigration system, the 
government began to put tighter restrictions on immigrants who had been legally 
admitted to the country. As was the case with immigration prior to federal control of the 
system, immigration was encouraged due to labor demands that required a large working 
class. The industrial revolution required a large pool of low-wage labor and because there 
was such a great need for immigrant labor, not all immigrants of color could be excluded. 
The United States needed cheap immigrant labor from developing countries to meet labor 
demands. Because it was unable to simply exclude all “undesirable” immigrants, the 
federal government began asserting its control over certain groups of immigrants through 
post-entry social control mechanisms.93 Immigrants who did not abide by legal and moral 
expectations faced the threat of deportation. During the early to mid twentieth-century, 
the federal government began to focus more on deportation as a means to control the 
types of immigrants entering the country. Deportation was used as a way to control 
immigrants once they had already been formally (legally) admitted into the country.94  
 Noncitizens faced deportation on two main grounds: poverty and criminal 
activity. The Scott Act of 1891 allowed the government to deport any immigrant who 
became a public charge within one year of entry. In 1917, that one-year period was 
increased to five years.95 Any noncitizen who became a public charge within five years of 
entering the United States could face deportation, thus increasing the ability of the 
government to deport admissible immigrants. After 1917, the types of crimes requiring 
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deportation were also expanded, further increasing the federal government’s control over 
immigrants already admitted to the United States.96 The Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Chae Chan Ping, Wong Wing, and Fong Yue Ting facilitated the expansion of federal 
control over immigrants already living in the country. The restrictions on post-entry 
conduct applied to all immigrants, regardless of immigration status. Congress was able to 
expand deportability grounds with no judicial oversight because the Court had granted 
Congress and the executive branch such expansive powers over immigration and the 
judicial branch had established the federal power to deport which came from international 
principles of sovereignty.97 
 Just as the first immigration policies were influenced by extreme racism toward 
Chinese and other Asian immigrants and overt discrimination, the immigration policies 
enacted in the early to late twentieth century were also motivated by racism and 
xenophobia. In 1924, Congress established the nation’s first immigration quota system 
under the Johnson-Reed Act.98 The quota system was designed to limit immigration from 
certain “undesirable” countries in Europe, while continuing to ban immigration from 
China, Japan, India and most other Asian countries.99 Under the national origins quota 
system, immigrant visas were given out based on national origin (or race). Fewer visas 
were allocated for immigrants from “less desirable” countries like those in eastern and 
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southern Europe. Congress wanted to encourage immigration from “desirable” western 
European nations and thus allocated more visas to immigrants from those countries.100  
 By establishing a national origins quota system, race became the central feature in 
determining whether one would be excluded from the United States. In focusing on race 
as a way to regulate immigration, the federal government effectively “made racial 
exclusion a central component of twentieth-century immigration, naturalization, and 
deportation law.”101 Although the purported rationale for the national origins quota 
system was to preserve “American culture and values,” the quota system was actually 
motivated by fears of “nonwhite” immigrants “flooding” the country with poverty, 
disease and crime. 102 This is evident by the fact that the immigration quotas were 
calculated based on the racial composition of the United States in the very early twentieth 
century, excluding Native Americans, descendants of African slaves, Asians and all 
countries in central and Latin America. 
 The national origins quota system was facially race-based. The government 
restricted visas based explicitly on the nationality or race of the immigrant seeking entry. 
The system was expressly discriminatory; however, it was upheld as constitutional and 
within Congress’s power to regulate immigration. The national origins quota system not 
only limited the number of immigrants of color from developing nations in Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Southern Europe, but the Act also restricted which immigrants would be 
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eligible to become U.S. citizens, a process called naturalization.103 Under the Act, certain 
noncitizens were ineligible to naturalize. Not surprisingly, Asian immigrants and other 
“nonwhite” immigrants from Europe were excluded from citizenship.104 The Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the ban on naturalization for immigrants of “less 
desirable” races.105  
Individual states continued to enact laws limiting the rights of noncitizens of 
color. Combined with the federal laws limiting citizenship to white immigrants primarily 
from Western Europe, thus immigrants of color were excluded even further from 
American society. For instance, many states passed “alien land laws” in the early 
twentieth century. These laws restricted land ownership to people eligible for citizenship. 
Combined with the federal restrictions on which immigrants could naturalize and become 
citizens, these “alien land laws” acted as a way to keep Asian immigrants from owning 
land.106 As with other laws passed in this era, the “alien land laws” were supported 
primarily by racist propaganda aimed directly at Chinese, Indian and Japanese 
immigrants. Although the laws were racially motivated, the Supreme Court upheld these 
laws as constitutional.107 
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3.  Immigration from Mexico and Latin America 
 Asian immigrants and immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were not the 
only ethnic groups that experienced overt discrimination during the late-nineteenth 
century to mid-twentieth century. Although most of the immigration case law during this 
period focused on Chinese and Asian immigrant rights, immigrants from Latin America, 
particularly from Mexico, also experienced overt discrimination and were denied 
constitutional rights. The border between the United States and Mexico has an interesting 
history. Until the 1920s, immigration between the two countries was relatively 
unhindered. As the federal government began to enact laws restricting immigration from 
Asia, the border between Mexico and the U.S. became more defined. Because much of 
the case law focuses on Chinese and Asian immigration, this section explores the similar 
experiences Mexican immigrants faced in the early to mid twentieth century. 
Prior to 1930, migration from Mexico was generally welcomed. Although the 
1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo created a definitive boundary between the U.S. and 
Mexico, movement across the border was relatively unhindered.108 While U.S. 
immigration policies focused on stemming the flow of Chinese immigrants in the late 
1800s, U.S. citizens saw Mexican migration as beneficial to the economy.109 Mexican 
migrants were “ideal” laborers because they worked for several months in the U.S. and 
then returned to Mexico. In fact, because the government placed so many restrictions on 
Chinese and other Asian immigration, Mexican immigrants were recruited to fill the 
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labor gap. Unlike other groups of immigrants, the majority of Mexican migrants did not 
settle permanently in the United States. Consequently, the tendency for Mexican migrants 
to return to Mexico helped to generate a perception that Mexican immigrants were more 
desirable than Chinese immigrants.110 
 With the increasing enforcement of the Chinese exclusion laws and the expansion 
of the agricultural industry, the federal government began to actively recruit Mexican 
workers.111 Between 50,000 and 80,000 Mexicans immigrated to the Southwest. Although 
they received a mixed welcome from the U.S. public, Mexican migrants were generally 
more accepted than the Chinese. It was clear, however, that Mexican immigrants were in 
no way considered to be part of the American public. For example, Mexican immigrants 
were likened to Chinese immigrants in that their skill in agricultural work was “of a type 
‘to which the oriental and the Mexican due to their crouching and bending habits are fully 
adapted.’”112 Mexican immigrants and immigrants from Central and South America were, 
like the Chinese, considered to be an inferior race by much of the white population.  
The initial acceptance of Mexican immigrants diminished over time as a changing 
economic climate and changing racial demographic created new concerns among the 
white majority over the “influx” of nonwhite immigrants. Violence toward Mexican 
immigrants was well documented during this period as anti-Mexican sentiment grew. As 
with anti-Chinese sentiment, the violence directed at Mexican immigrants was deeply 
rooted in racist and nativist attitudes of the American public.  
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Although there was a growing concern over Mexican immigration during this 
period, the federal government did not take steps to prohibit Mexican migration as it had 
with immigration from Asia and Southern/Eastern Europe.113 For example, the Johnson-
Reed Act, which placed a numerical limit on Asian immigrants, contained no such 
restrictions on immigration from the Western Hemisphere.114 Mexican immigrants, along 
with Central and Latin American immigrants, thus continued to be a cheap source of 
immigrant labor. Migration from Mexico ebbed during times of racial strife but also 
increased in response to labor shortages in the United States.  
While the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act did not expressly place a quota on immigration 
from Mexico, Congress enacted laws in the same year that were aimed at limiting extra-
legal or undocumented immigrants. Those laws had a great effect on Mexican 
immigrants, which made up a large percentage of the undocumented immigrant 
population in the United States.115 In an attempt to penalize undocumented immigration, 
the federal government eliminated the statute of limitations on immigrants who had 
overstayed their visa. The government also began to enforce laws that penalized 
immigrants who entered the country without ever securing a valid visa. Eliminating the 
statute of limitations meant that anyone in the country without documentation or without 
current documentation was deportable, regardless of when he or she entered the country. 
                                                
113 Id. at 157. 
 
114 Id. 
 
115 Id. at 158. 
 
 56 
Many Mexican immigrants fell into this category and were subsequently deported from 
the United States.116 
 The federal government also used the public charge, health, and criminal 
provisions of immigration law to exclude Mexican immigrants.117 Large numbers of 
Mexican immigrants who attempted to enter the country through legal means were denied 
entry on the basis of their health, while others were denied because immigration officials 
found they would likely become a public charge.118 Additionally, Mexican immigrants 
were denied entry based on their criminal history. Thus, although the Johnson-Reed Act 
did not place a quota on immigrants coming from Mexico, the number of Mexican 
immigrants admitted dropped along with the number of Asian immigrants. For example, 
between 1923-1929, the number of Mexican immigrants admitted dropped from an 
annual average of 62,000 to just 2,500, and in 1930, no visas were issued to Mexican 
nationals.119 
 In 1924, the federal government created the U.S. Border Patrol. Although the 
border patrol began as a relatively small immigration enforcement agency, early Border 
Patrol agents were armed and directed to strictly enforce the flow of immigrants entering 
the United States. The Border Patrol focused primarily on the southern border, which is 
unsurprising considering the perceived “threat” of undocumented Mexican migration at 
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the time. The government and the public was also concerned with the entry of Chinese 
and other Asian immigrants from the southern border.  
By creating a physical boundary through the establishment of a Border Patrol and 
through criminalizing undocumented immigration, the U.S. effectively defined Mexican 
immigrants and other immigrants of color as the “Other.”120 Illegal immigration became a 
defined category of immigration and further facilitated the denial of constitutional rights 
to certain groups of immigrants. The Johnson-Reed Act prohibited virtually all 
immigration from non-western (non-white) countries. Coupled with the criminalization of 
undocumented immigration, these restrictions ensured that the only groups of people 
allowed to legally enter the United States were immigrants with visas from Western 
Europe. “Illegal” immigrants and immigrants of color were conflated in the eyes of the 
American public. 
During the Great Depression, the government began to focus more on the 
deportation of noncitizens and Mexican migration during this period was characterized 
by massive deportations and voluntary expatriations. U.S. Citizen attitudes towards 
Mexicans became increasingly hostile as the Depression deepened. As unemployment 
increased, immigrants became scapegoats for the economic and social problems the U.S. 
faced. The period between 1929 and 1941 represents the first time in U.S.-Mexico history 
that large numbers of Mexicans were systematically deported and expatriated. During the 
years of the Great Depression, more than one million people of Mexican descent were 
forcibly deported from the United States.121 These massive deportations were a method 
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through which the United States attempted to remedy its economic problems. Throughout 
U.S. history, anti-immigrant sentiments have been at their most extreme during times of 
economic uncertainty.122 
After the start of World War II, Mexican migration was once again welcomed and 
even encouraged by the U.S. government. Because the war created severe agricultural 
shortages, the United States turned to Mexican labor as a means to stimulate the U.S. 
economy. Over 160,000 Mexicans, mostly farm workers from rural areas of Mexico, 
were recruited to work on U.S. farms in a program known as the Bracero Program. The 
Bracero Program was a guest worker program; it provided a way for Mexican 
immigrants to enter the country legally, but limited the duration of entry to one year.123 
Even though the U.S. government formalized this program through a bilateral treaty with 
Mexico, the demand for agricultural workers was so great that many farmers began to 
recruit migrants informally. Additionally, informal recruitment allowed employers to pay 
Mexican immigrants less and working conditions did not have to conform to the 
requirements of the program.124 Informal recruitment became a common practice and 
facilitated future undocumented migration from Mexico to the United States. 
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4.  1965 INA and the End of Race-Based Exclusion 
 
The national origins quota system was in place for half a century. The Civil 
Rights Movement in the 1960s influenced immigration policy in that race-based 
restrictions on immigration came under scrutiny. 1965 marked a shift in U.S. immigration 
law and policy; Congress passed the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which 
abolished all national origins quotas on immigrant visas.125 This act was significant in that 
it ultimately shaped the basis for the U.S.’s current immigration policy.  
Under the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, immigrants were no longer 
excluded based solely on their country of origin. Instead of race, family ties and skills 
became the primary bases for deciding who to admit and to exclude.126 Because of 
concerns that too many immigrants would be admissible to the United States, the 
government capped immigrant visas at 120,000 annually.127 Labor demands meant that 
initially, the ceiling on the number of immigrants did not include Mexico and other 
countries in Latin America because immigrants from those regions128 were a large low-
wage labor source. It wasn’t until 1976 that the annual ceiling on immigrant visas 
extended to all nations.129 After 1976, all countries had an annual limit of 20,000 visas. 
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The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, and its 1976 amendment changed not 
only U.S. immigration policy, but modified the flow of immigrants as well.130 Through 
the elimination of a race-based quota system and the implementation of an immigration 
system based on family ties and employment skills, the government opened the door to a 
diverse group of immigrants. Those who had been unable to immigrate because they were 
nationals of an “excluded” country or region, like China and most of Asia, were suddenly 
allowed to apply for a visa based on ties to family members already living in the United 
States. The emphasis on family ties changed the racial composition of immigrants 
entering the country. Fewer people emigrated from Western European nations and more 
immigrants from Asia and Latin America were admitted.131  
The switch from a race-based quota system to an immigration policy that focused 
on employment needs and skills also drastically changed the nature of immigration in the 
United States. Because there was a high demand for low-wage, low-skilled labor, 
immigrants from Mexico and Latin America were allowed to enter the country 
temporarily. As mentioned above, the 1965 Act instituted a ceiling of 120,000 visas per 
year. However, this ceiling did not apply to Latin America.132 By exempting Latin 
American immigrants from this limit, more immigrants from that region entered the 
country. Additionally, immigration from India increased substantially, primarily migrants 
with high skills seeking employment.133  
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 The 1976 extension of the immigrant visa ceiling to all countries, including 
Mexico and Latin America, also drastically altered the flow of immigrants. All countries 
had a maximum number of visas and that maximum was the same across all countries. In 
creating a cap of 20,000 visas for all countries, regardless of the higher demand for 
certain types of labor and the number of immigrants of that country already living in the 
United States, the government inadvertently influenced the levels of undocumented 
migration.134 The result of these automatic ceilings was a sharp rise in undocumented 
migration, mainly from Mexico and Central America. Because of its proximity to the 
United States, the inherent demand for low-wage labor, the desire many Mexican 
migrants had to earn a higher wage in the U.S., and the family ties already established in 
the United States, undocumented migration from Mexico skyrocketed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 U.S. IMMIGRATION HISTORY: 1965 INA THROUGH CURRENT U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICIES  
 
 As undocumented migration became more prevalent, media attention to the issue 
of undocumented migration became more frequent. Before 1950, the media rarely 
covered immigration issues. Between 1970 and 1972, the New York Times published only 
16 articles referencing immigration.135 However, between 1973 and 1980, the number sky 
rocketed; The New York Times published more than 57 articles referencing immigration 
issues each year.136 This increase in media coverage influenced public opinion on 
immigration and contributed to the growing national awareness of immigration as a 
problem.137 The late 1960s marked a period in U.S. history in which the public began to 
perceive the border “as dangerously out of control, as a porous line of defense against 
unprecedented numbers of potentially threatening unauthorized migrants.”138  
In the 1970s, undocumented migration first became part of the public debate and 
by the 1980s, public opposition to undocumented migration developed.139 The “tightening 
of the economy combined with an increasing number of arrivals of immigrants from 
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Latin America generated waves of anti-immigrant sentiment.”140 With increasing media 
attention and public outrage, politicians were forced to address the issue of 
undocumented immigration. The public concern over undocumented immigrants and 
concern over general U.S. immigration policy led Congress to pass the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). 
IRCA aimed to deter undocumented migration in four ways. First, it instituted 
employer sanctions for any U.S. employer who knowingly hired an undocumented 
worker. Second, IRCA significantly expanded Border Patrol resources in an attempt to 
block undocumented migrants from physically crossing the southern border. Third, 
undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. were granted amnesty, which provided them 
with a path to citizenship. Ironically, this method led to a large increase in family 
reunification visas, which in turn, raised the number of Mexican citizens petitioning for 
legal status. And lastly, IRCA gave the President ultimate authority to declare an 
immigration emergency. IRCA essentially legalized the foundation for another Operation 
Wetback, where vast numbers of Mexican immigrants were deported.141  
Virtually all immigration policies following IRCA further criminalized 
undocumented migration by expanding border enforcement budgets, by instituting more 
serious penalties on the hiring of undocumented workers, as well as by increasing the 
criminal severity of attempting to cross the border without inspection. Even legislation 
aimed at deterring crime and drug abuse had severe effects on immigration policy and 
further blended immigration regulation with the criminal justice system. 
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In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA). Although not 
specifically directed at immigration and the further criminalization of immigration, the 
ADAA did contain provisions that substantially impacted immigration regulation and the 
further criminalization of immigration violations. The debates within the House of 
Representatives prior to passing the ADAA demonstrate that the legislature was 
concerned with crime rates, particularly drug and weapons offenses committed by 
noncitizens.142 Therefore, the ADAA created a new category of deportable offenses: the 
aggravated felony.143 Under the ADAA, only murder and trafficking of drugs or weapons 
were classified as aggravated felonies.144 If a noncitizen was convicted of a crime defined 
as an aggravated felony at any time after admission to the United States, he or she was 
deportable and barred from entering the country for at least ten years.145 
Two years later, the Immigration Act of 1990 further criminalized immigration by 
expanding the list of crimes defined as aggravated felonies.146 The Immigration Act of 
1990 expanded the list of aggravated felonies to include “money laundering, crimes of 
violence for which the [noncitizen] received a sentence of more than five years in prison, 
and any conspiracy to commit these acts.”147 Although the purpose of the Immigration 
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Act of 1990 was to add to the list of “serious” crimes rendering a noncitizen deportable, 
the crimes added to the list were much less serious than those listed in the ADAA.148 As 
with the ADAA, there is evidence to suggest that the legislature was concerned with 
immigration, crime and national security.149 
The Immigration Act of 1990 also increased the bar on reentry for any noncitizen 
convicted of an aggravated felony from ten years to twenty years. The Act also limited 
discretionary relief for aggravated felons. Where previously, anyone facing deportation 
had the option to ask for a discretionary waiver of deportation, the Act made anyone 
convicted of an aggravated felony who served more than five years in prison ineligible 
for a waiver of deportation.150 The Immigration Act of 1990 also authorized INS officers 
to carry firearms and make arrests, blurring the distinction between law enforcement and 
immigration enforcement.151  
At the same time that Congress passed increasingly punitive immigration policies 
focused on interior enforcement of immigration regulations, the government also looked 
to border control as a means to enforce immigration laws. While the Immigration Act of 
1990 increased deportability grounds for noncitizens legally admitted to the United 
States, the government also sought to beef up border enforcement and increased funding 
for border enforcement. In addition to making more noncitizens already in the country 
deportable, the government also sought to physically prevent immigrants from entering 
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the country without inspection. The majority of government resources was spent along 
the southern border, as immigration from Mexico was seen as more of a problem. 
 In 1993, a series of “operations” were set in place to physically block immigrants 
from crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. Operation Blockade (later renamed Operation 
Hold the Line) in El Paso, and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego were the first in a 
series of intense enforcement efforts aimed at preventing illegal border crossing. Both 
operations dramatically increased the number of Border Patrol agents on patrol, and 
funds were spent to fortify the border with an eight foot steel fence and high-intensity 
floodlights.152 The government also used funds to install motion detectors, heat sensors, 
trip wires and infrared scopes.  
Although the serious prevention efforts did deter migrants from attempting to 
cross in heavily monitored areas, these methods did not actually stop undocumented 
migration. Rather, migrants chose to cross in more remote areas along the 2,000-mile 
border. While the border appeared to be more under control, the flow of undocumented 
migration was merely shifted to more remote and more dangerous areas.153  
 The measures taken by the government to reduce crime through stricter 
enforcement of immigration regulations reflects public perception during this time that 
immigrants were responsible not only for crime but for a range of social problems. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, immigrants were increasingly blamed for rising 
unemployment, drug addiction and abuse, and the increasing cost of social services.154 
The growing number of non-white, particularly Latino, population also led to concerns 
                                                
152 MASSEY ET AL., supra note 122 at 93-95. 
 
153 Id. 
 
154 Cook, supra note 142 at 306. 
 67 
over immigration regulation. The government responded to public anti-immigrant 
sentiment by increasing border enforcement while at the same time constricting legal 
avenues to immigrate. In order to deal with the rising number of immigrants already in 
the United States, the government enacted harsher penalties on immigrants with criminal 
histories, making increasing numbers of immigrants already in the United States, 
deportable. 
 
1. IIRIRA and the AEDPA: Ramping Up the Criminalization of Immigration 
Beginning in 1996, the convergence of immigration policy and the criminal 
justice system accelerated substantially. Congress passed two noteworthy reforms in that 
year, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Both acts drastically 
changed immigration detention and deportation in the United States by expanding even 
further the list of crimes that made noncitizens deportable. Additionally, IIRIRA and the 
AEDPA required mandatory detention for noncitizens that had committed certain crimes 
and completely eliminated judicial review for a large percentage of deportation orders.155 
It is with these acts that the criminalization of immigration gained considerable 
momentum. These laws also set the stage for the post-9/11 era of immigration policies 
and the War on Terror. 
The AEDPA was passed in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing. Although it 
was later reported that American citizens were responsible for the bombing, immediately 
following the incident, much of the public believed noncitizens from the Middle East 
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were responsible.156 IIRIRA was passed just six months later; together, both acts 
essentially eliminate all forms of relief from deportation for aggravated felons and greatly 
expanded the list of crimes deemed aggravated felonies.157 
IIRIRA focused heavily on deterrence and further accelerated the build-up of 
border enforcement. Penalties on smugglers, undocumented migrants and visa overstays 
were increased. The Act also focused on immigration policy within the United States and 
effectively denied undocumented immigrants (and even some categories of legal 
immigrants) the ability to access social services and other public programs. This law was 
passed largely as a means to de-incentivize migrants from coming to the United States 
and to deport noncitizens already in the country.158 
Before 1996, there was a significant amount of judicial discretion in deportation 
hearings. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allowed the immigration judge to 
consider mitigating circumstances for noncitizens facing deportation due to a criminal 
conviction that made the noncitizen deportable.159 For example, an immigration judge 
could suspend, or in many cases waive, a deportation if the noncitizen could show that 
the deportation would result in extreme hardship.160 Additionally, a provision in the INA 
allowed the immigration judge to consider family ties in determining whether to order a 
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deportation.161 All of these provisions allowing an immigration judge to use discretion in 
determining whether to order deportation were repealed or amended by IIRIRA.162  
Prior to 1996, immigration judges used a two-step process in determining whether 
to deport a noncitizen in a deportation proceeding.163 The immigration judge would first 
determine whether the noncitizen was deportable.164 As mentioned above, the list of 
crimes that made a noncitizen deportable has steadily expanded since the country’s first 
deportation regulations. The immigration judge would, therefore, consider whether the 
noncitizen had been convicted of an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.165 After 
ascertaining whether the noncitizen had been convicted of a crime making him 
deportable, the immigration judge would look to extenuating circumstances before 
ordering the deportation.166 The immigration judge would consider all the circumstances 
of the case, including whether the noncitizen had been rehabilitated, the hardship his 
deportation would have on his family and the noncitizen’s ties to the United States.167 
After Congress passed IIRIRA and the AEDPA, the avenues for deportation relief 
virtually disappeared for any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony. Additionally, 
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the list of crimes classified as an aggravated felony expanded substantially and the re-
classification of crimes constituting an aggravated felony were held by the courts to apply 
retroactively. The effect of a retroactive application of the laws meant that an immigrant 
who was convicted of a crime, which prior to 1996 was not an aggravated felony, could 
be deported after 1996 if the crime he was convicted of was re-classified as an aggravated 
felony for immigration purposes.168  
The AEDPA added crimes, such as gambling, alien smuggling and passport fraud 
to the list of aggravated felonies and IIRIRA added rape, sexual abuse of a minor to the 
list of crimes making noncitizens automatically deportable.169 Before IIRIRA and the 
AEDPA, money laundering and theft offenses required a certain monetary value before 
those convictions could be considered aggravated felonies for immigration purposes.170 
IIRIRA and the AEDPA lowered the threshold monetary requirements for all theft and 
fraud offenses to $10,000.171 By drastically lowering these amounts, Congress ensured 
that a much greater number of people convicted of theft offenses would be deportable. 
Along with expanding the list of crimes and lowering monetary thresholds for 
certain crimes, IIRIRA and the AEDPA decreased the length of sentences and expanded 
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the definition of  “conviction.”172 Prior to 1996, crimes of violence, theft offenses, 
counterfeiting and forgery offenses were only deportable offenses if the person convicted 
served a five-year sentence.173 That five-year sentence was lowered to a possible one-year 
sentence, making a conviction for a crime with a possible sentence of one year a 
deportable offense under the INA. This means that even if the noncitizen served only 3 
months, if the crime he was convicted of carried a potential sentence of one year or more, 
that crime is considered an aggravated felony rendering the noncitizen automatically 
deportable. Following IIRIRA, the definition of  “conviction” also expanded to include 
suspended sentences. By expanding “conviction” in this way, a noncitizen “convicted of 
a crime that carried a possible sentence of one year or more, [but] that sentence was never 
carried out, that person is deportable.”174 
As mentioned above, IIRIRA and the AEDPA significantly limit an immigration 
judge’s ability to use discretion in determining whether to issue a final deportation order. 
IIRIRA repealed INA § 212(c), which allowed the immigration judge to consider extreme 
hardship and the individual circumstances of each individual’s case. INA § 212(c) was 
replaced by what is now called “cancellation of removal.”175 An aggravated felon is 
ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal under the INA, no matter the 
circumstances. By repealing INA § 212(c), Congress effectively denied relief from 
removal for anyone convicted of an aggravated felony and denied any judicial discretion 
in determining whether deportation is appropriate. All of these changes created a system 
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where a noncitizen (even a long-term legal permanent resident) could be deported if 
convicted of a single misdemeanor offense carrying a possible sentence of one year or 
more.176 
Another result of the AEDPA and IIRIRA was the increased involvement of state 
and local law enforcement agencies with the INS. Prior to 1996, local and state law 
enforcement officers had little to do with enforcing civil immigration violations. IIRIRA 
and the AEDPA amended the INA to include provisions increasing the role state and 
local law enforcement play in regulating immigration.177 AEDPA § 439 allows state 
agencies to apprehend and detain noncitizens with a criminal record who have been 
previously deported.178 IIRIRA and the AEDPA also allow the Attorney General to enter 
into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies to investigate, arrest and 
detain noncitizens suspected of simple immigration violations such as overstaying a 
visa.179 Essentially, these provisions of the AEDPA and IIRIRA allow INS to work with 
local law enforcement agencies in the regulation of purely civil violations. 
To counteract the harshness of the AEDPA and IIRIRA and the elimination of 
judicial discretion in immigration proceedings, the government encourages prosecutorial 
discretion. Prosecutorial discretion “gives prosecutors discretion to determine whether to 
file charges against an immigrant and whether to commence immigration proceedings 
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against an immigrant.”180 The prosecutor can consider factors like length of residence in 
the United States, family ties in the United States, ties to native country, U.S. military 
service, immigration history and criminal history and humanitarian concerns.181 These 
factors are similar to the factors an immigration judge could use prior to IIRIRA and the 
AEDPA to determine whether deportation was appropriate in each individual 
immigration case. By allowing prosecutors to use discretion in deciding whether to 
institute immigration proceedings against a noncitizen, individual circumstances could 
still be weighed in deportation proceedings. 
In actuality, prosecutorial discretion did little to minimize the harshness of the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA. First, prosecutors often declined to use their discretion in a 
particular case and often prosecutors and immigration enforcement agents even 
encourage criminal prosecutors to seek sentences that would result in deportation. For 
instance, an INS memo “encouraged ‘prosecutors to seek plea bargains and sentences that 
[would] result in deportation, and to not agree to sentences or pleas which may allow 
immigrants to avoid deportation.’”182 The memo also directed prosecutors to avoid 
reducing sentences from twelve months to eleven months because “‘by reducing the 
sentence, the alien may avoid removal.’”183 Second, prosecutorial discretion puts 
immigrants at risk of future immigration proceedings and this risk instills a constant fear 
of being deported. By giving prosecutors and government agents the authority to use or 
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not use prosecutorial discretion, immigrants who are deportable are unable to leave the 
country and live in an indeterminate state.184 
The 1996 laws also profoundly affected asylum-seekers. After the enactment of 
IIRIRA and the AEDPA, people fleeing persecution in their home country were required 
to prove they had a credible fear of persecution if returned to that country. IIRIRA and 
the AEDPA require all asylum-seekers, upon crossing the border, to prove a credible fear 
of persecution to the satisfaction of a border patrol agent.185 If the border patrol agent 
does not believe the asylum-seeker has a credible fear of persecution, the asylum-seeker 
faces immediate deportation and has no right to a hearing before and immigration 
judge.186 If the border patrol agent does believe there is a credible fear of persecution, the 
asylum-seeker is promptly detained until he or she can have their credible fear interview 
with an asylum officer. Often asylum-seekers are detained for months before they have 
their credible fear interview and asylum-seekers who have not had a credible fear 
interview are not eligible for parole. The result of this system is that even if an asylum-
seeker has a credible fear of persecution, he faces mandatory detention for months while 
he waits to start the asylum process. 
 
2. Post-9/11 and Immigration Policy: The War on Terror and Immigration 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 mark an important point in U.S. 
immigration policy and the trajectory towards increased criminalization of immigration. 
While the 9/11 attacks profoundly altered U.S. immigration policy and the public attitude 
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toward immigrants in general, it is important to note that the convergence between 
criminal law and immigration law began well before 2001.187 In fact, legislators 
capitalized on pre-9/11 immigration laws that embraced limited judicial discretion, 
enhanced penalties for criminal convictions, and relied on the well-established concept 
that immigration proceedings were not criminal proceedings but rather regulatory 
proceedings, and thus constitutional rights in deportation proceedings were very 
limited.188 
 Part of the government’s response to the 9/11 attacks was to take advantage of the 
harsh immigration consequences that resulted from IIRIRA and the AEDPA.189 The 
government “capitalized on immigration law’s utility as a mechanism for crime control 
and social control to confront the ‘hypercrime’ of terrorism.”190 In fact, the War on Terror 
and all laws passed following 9/11 that attempted to combat terrorism have expanded to 
“encompass the incarceration and removal of noncitizens who have committed unrelated 
criminal offenses.”191 The post-9/11 era of immigration policy approaches immigration 
regulation from the perspective of national security and public safety. In using national 
security and the War on Terror as justification for harsh immigration policies, the United 
States has effectively created an immigration system whereby noncitizens, whether they 
are undocumented or legal permanent residents, have severely limited constitutional 
rights. 
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Immediately following 9/11, the government used the immigration system to 
detain people suspected of terrorism.192 Because the immigration system was already set 
up to allow for the detention of noncitizens and because criminal constitutional 
protections do not apply in immigration proceedings, the government was able to detain 
noncitizens it deemed “terror suspects” and to legally deprive them of constitutional 
protections.193 Instead of using the criminal justice system, which to be constitutional 
would require the law enforcement agencies to obtain arrest and search warrants based on 
probable cause, to Mirandize those facing criminal charges, to provide counsel, and to 
provide the right to a jury trial, the government used the immigration system to detain 
noncitizens (and sometimes even citizens) without providing them with the basic rights 
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.194  
In addition to using the immigration system’s detention mechanisms to detain 
suspected terrorists, the Attorney General expanded INS’s power to detain noncitizens by 
increasing the time-limit on detention; whereas prior to 9/11 INS was allowed to detain 
noncitizens for up to 24 hours before having to either release them or charge them with 
violating an immigration regulation or a crime, following 9/11, Attorney General 
Ashcroft increased the 24 hour period to 48 hours.195 That period was expanded even 
further to allow for “emergency or extraordinary circumstances,” agencies could detain 
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noncitizens for an additional “reasonable period of time” without filing criminal or 
immigration charges against them.196 
 Following 9/11, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act and the Homeland 
Security Act.197 Both acts were passed as an attempt to protect “national security” and 
were supplemented by presidential directives, new agency rules and regulations intended 
to reinforce these new laws.198 Much of the discussion surrounding these acts has 
centered on increased government surveillance of people it suspects may be a threat to 
national security or public safety; however, these acts and the accompanying changes to 
the law were also used as a means to expand detention and deportation of noncitizens and 
to enhance security along the U.S. border.199 The government chose immigration 
regulation as a mechanism for protecting national security; it used strict immigration 
enforcement to detain and deport noncitizens that “threatened” public safety.200 
 Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, immediately following the 
terrorist attacks. The USA PATRIOT Act increased INS’s budget to enforce immigration 
regulations at the border as well as within the United States.201 This increase in budget led 
to an increase in the number of noncitizens detained by immigration enforcement agents. 
The USA PATRIOT Act also increased the government’s ability to surveil, detain and 
deport noncitizens suspected of aiding in the terrorist attacks.  
                                                
196 Id. 
 
197 Miller, supra note 159 at 87. 
 
198 Id. 
 
199 Id. 
 
200 Id. 
 
201 GOLASH-BOZA, supra note 2 at 40. 
 78 
 In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act. This Act not only 
established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but it also consolidated what 
was previously known as the INS under the newly created DHS. Through the Homeland 
Security Act, INS was divided into three subdivisions: Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE); Customs and Border Patrol (CBP); and Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS). ICE’s responsibility was to focus on interior enforcement of immigration 
regulations; that is, finding and instituting deportation proceedings against any noncitizen 
that had been convicted of a deportable offense, who had entered the country without 
documentation, or who had overstayed a visa. CBP would focus on border protection, 
keeping out “dangerous” people and preventing undocumented entries into the United 
States. CIS’s role was to regulate the visa process; all noncitizens wishing to enter the 
United States must first secure a visa and CIS determined which noncitizens were 
admissible to the United States. 
After 2002, with the creation of DHS and the division of INS into three separate 
immigration enforcement regimes, the budget to regulate immigration at the border and 
within the border skyrocketed; in merging immigration regulation with homeland 
security, the government was able to put forward greater resources for the arrest, 
detention and deportation of noncitizens.202 The Act was used as a means to strengthen 
national security through stricter enforcement of immigration laws.203  
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The Homeland Security Act also increased cooperation between other law 
enforcement agencies and immigration officials.204 Section 403 of the Act provides 
immigration officials with access to the National Crime Information Center; this access 
allows immigration officials to check for criminal convictions for any noncitizen in 
detention. This coordination makes it easier and more efficient for immigration officials 
to detain and deport noncitizens. Additionally, the Act provides for the development of 
new technologies that can work between all law enforcement agencies; through this 
sharing of technology and information systems, all government law enforcement agencies 
and officials can share intelligence more rapidly and efficiently.205 This streamlining led 
to a rapid expansion in the number of noncitizens detained and subsequently deported. 
 Immigration also began to work with state and local law enforcement agencies 
following 9/11. While previously, the federal government retained the sole power to 
enforce immigration regulations, after 9/11, states began to take up more of a role in 
immigration enforcement. In 2002, Florida deputized all of its law enforcement officers, 
giving them the ability to enforce immigration regulations through the arrest and 
detention of noncitizens in violation of federal immigration laws.206  Other states 
followed suit and today, all state and local law enforcement agencies have some hand in 
regulating immigration through seeking out, arresting and detaining noncitizens. In 
effect, police officers can hold and detain a person they suspect has violated an 
immigration law, even though the person is not suspected of breaking a state criminal 
law. Sharing technology allows local and state law enforcement agencies to check the 
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immigration status of any individual they suspect to be in violation of an immigration law 
and also allows law enforcement agencies to detain that individual until an ICE officer 
arrives.  
 The federal government also began to enforce immigration regulations more 
strictly following September 11th. With the cooperation of local and state law 
enforcement agencies, the government implemented a zero-tolerance approach to 
immigration law enforcement.207 This was done in several ways. First, just three months 
following the attacks, the government instituted an Absconder Initiative Program; its goal 
was to “locate, apprehend, interview and deport” several hundred thousand noncitizens 
who had previously been ordered removed but had not yet left the country.208 The 
program was largely criticized because it focused primarily on immigrants of Arab 
descent and because it involved law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of civil, not 
criminal laws.209 
 Another example of the zero-tolerance enforcement strategy involves the 
crackdown on immigration laws that, prior to 2002, had rarely been enforced. The 
government used immigration laws to increase the number of noncitizens it could detain 
and deport following the terrorist attacks. For example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
began to strictly enforce the address change provision in § 265 of the INA, which had 
virtually never been enforced since its adoption in 1952.210 This section requires all 
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noncitizens, regardless of their legal status, to report any address change to the 
government within ten days of moving.211 By suddenly enforcing this provision, the 
government was able to not only penalize noncitizens for not complying with the 
statutory requirements under the INA, but to also increase surveillance and detention of 
noncitizens. 
 
3.  Current U.S. Immigration Law and Policy 
 Today, U.S. immigration policies center on detention and deportation of 
noncitizens and on enhanced enforcement of the nation’s borders. The consolidation of 
the INS with DHS following 9/11 greatly increased funding for border security and the 
enforcement of immigration regulations. Immigration laws are continuing to converge 
with the criminal justice system and the result is that the United States is detaining and 
deporting more noncitizens than ever before. In 2012, over 400,000 people were deported 
from the U.S.. According to immigration scholar, Tanya Golash-Boza, if the government 
continues on this trajectory, the Obama Administration will have deported over 2 million 
people by 2014: more people in six years than all people deported before 1997.212 
 Congress has chosen to focus almost exclusively on two classes of noncitizens: 
those with a criminal history and those suspected of terrorist-related activities.213 
“Consequently, the most criminally punitive treatment with the fewest avenues for relief 
has been reserved for noncitizens with criminal convictions and those suspected of ties 
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with organized terrorism.”214 The term “criminal alien” is commonly used to describe a 
particular group of immigrants and refers to noncitizens who have been convicted of a 
deportable crime. Not all criminal convictions result in immigration consequences and 
the crimes that do are divided into three categories: crimes involving moral turpitude 
(CIMTs), aggravated felonies, and specific offense-related crimes.215 
 A CIMT is a broad category of criminal activity and not precisely defined in the 
INA. A conviction for a CIMT generally carries lighter immigration consequences than a 
conviction for an aggravated felony. Because CIMTs are not listed out in the INA, it can 
be difficult to determine whether a conviction was for a CIMT or a non-deportable crime. 
CIMTs are generally understood to be crimes involving acts that are “inherently base, 
vile, or depraved, and contrary to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between 
persons or to society in general.”216 Thus, whether a crime is classified as a CIMT 
depends not on acts that are statutorily prohibited but on whether the crime is considered 
intrinsically or morally wrong.217 Traditionally, crimes like robbery, voluntary 
manslaughter, assault with intent to inflict serious bodily injury and child abuse have 
been considered CIMTs.218 A conviction for a CIMT does not automatically preclude a 
noncitizen from deportation relief but it does make a noncitizen deportable. Additionally, 
a noncitizen convicted of a CIMT is subject to mandatory detention without the 
possibility for parole. 
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 The second category of deportable offense is an aggravated felony. As mentioned 
above, the INA specifically defines which crimes are aggravated felonies for immigration 
purposes, and the list of crimes has steadily expanded since the creation of the aggravated 
felony in 1988 under the ADAA. A conviction for an aggravated felony has much greater 
immigration consequences than a conviction for a CIMT; a noncitizen convicted of an 
aggravated felony is ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal, which means he will 
be deported. Like a conviction for a CIMT, a conviction for an aggravated felony subjects 
the noncitizen to mandatory detention without the possibility of parole. 
 Certain offense-specific crimes, like suspected terrorism, are the third category of 
deportable crimes. The AEDPA added terrorism to the list of crimes that make a 
noncitizen deportable and those provisions were strengthened by IIRlRA and laws 
enacted following the 9/11 attacks. Today, noncitizens suspected of terrorism face very 
different removal proceedings than do other noncitizens.219 “Under special removal 
procedures for suspected terrorists, the government bears a lesser burden of proof on the 
issue of deportability, discovery is limited, even prohibited in the case of classified 
information, judicial review is expedited, and the customary forms of relief from removal 
are unavailable.”220 
 The ADAA, IRCA, the Immigration Act of 1990, the AEDPA, IIRIRA and all 
laws further criminalizing immigration and expanding the ability of the government to 
detain noncitizens following 9/11 have created an immigration system based solely on 
detention and deportation as mechanisms for immigration regulation. All changes the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA made to the aggravated felony provisions of the INA and the 
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retroactivity of the IIRIRA are still in place today. Avenues for relief from deportation 
for any noncitizen convicted of a crime are minimal and any noncitizen convicted of an 
aggravated felony has virtually no hope to fight his or her deportation.  
Additionally, mandatory detention provisions of IIRIRA and the ADAA are still 
in place and the number of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention has steadily 
increased since 9/11.221 Today, any noncitizen convicted of a CIMT, an aggravated felony 
or an offense-specific crime is subject to mandatory immigration detention, regardless of 
family hardship, ties to the United States, or any other consideration. This has drastically 
increased the number of noncitizens in immigration detention as well as the length of 
time noncitizens are detained.222  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 The current state of the U.S. immigration system has prompted many human 
rights organizations and activists to question the United States’ commitment to well-
established human rights principles. Even the United Nations has expressed grave 
concerns as to the way the U.S. government treats its noncitizens. The next chapter will 
detail how U.S. immigration policies that focus primarily on detention and deportation 
violate several international human rights laws. 
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CHAPTER V 
  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY:  
U.S. OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ICCPR, CAT, AND THE REFUGEE 
CONVENTION AND HOW THE U.S. IS VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 This section explores international human rights laws, U.S. obligations under 
those laws, and how current U.S. immigration policies are violating international law The 
first part of this section focuses on the current international human rights laws and 
standards and how those laws apply to all immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. 
While there exist a multitude of treaties that protect the human rights of immigrants, this 
section emphasizes only those conventions that are most applicable to immigrants in the 
U.S.: the ICCPR, CAT, and the Refugee Convention. While there exist a multitude of 
treaties that pertain to immigrant rights, this section focuses only on the treaties the 
United States has signed and ratified, primarily because U.S. obligations under treaties it 
has signed and ratified are clearer. This first part of this section will explain immigrant 
rights in the United States according to international law. 
 This section will then discuss how the United States is failing to comply with its 
obligations under the ICCPR, CAT and the Refugee Convention. Current U.S. 
immigration policy is in direct violation of several fundamental international laws. The 
way the United States detains and deports immigrants violates the right to liberty under 
the ICCPR and the right to be free from arbitrary detention under the ICCPR. The way 
the government treats immigrants in detention also directly violates the right to be free 
from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment under the ICCPR as well as 
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the right of detained people to be treated with humanity and human dignity. U.S. 
immigration detention conditions also violate the right to be free from torture or other 
acts of cruel, human or degrading treatment or punishment under CAT. U.S. immigration 
policy also directly violates the right to family and private life under the ICCPR. Finally, 
the way refugees and asylum-seekers are treated in the United States directly violates the 
Refugee Convention, which the United States has not only signed and ratified, but has 
signed into domestic law. 
 
1. U.S. Obligations Under International Law 
A. The Right to Liberty and the Right to Be Free From Arbitrary Detention 
The right to liberty is a well-established international human right. Both the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) refer to an individual’s right to liberty. Article 3 of the 
UDHR explicitly provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person,”223 while Article 9 adds that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile.”224 While the UDHR is a non-binding document, the ICCPR, a binding 
international covenant, incorporates the right to liberty in Article 9(1): “Everyone has the 
right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law.”225 
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The right to liberty and security of person applies to all human beings regardless 
of their immigration or other status.226 And the right to liberty applies to all deprivations 
of liberty, including detention for immigration purposes.227 While the right to liberty is 
not absolute and Article 9 does not expressly prohibit detention for immigration 
purposes, Article 9 does protect immigrants from unlawful and arbitrary detention.228 
Although the ICCPR does not define unlawful or arbitrary detention, human rights 
jurisprudence has developed definitions of arbitrary and unlawful detentions. 
The U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) has five criteria developed to assist in 
determining whether a detention is arbitrary or unlawful. The first criteria requires 
detention be in accordance with, or authorized by, law.229 Detention must not only be 
lawful but must not be arbitrary; in determining whether detention is arbitrary, courts 
look to the last four criteria: reasonableness, necessity, proportionality, and non-
discrimination.230 These five criteria are essential in determining whether detention 
violates the right to liberty. Although a detention may be lawful, that is, in accordance 
with or authorized by law, if the detention is arbitrary because it is not proportional, 
reasonable, necessary and non-discriminatory, then it violates the individual’s right to 
liberty under international human rights law. 
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a. Lawfulness Criterion 
The first criterion, lawfulness, includes not only domestic and national legislation 
but also includes international law. Although a state may have domestic legislation 
authorizing detention, if the domestic legislation is in conflict with international human 
rights laws and standards, then the detention is unlawful.231 Additionally, elements of 
foreseeability and predictability of the law and its consequences exist within the 
lawfulness requirement.232 A person subject to detention must have been able to foresee 
to a reasonable degree the consequences of his actions.233 Where a law’s consequences 
are imprecise in this way, detention may be unlawful. Foreseeability and predictability 
also require that the lawful purposes of detention be expressed clearly in legislation.234 
b. Arbitrariness: Reasonable, Necessary and Proportionate Criteria 
Detention must not only be lawful, it must not be arbitrary; the HRC has clarified 
this concept: 
‘Arbitrariness’ is not to be equated with ‘against the law’, but must be 
interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice 
and lack of predictability. This means that remand in custody pursuant to 
lawful arrest must not only be lawful but reasonable in all the circumstances. 
Further, remand in custody must be necessary in all the circumstances, for 
example, to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of 
crime.235 
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For detention to be reasonable in all circumstances and necessary in all 
circumstances, there must be some level of proportionality.236 In this sense, the 
reasonableness and necessary criteria blend with the proportionality criterion; detention 
cannot be reasonable and necessary without being proportional. To be proportional, 
detention must be absolutely necessary to achieve the state’s objective.237 In terms of 
immigration detention, where detention is used in the interest of national security, an 
individual’s detention must be necessary to achieve the state’s goal of protecting national 
security. Where it is necessary to achieve national security, the proportionality criterion 
may be satisfied. 
The concept of proportionality also applies to the length of detention, in addition 
to the initial detention order. According to the HRC, “detention should not continue 
beyond the period for which the state can provide appropriate justification.”238 This 
requires the State make a periodic review of each individual’s case to ensure that the 
detention by the State is still necessary to achieve its goals. And although the HRC has 
not established a precise acceptable period of detention, clearly, indefinite detention is 
arbitrary under this proportionality concept. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention (WGAD) has suggested states adopt a maximum period of immigration 
detention to ensure detention is not arbitrary.239 
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For the detention to comply with the reasonable, necessity and proportionality 
criteria, there must be an individual assessment of the merits of each individual case. For 
states that use detention as a means to regulate migration, there must be a system in place 
to assess each individual’s case and the necessity of detention before that individual is 
detained.240 According to the ICCPR, “every detention must be justified and assessed on 
its merits.”241 Mandatory detention is arbitrary in this respect because an individual is 
detained automatically, without an individual assessment of his case.  
The ICCPR does not provide a list of accepted grounds for detention, and as 
mentioned above, detention for immigration purposes is not expressly prohibited. 
However, to comply with the ICCPR, every detention must be justified and assessed on 
its merits. The HRC has established accepted reasons for detention, and those include 
likelihood of absconding and lack of cooperation.242 The HRC has further clarified that 
illegal entry, without more, is an insufficient reason to detain an individual.243 Similarly, a 
detention is arbitrary if the decision to detain is made with an improper purpose.244 For 
instance, although detention for immigration purposes is not explicitly arbitrary, using 
detention to deter migration may be an improper purpose and therefore arbitrary under 
international law.245 Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, detention as a means to deter 
asylum-seekers is amounts to punishment and is an improper purpose under the 
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ICCPR.246 According to the WGAD, immigrant detention can be justified if the purpose 
is proper and relates specifically to immigration reasons.247  
Alternatives to detention are an important requirement to ensure detention is 
lawful and not arbitrary under international law. The HRC has held that the right to 
freedom incorporated in Article 9 of the ICCPR requires a state to consider a “less 
invasive means of achieving the same ends.” 248 Principles of proportionality, necessity 
and reasonableness require a state to investigate alternative options before relying on 
detention.249 Additionally, a state may not simply point to its inability to provide 
alternative options to detention as justification for its reliance on detention. Especially in 
terms of immigration detention, where deportation is unlikely or unrealistic, the HRC has 
held that a state has an obligation to explore alternatives to continued immigration 
detention.250  
c. Arbitrariness: Non-Discrimination Criterion 
 
Non-discrimination is the final criterion in assessing with a deprivation of 
freedom is arbitrary. No state may detain an individual based on race, sex, nationality, 
religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status.251 According the HRC, 
international human rights laws apply to all individuals and a state is required to respect 
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these rights “without discrimination between citizens and aliens.”252 This means that the 
right to liberty under Article 9 of the ICCPR applies to non-citizens and citizens in the 
same way.  
 Article 9(3) of the ICCPR sets forth additional procedural guarantees under the 
right to liberty: [a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide without 
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not 
lawful.”253 According to the WGAD, the following procedural guarantees apply to 
immigration detention under the ICCPR: 
1. All immigrants in detention, including asylum-seekers, must be brought 
promptly before an immigration authority, 
2. The grounds for detention must be established by law and based on legality, 
3. There must be a maximum period of detention established by law and 
detention can never be unlimited or excessive in length, 
4. All immigrants and asylum-seekers must be notified, in a language he or she 
understands, of the conditions for applying for judicial review, 
5. All immigrants and asylum-seekers who seek judicial review of their 
detention must have their petitions heard and decided promptly on the 
lawfulness of the detention, 
6. States must place immigrants and asylum-seekers in premises separate from 
persons imprisoned under criminal law; and 
7. UNHRC and ICRC, and, where appropriate, non-governmental organizations 
must be granted access to places of custody.254 
 
Article 9(4) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to judicial review of any decision 
to detain. The review must be prompt and there must be a realistic possibility of 
successfully challenging ones detention. A formal review process, with no meaningful 
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opportunity to truly challenge detention, does not satisfy the procedural guarantees of the 
right to liberty under international law. An opportunity to effectively challenge detention 
may mean the State must provide legal assistance to immigrants or asylum-seekers who 
wish to challenge their detention. Additionally, the State must have the burden to prove 
detention is necessary in each individual case. A state must justify reasons for continued 
detention in light of the alternatives to detention and its goals.255 
 
B. Right to Be Free From Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, 
Degrading Treatment (CIDT) 
Along with the right to freedom of liberty, the UDHR declares that “[n]o one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”256 
This right is encapsulated in the Article 7 of the ICCPR, which provides that “[n]o one 
shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”257 
The ICCPR also provides that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”258 According 
the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, this provision of the ICCPR 
dictates that “migrants deprived of their liberty should be subjected to conditions of 
detention that take into account their status and needs.”259 
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Similarly, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) protects individuals from 
torture; Article 16 provides that “[e]ach State Party shall undertake to prevent in any 
territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are 
committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”260 The right to be free from torture 
and other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is, like the right to liberty, a 
well-established human rights principle under international law. 
Under CAT, torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted.”261 For the act to be torture as 
defined by CAT, the pain or suffering must be at the hands of, or with acquiescence of, a 
public official.262 Although the definition of torture is relatively clear, neither CAT, nor 
the ICCPR define CIDT. However, according to the HRC, the prohibition against CIDT 
includes physical pain as well as mental suffering.263  
 Both the ICCPR and CAT require State parties to not only refrain from torture 
and infliction of CIDT, but also to ensure that all individuals within their borders, 
regardless of citizenship or legal status, are protected against torture and CIDT.264 This 
protection extends to prohibit state governments from returning any individual to a 
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country where he or she is likely to be at risk of torture.265 This protection also extends to 
require all State parties ensure government officials are complying with CAT obligations, 
especially in the context of detention and imprisonment.266 
 Because neither CAT nor the ICCPR define CIDT, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has developed specific restrictions on member 
states’ ability to detain individuals, especially in the context of immigration detention.267 
These restrictions were developed to clarify the right to liberty and the right to be free 
from torture and CIDT under the ICCPR and CAT, as those rights are incorporated into 
the American Convention. All states that are members of the ICCPR, CAT and the 
American Convention are bound by the IACHR’s clarifications of what constitutes the 
right to liberty and the right to be free from torture and CIDT. 
The IACHR recently developed guidelines to aid in the determination of whether 
the right to be free from torture and CIDT are violated. The guidelines, entitled 
“Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the 
Americas,” (IACHR Principles) outline basic requirements for individuals in detention. 
Some of the basic provisions include that all people detained receive food, water, medical 
treatment, adequate sleeping quarters, and additionally, that all detained individuals have 
the right to religious freedom, clothing, educational and recreational activities.268 
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 The IACHR has developed specific rights, in addition to the basic provisions 
listed above. Those specific rights include the right to medical care, which encompasses 
the right to “an impartial and confidential medical or psychological examination” upon 
arrival at a detention center.269 Principle 10 of the IACHR Principles clarifies the range of 
medical services that detainees must have access to, including physical, psychiatric and 
dental services.270 Principle 10 requires there be informed consent, patient confidentiality 
and autonomy in all cases.271  
Psychological care is especially important, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrant Workers highlighted the importance of interpreters for all 
detained immigrants seeking medical treatment, as well as the importance of having 
doctors available with appropriate training in psychological treatments.272 Even more 
importantly, the IACHR has special regulations for solitary confinement, especially for 
detainees with mental disabilities. Solitary confinement must be “authorized by a 
competent physician; carried out in accordance with officially approved procedures; 
recorded in the patient’s individual medical record; and immediately notified to their 
family or legal representatives.”273 
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Solitary confinement for disciplinary purposes is limited.274 Solitary confinement 
is only permitted as a last resort and must be only for a limited period of time. Use of 
solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure is allowable only to protect the detention 
center’s internal security and to protect fundamental human rights of others in the 
institution. According to the IACHR, the protection of fundamental rights includes 
protection of the right to life and integrity of persons.275 
The IACHR Principles also dictate that international principles of humane 
treatment require that individuals detained for civil purposes have the right to be 
separated from criminal inmates.276 The IACHR explicitly requires that asylum-seekers, 
refugees and those being held for immigration-related violations should be housed in a 
separate facility from those who are being detained for criminal violations. In addition to 
separating civil detainees from criminal detainees, the IACHR also directs member states 
to separate men and women, children and adults, and the elderly.277 
Humane treatment also requires that individuals who are detained receive notice 
of transfer to other detention centers.278 Principle 9(4) requires that state officials “take 
into account the need of persons to be deprived of liberty in places near their family, 
community; their defense counsel or legal representative; and the tribunal or other State 
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body that may be in charge of their case.”279 Principle 9(4) further prohibits transfers 
made in an attempt to punish and prohibits transfers “conducted under conditions that 
cause physical or mental suffering.”280 For those held in immigration custody, the IACHR 
Principles require that the individual be promptly informed of his right to communicate 
with his consulate.281 
 Specifically, the IACHR notes the problems surrounding transfer and the ability 
of the individual to fight his case. According the IACHR, immigrants who have an 
attorney or legal representative should never be transferred from the jurisdiction where 
they were apprehended unless there exist exceptional circumstances.282 Additionally, the 
IACHR Principles prohibit transfers to jurisdictions where the immigrant’s removal is 
more likely.283 This requirement on transfers comes from the concern over immigrant 
detainees’ right to due process, as well as the concern for humane treatment in detention. 
The right to humane treatment also includes the requirement that detention 
facilities have qualified personnel and independent supervision.284 For immigration 
detention, this includes proper training for detention center guards in 
psychological aspects relating to detention, cultural sensitivity and human 
rights procedures, and ensuring that administrative detention of migrants 
are not run by private companies or staffed by private personnel unless 
they are adequately trained and the centres are subject to regular public 
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supervision to ensure the application of international and national human 
rights law.285 
 
 Lastly, the IACHR Principles state that detention institutions are obligated to 
investigate any deaths that occur during detention.286 This requirement extends to deaths 
that occur shortly after release from detention, if warranted under the circumstances.287 
The investigation must be prompt, impartial and the investigation’s findings must be 
available upon request.288 
 
C. Right to Protection of the Family and the Right to Private Life 
 Fundamental human rights under international law also include the right to 
protection of the family and the right to private life. The right to family was first 
articulated in article 12 of the UDHR, which states that “[t]he family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State.”289 The ICCPR incorporated the right to family in Article 23 and Article 17 of the 
ICCPR expands this right, stating “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, or correspondence...”290 Because the family is the 
“fundamental group unit of society” international law requires states to protect the family 
and holds the right to family as a fundamental right on par with the right to liberty, and 
the right to be free from torture and CIDT. 
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 The American Declaration has also adopted the right to family and privacy. 
According the IACHR, the right to family is “a right so basic to the [American] 
Convention that it is considered to be non-derogable even in extreme circumstances.”291 
The main objective of the right to private life and the right to family is protection from 
arbitrary State interference in individuals’ private lives.292 This right ultimately “protects 
home and family life from unnecessary intrusion by the State.”293  
 The right to family and private life has important implications for immigration 
detention because the right to family limits the state in its enforcement of immigration 
laws.294 First, a state may not enforce immigration laws in an individual’s private home 
unless it has probable cause to suspect that person has violated immigration law.295 
Probable cause requires the state have reliable information and know the location of the 
person in violation.296 Additionally, in order to invade a home, the risk that individual 
poses to the community must be great.297 Lastly, invasion of the home by the state must 
be the last alternative means of enforcing its immigration laws.298 
                                                
291 IACHR, X & Y, (Argentina), Report No. 38/96 (Merits), Case No. 11.506, para. 96 (October 
15, 1996). 
 
292 IACHR Report on Detention, supra note 267. 
 
293 Id. 
 
294 Id. 
 
295 Id. 
 
296 Id. 
 
297 Id. 
 
298 Id. 
 
 101 
Another important implication of the right to family relates to parental rights.299 
The IACHR has held that the State is forbidden from using a parent’s immigration 
violation or detention as a means to permanently take away that parent’s legal custody of 
his or her children.300 Similarly, the IACHR highlights the importance of the immigrant 
child’s best interests in a state’s decision to remove his or her parent.301 If the child’s best 
interest is taken into account and the parent is still removed, the immigrant parent must 
have access to due process in determining who will have custody of his or her child 
following removal.302 
 The IACHR Principles also highlights the right to family under the ICCPR. 
According to these principles, a detained person has the right to communicate freely with 
his or her family. Communication includes the right to visitation by family members. 
Additionally, a detained individual shall have the right to communicate freely with the 
outside world and this right is subject to limitation only in limited circumstances.303 
 
D. Specific Rights Under the Refugee Convention 
 
The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention) is a consolidation of the rights and liberties refugees are entitled to under 
international human rights law. The 1951 Refugee Convention entered into force in 1954 
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and was later expanded by the 1967 Protocol.304 Initially, the 1951 Refugee Convention 
limited refugee status to certain individuals; however, the 1967 Protocol extended refugee 
rights to all refugees from all countries fleeing persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.305 The Refugee 
Convention binds all member states to respect refugee human rights, regardless of 
whether an individual has formally been recognized as a refugee under the Refugee 
Convention.306 
The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who has a “well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion” and “who is outside of the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.”307 The Refugee Convention also sets forth a State party’s 
legal obligations to all refugees under international law; these obligations explicitly limit 
ways in which the state can detain and deport refugees and asylum-seekers. 
Article 31(2) prohibits State parties from restricting refugees’ movements “other 
than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their 
status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country.”308 
Further, Article 31(2) requires a state allow all refugees “a reasonable period of time and 
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all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.”309 Additionally, 
Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention requires that State parties 
shall not impose penalties on account of [a refugee’s] illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened ... enter or are present in their territory without 
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.310 
 
The Refugee Convention also limits a State’s ability to deport or return 
refugees who seek asylum. Article 33 prohibits a state from expelling or returning “a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”311  
Although the Refugee Convention has explicit rules regarding how member states 
are to treat asylum-seekers and refugees, standards of detention and deportation of 
asylum-seekers and refugees is clarified in the UNHRC Detention Guidelines.312 These 
guidelines set forth specific requirements for States to conform under the Refugee 
Convention, in addition to setting forth the requirements for the right to liberty and the 
right to be free from CIDT in the detention context.  
The requirements that detention be lawful and not arbitrary apply equally to 
asylum-seekers as to any individual who is detained for immigration purposes. The same 
principles of reasonableness, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination apply in 
the context of refugee and asylum-seeker detention. Asylum-seekers are also guaranteed 
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the right to due process while in detention, as well as the right to be free from CIDT and 
torture. The UNHRC Detention Guidelines have explicit rules regarding asylum seekers, 
however, because of their protected status under the Refugee Convention. 
First and foremost, the Detention Guidelines clarify that detention of asylum-
seekers should be avoided and used only as a last resort.313 In all cases where an 
immigrant is seeking asylum, the presumption should be against detention.314 Guideline 1 
explains that all human beings have the right to seek asylum from persecution and as 
such, the act of seeking asylum is not in violation of law.315 Therefore, those seeking 
asylum should not be punished for illegal entry into the country in which they are seeking 
protection.316 This particular guideline, which forbids a state to punish an asylum-seeker 
based on illegal entry, explains that asylum-seekers are often forced to flee without 
documents; asylum-seekers are thus fundamentally different than regular migrants.317 
Guideline 1 also notes that asylum-seekers are often victims of trauma and should be 
treated differently than ordinary migrants.318 Additionally, this section of the guidelines 
makes clear that using detention to deter asylum-seekers is absolutely forbidden under the 
Refugee Convention.319 
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Guideline 2 of the UNHRC Detention Guidelines sheds light on the Article 33(2) 
of the Refugee Convention, which prohibits states from limiting the free movement of 
refugees and asylum-seekers.320 The fact that every human being has the right to seek 
asylum, coupled with the fundamental right to liberty and security of person and freedom 
of movement, requires that detention of those seeking asylum should be a last resort.321 In 
all cases, liberty should be the presumption for those seeking asylum.322 
Alternatives to detention are a focus of the UNHRC Detention Guidelines. As 
detention of asylum-seekers and refugees should be a last resort, states must have 
alternatives to detention in place to comply with international law. Some alternatives 
include “self or family-reporting; the maintaining a specific address; residing at 
‘collective accommodation centers’ where individuals are free to come and go and live as 
normal; providing a guarantor or surety; or posting bail in some situations.”323 The 
UNHRC Detention Guidelines specify that alternatives to detention must “not be used as 
alternative forms of detention; nor should alternatives to detention become alternatives to 
release.” 324 
 The UNHRC Detention Guidelines set forth special circumstances and the unique 
needs of asylum-seekers who are often victims of torture and trauma. Guideline 9 
requires that emotional and psychological trauma should be taken into account when a 
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state decides to detain an asylum-seeker.325 Because detention can aggravate emotional 
trauma, those who present with symptoms of anxiety, depression, aggression or 
psychological illness should be treated with special care.326 This particular guideline also 
requires a periodic assessment or review of a detainee’s mental and physical wellbeing 
should detention be required.327 
 Guideline 9 of the UNHRC Detention Guidelines singles out several groups of 
asylum-seekers that should be treated with care and special consideration. It lists 
children, women, victims of potential trafficking, elderly asylum-seekers, asylum-seekers 
with disabilities and lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered asylum-seekers as types of 
asylum-seekers that need special protection should the state decide to detain them.328 
 According to the UNHRC Detention Guidelines, children should not be detained. 
If there is a reason to detain a child, the detention must comport with the Convention for 
the Rights of the Child (CRC).329 Among the rights enunciated in the CRC are a child’s 
right to life, survival and development, the right to family unity, the right to special 
protection and assistance and right to education.330 The UNHRC Guidelines specify that 
an “ethic of care – and not enforcement – needs to govern interactions with asylum-
seeking children, including children in families, with the best interests of the child as the 
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primary consideration. The extreme vulnerability of a child takes precedence over the 
status of an ‘illegal alien’.”331 
 The UNHRC Detention Guidelines also state that pregnant women and nursing 
mothers should not be detained.332 In cases where detention is necessary, women should 
be protected from sexual and gender-based violence; separate facilities for women and 
families should exist and where those facilities do not exist, alternatives to detention 
should be pursued.333 Alternatives to detention should also be pursued for victims of 
trafficking.334 
 Similarly, older asylum-seekers and those with mental and physical disabilities 
should be treated with care and detention should be the last resort.335 Like all detained 
individuals, those with mental and physical disabilities have the right to medical care 
while in detention. The UNHRC Detention Guidelines note that as a general rule, 
asylum-seekers with long-term mental or physical disabilities should not be detained and 
alternatives to detention should be pursued.336 
Finally, asylum-seekers who identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender or 
intersex should be afforded every protection possible to ensure that the detention “avoids 
exposing them to risk of violence, ill-treatment or physical, mental or sexual abuse.”337 
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This includes the right to counseling and medical care and requires that detention guards 
be trained and qualified in international human rights standards of non-discrimination.338 
In the event that an asylum-seekers safety is at risk, an alternative to detention must be 
established. Further, the guidelines expressly forbid solitary confinement as a means to 
protect these individuals.339 
 
2.  U.S. Immigration Policies: How the U.S. Is Violating International Law 
 
 United States immigration policies are in stark violation of international law. The 
way the U.S. detains and deports noncitizens, specifically, immigration policies requiring 
mandatory detention and limiting judicial discretion, directly violates the right to liberty 
and the right to be free from arbitrary and unlawful arrest or detention under the ICCPR. 
Similarly, U.S. conditions of immigration detention as well as deportation procedures and 
policies more generally, violate the right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment under both CAT and the ICCPR. Further, U.S. 
immigration policies, both detention and deportation policies, and immigration policy in 
general, violate the fundamental and well-established right to family and the right to 
private life under the ICCPR (and several other international conventions). Lastly, U.S. 
immigration policies violate important provisions in the Refugee Convention, as well as 
the right to seek asylum encapsulated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. 
 
A.  The Right to Liberty and U.S. Detention and Deportation Policies 
 U.S. detention policies that require mandatory detention and deportation of certain 
classes of immigrants violate the right to liberty under the ICCPR. The ICCPR states that 
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all people “have the right to liberty and security of person” and that all people have the 
right to be free from “arbitrary arrest or detention.”340 This right applies to all 
deprivations of liberty, including administrative detentions, and it applies to all people, 
regardless of nationality or immigration status.341  
 According to international law, a detention is arbitrary where it is not necessary in 
all the circumstances, nor reasonable in all the circumstances.342 To determine whether a 
detention is necessary and reasonable, international law requires “that the decision to 
detain someone should be made on a case-by-case basis after an assessment of the 
functional need to detain a particular individual.”343 Mandatory detention policies in the 
United States are arbitrary because there is no case-by-case determination of whether 
there is in fact a need to detain a particular individual. Mandatory detention is the exact 
opposite of an individual, case-by-case determination; mandatory detention ensures that 
large classes of people are automatically detained without an individual determination. 
 For those immigrants who do not face mandatory detention due to their criminal 
history, they still face arbitrary detention in violation of international law. ICE officials 
have extensive authority over immigrant bond determinations and over the decision of 
whether an immigrant qualifies for bond. ICE officials can refuse to give a bond to an 
immigrant in detention and ICE officials can arbitrarily raise or revoke an ICE bond at 
any time. Immigrants cannot appeal the ICE bond until they have a bond hearing before 
an IJ. At that hearing, the IJ can raise or revoke the ICE bond completely. Although bond 
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determinations should be based on an individual’s flight risk or whether the individual is 
a danger to the community, ICE officials and IJ’s often impose arbitrarily high bonds or 
completely deny bonds to detainees. The detainee cannot appeal to a higher authority 
because there is no higher authority than the IJ in bond determination hearings. An 
immigrant who wishes to appeal the IJ’s initial bond determination must appeal to that 
same IJ. And if he asks for a bond redetermination hearing he risks losing his bond 
completely. Thus, many detainees settle for the initial bond determination, even if they 
are unable to pay it, because they fear the IJ will completely revoke their bond on appeal. 
This absolute discretion and the arbitrary way in which bonds are decided, violates due 
process under international law and results in arbitrary detention in violation of 
international law. 
 The bond determination process violates fundamental due process rights under 
international law. The right to liberty and the right to be free from arbitrary detention 
entitle an individual to be heard in order to determine whether detention is justified and 
not arbitrary. Similarly, due process under international law requires a prompt judicial 
determination of whether a detention is lawful. Immigrants are taken into ICE custody 
and spend weeks in detention before they are allowed to see an IJ. This is not prompt 
under international law and thus violates due process. 
 U.S. detention and deportation policies also violate the due process right to fair 
deportation procedures under the ICCPR. According to Article 13 of the ICCPR, any 
immigrant lawfully within a state may only be removed by procedures in accordance with 
law and the immigrant facing removal has the right to “submit evidence against his 
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expulsion and to have his case reviewed by” a competent authority.344 Under current U.S. 
immigration policy, immigrants who have been convicted of certain crimes face 
mandatory detention; mandatory detention prohibits an immigrant from submitting 
evidence against his expulsion and thus violates this particular procedural due process 
right under international law. Immigrants who have been convicted of an ‘aggravated 
felony’ for immigration purposes have no way to fight their deportation because U.S. 
mandates their removal. By denying immigrants the ability to submit evidence against 
their removal, like family ties and evidence of rehabilitation, U.S. law violates Article 13 
of the ICCPR. 
 Due process under international law also requires access to legal counsel. While 
immigrants in the United States have the right to counsel in their immigration 
proceedings, that right is not absolute. According to the government, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not apply to deportation proceedings because they are 
civil proceedings. Therefore, immigrants who cannot afford an attorney are not provided 
with government appointed counsel and must represent themselves in immigration 
proceedings. As the majority of immigrants in detention cannot even afford to pay their 
bond, most detainees also cannot afford a private attorney. Nearly 86% of immigrants in 
detention cannot afford counsel and thus represent themselves.345 
The remote location of most detention centers is another barrier to the right to 
counsel. Immigrants are typically held in rural areas, miles away from the nearest city. 
The remote location of detention centers makes it difficult for attorneys to meet with their 
clients and the cost for private attorney services includes the time it takes to travel to and 
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from the detention center. Not only do attorneys have to travel hours to get to their 
clients, but they charge for that time. For immigrants who can barely afford the cost of 
legal representation, paying an attorney for travel time is almost impossible. Furthermore, 
detainees are often transferred to detention centers located thousands of miles away from 
their family and their community. This makes it even more difficult for them to find an 
attorney to represent them, even if they can afford one. 
 
B.  The Right to Be Free From Torture and CIDT and Conditions in U.S. 
Detention Centers 
 Conditions in immigration detention centers violate the right to be free from 
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under both CAT and 
the ICCPR. Each convention not only prohibits state parties from inflicting torture or 
other forms of CIDT, but they also require state parties ensure that all people within its 
borders are protected against torture and CIDT. The IACHR has defined torture and 
CIDT with regards to detention, and those definitions extend to immigrant detention in 
the U.S. The IACHR Principles establish certain detention conditions that can amount to 
torture and or CIDT under international law, including the use of shackles, solitary 
confinement and other prison-like detention conditions. The way the United States 
detains immigrants and the way it treats immigrants in detention violate both prohibitions 
on torture and CIDT under international law, especially as defined by the IACHR 
guidelines. 
 The IACHR Principles outline basic requirements for individuals in detention, 
including the right to food, water, medical treatment, adequate sleeping quarters, privacy, 
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and the right to religious freedom, clothing, and educational and recreational activities.346 
U.S. immigration detention violates several of these basic requirements. Detention 
centers are overcrowded and overcrowding creates problems with providing basic 
necessities like food, appropriate medical treatment and appropriate sleeping conditions. 
Privacy is minimal. ICE detains hundreds of immigrants on a daily basis and new arrivals 
are constantly flooding into detention centers. Most detention facilities are ill equipped to 
handle such high numbers and overcrowding is the inevitable result.  
 According to international law and detention standards, human treatment also 
requires that individuals who are detained receive notice of transfer to other detention 
centers. In practice, immigrants typically do not receive such notice. It is not uncommon 
for immigrants to be transferred to a detention center hundreds of miles from their 
attorney. Detainees are often denied communication with their consulate, which 
according to international law, is required to constitute human treatment. Denying 
detainees access to their legal counsel and their consulate is not only a due process 
violation under international law, but also a violation of the right to be free from CIDT. 
 Medical care, including psychological treatment, is lacking in U.S. detention 
centers. Although the IACHR Principles dictate that human treatment includes qualified 
medical personnel, especially for psychological treatment, U.S. detention centers rarely 
provide adequate counseling and psychological services to detainees. Many detainees 
suffer from depression and anxiety, and the prison-like detention conditions exacerbate 
those mental health issues. However, rather than provide counseling or medication for 
depression and anxiety, if a detainee expresses feelings of depression, they are often put 
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into solitary confinement. Not only is solitary confinement expressly prohibited by the 
IACHR Principles, but solitary confinement also rises to the level of torture as defined in 
CAT and the ICCPR. 
 Under international law, including the IACHR Principles and the UNHRC 
Detention Guidelines, immigration detention should not be punitive detention, and 
alternatives to detention should be pursued if at all possible. U.S. policies regarding 
immigrant detention directly violate this principle. Immigrants wear jumpsuits, live in 
cellblocks identical to prison cellblocks, their freedom of movement is restricted at all 
times, they are reprimanded with punishments like solitary confinement or loss of 
outdoor recreation time and many immigrants are detained alongside criminal inmates. 
For all intents and purposes, immigrants in immigration detention are in prison; for those 
who had been convicted of a crime and served their sentence in prison, immigration 
detention is indistinguishable from where they served their criminal sentence. The use of 
prisons to detain immigrants directly violates fundamental human rights and the 
constitutes torture and CIDT under international law . 
 
C.  The Right to the Protection of the Family and the Right to Private Life and 
U.S. Immigration Policies 
 U.S. detention and deportation policies violate the right to family and the right to 
private life under international law. On a basic level, any unlawful or arbitrary detention 
that separates an individual from his or her family violates the right to family. Because 
U.S. detention policies require mandatory detention and because there is no individual, 
case-by-case determination of the state’s need to detain, the majority of individuals 
detained in immigration facilities are arbitrarily detained and separated from their 
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families in violation of international law. Similarly, deportation policies that forbid an IJ 
to take family ties and family hardship into account in the decision to deport directly 
violate the right to family. 
 U.S. immigration policies that promote transferring detainees to remote detention 
facilities, far from their families also violate the right to family, as do restrictions on 
visitation for immigrants in detention. Every detained person has the right to family 
visitation and family correspondence. U.S. detention policies, which restrict family 
visitation and policies that transfer detainees to detention facilities hundreds, and 
sometimes even thousands, of miles away from their families, are in direct violation of 
international law. Family visitation is also severely restricted in detention centers; not 
only are most family members so far away that they cannot visit the detention center 
regularly, but visitation times are also limited. Furthermore, many family members of 
immigrants in detention are undocumented, and cannot visit their loved one for fear that 
they will also be detained and deported. 
 Moreover, the right to family and private life protects an individual from arbitrary 
interference by the state. This right corresponds to international due process rights and 
the right to liberty in that a state may not enforce immigration laws in ones home unless 
the state has probable cause to believe an individual has committed an immigration 
violation.347 The government, in its ‘crackdown’ on ‘illegal’ immigration, instituted a 
policy whereby ICE officials would raid the homes of people suspected to be in the 
country illegally.348 Although these raids are less common today, ICE continues to raid 
people’s homes and terrorize immigrant communities. Although international law would 
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require probable cause to enter a private residence, ICE officials conducted home raids 
without probable cause to believe the residents were undocumented. These raids violate 
the right to family and private life under international law. 
 U.S. detention conditions also violate the right to family and private life. Families 
in detention, according to international law and the Detention Guidelines, should be 
separated from the rest of the detained population and alternatives to detention should be 
pursued if at all possible.349 The U.S., however, continues to detain families in prison-like 
detention conditions and more often than not, families are separated from each other.  
 
D.  The Refugee Convention and U.S. Treatment of Asylum-Seekers 
 Asylum-seekers face mandatory detention in the United States. When an asylum-
seeker presents himself at the border as someone seeking asylum, he must convince the 
immigration official on duty that he has credible fear of persecution. If the immigration 
official finds the story implausible or unconvincing, the asylum-seeker is immediately 
placed in expedited removal proceedings and detained until the government can deport 
him. The asylum-seeker in this case cannot appeal to a higher authority; the immigration 
official has sole discretion and authority to place an asylum-seeker in expedited removal 
proceedings. 
Even if the immigration official finds the asylum-seeker’s story to be plausible or 
convincing, the asylum-seeker still faces mandatory detention until he can have a more 
formal credible fear interview with an asylum officer. The length of time one must wait 
for a credible fear interview with an asylum officer varies; however, many are detained 
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for several months while they wait for the interview. Asylum-seekers are not eligible for 
parole or bond during this time, thus making their detention mandatory. 
After the credible fear interview, many asylum-seekers are forced to remain in 
detention for the duration of their asylum application. Although technically eligible for 
release from detention, if the IJ determines the individual seeking asylum does not have 
sufficient contacts in the United States, he is deemed a flight risk and must remain in 
detention for the duration of the asylum application process. Similarly, asylum-seekers 
who cannot afford to pay their bond are also forced to remain in detention for the 
duration of the application process. Applying for asylum is a lengthy process that requires 
extensive documentation. Many asylum-seekers spend months in detention while they 
complete the application and gather documents necessary to prove they faced persecution 
and fear future persecution in their home country. 
If the IJ determines the applicant does not qualify for asylum, the asylum-seeker 
can appeal, and must remain detained for the duration of the appeals process. IJ’s deny 
the majority of asylum applications and a large percentage of asylum-seekers appeal the 
initial IJ decision. If the individual seeking asylum is not eligible for parole or cannot 
afford to pay his bond, he must remain in detention until the appeals process is complete. 
The first appeal goes to the BIA and if the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision, then the asylum 
applicant must appeal to the Ninth Circuit. This process can take many months or even 
years; the asylum-seeker remains detained, without the possibility of parole, for the entire 
time. 
The Refugee Convention is clear that refugees and asylum-seekers should not be 
penalized or punished for seeking asylum. Article 31(1) forbids a state to penalize 
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refugees or asylum-seekers who enter the country without documentation or 
authorization.350 As long as asylum-seekers and refugees present themselves to 
immigration officials within a reasonable period of time and who good cause for their 
delay or illegal entry, state governments are prohibited from punishing illegal entry or 
entry without documentation.351 This article is important for most refugees and asylum-
seekers because the large majority of those fleeing their country must do so hastily and 
most do not have time to gather important documentation. Others are forced to flee under 
false names so as to avoid detection by their home government. This particular provision 
of the Refugee Convention acknowledges the extreme and dire circumstances under 
which refugees and asylum-seekers are forced to flee. 
By detaining all asylum-seekers, without the possibility of release prior to a 
credible fear interview with an asylum officer, the United States is directly violating 
Article 31(1). Through requiring that all asylum-seekers face mandatory detention, the 
United States is punishing asylum-seekers. Those who present themselves at the border 
without proper documentation are immediately placed in immigration detention, where 
they live in a prison-like setting, segregated from the rest of the U.S. population and often 
housed with criminal offenders. Mandatory detention is the very punishment the Refugee 
Convention forbids, however, the United States continues to detain all asylum-seekers. 
Furthermore, these detentions are not short but prolonged; a large number of asylum-
seekers wait months before they have their credible fear interview with an asylum officer, 
and many are detained for over six months, or even years if they are denied bond or 
parole. Detention in this context is punishment and violates the Refugee Convention. 
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 Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention prohibits unnecessary “restrictions on 
refugees’ movements.”352 Through requiring mandatory detention of asylum-seekers, 
without a case-by-case review of the necessity of such detention, the United States is 
violating this particular provision of the Refugee Convention. As mentioned in the 
previous section, although the Refugee Convention itself does not define exactly what 
‘necessary’ means under this provision, the UNHRC Detention Guidelines have 
explained what restrictions on refugees’ and asylum-seekers’ movements are ‘necessary,’ 
and therefore, proper under international refugee law. For example, a state would not 
violate the Convention if it were to detain an asylum-seeker who posed a legitimate threat 
to national security or the public order.353  
As it is U.S. policy to detain all asylum-seekers, regardless of whether they pose a 
threat to national security or the public order, U.S. policies cannot possibly be in 
accordance with Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention. According to U.S. law, anyone 
seeking asylum must be detained until he or she passes a credible fear hearing with an 
asylum officer. This is not a necessary detention under international law. And further, 
since 9/11, the United States has expanded grounds for detaining asylum-seekers at the 
border. For example, Operation Liberty Shield requires mandatory detention for all 
asylum-seekers from thirty-three countries that the U.S. government has determined Al 
Qaeda has been known to operate.354 Just this policy alone violates Article 31(2) of the 
Refugee Convention. 
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The Detention Guidelines express a clear preference against detaining asylum-
seekers and refugees. According to the Detention Guidelines, international law requires 
there be a presumption against detention355 and that detention of asylum-seekers is 
“inherently undesirable.”356 In the United States, and contrary to international law, the 
general presumption is not against detention but rather, it is to detain asylum-seekers and 
refugees; this preference for detention is evidenced by the mandatory detention policies 
that keep asylum-seekers and refugees detained for months and even years. While the 
UNHRC Detention Guidelines clearly state that asylum-seekers should not be detained 
while their cases are pending, the United States typically keeps asylum-seekers in 
detention for the duration of the application and appeals process. Mandatory detention 
and detaining asylum-seekers through out the lengthy asylum application process violates 
the Refugee Convention and international law. 
The UNHRC Detention Guidelines also outlines classes of asylum-seekers and 
refugees who should not be detained. According to the Guidelines, the elderly, pregnant 
women, children, people with mental and physical disabilities, survivors of trauma, 
victims of trafficking and lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgendered people should not be 
detained.357 If, in the rare instance where detention is necessary, the Detention Guidelines 
delineate clear requirements for the special treatment and consideration of these more 
vulnerable groups. Special treatment and consideration includes regular access to medical 
treatment, periodic assessment or review of mental/physical wellbeing, counseling and 
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other resources. Additionally, the state should pursue alternatives detention wherever 
possible for these groups, and should provide separate facilities for women and families.  
U.S. detention centers do not comport with international law in this respect. 
Asylum-seekers are not only detained in prison-like settings, but they are also detained 
with convicted criminals. There is limited access to medical treatment and often no 
access to counseling. There are no resources for survivors of torture or trauma and the 
government does not pursue alternatives to detention for these groups, as it is directed to 
do under international law. Those with mental and physical disabilities are provided 
minimal treatment and not separated from the general detained population. The groups 
who should be afforded special treatment, according to international refugee law, are not 
afforded any special treatment or consideration in U.S. immigration detention centers. 
 
3.  United States Immigration Policies Violate Well-Established International 
Human Rights Laws 
Not only does U.S. detention and deportation policy violate well-established 
human rights laws like the right to liberty, the right to be free from torture and CIDT, the 
right to family and several key provisions of the Refugee Convention, but the way the 
United States treats its immigrants more generally violates international law. Although 
the United States has signed and ratified the ICCPR, CAT, the Refugee Convention and 
although the United States is a member of the OAS and thus bound by IACHR decisions, 
the government continues to enact immigration policies that violate international law. 
 This section was by no means an exhaustive list of the ways U.S. immigration 
policies violate international law, nor did it detail all the international laws the United 
States is violating with its immigration policies. Rather, this section was meant to point 
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out key ways in which the United States is failing to comply with its obligations to 
respect the human rights of immigrants (including refugees and asylum-seekers) under 
international law. U.S. immigration policies are rife with human rights violations and are 
in direct conflict with fundamental human rights laws.  
 The contrast between U.S. obligations under international human rights law and 
U.S. immigration policy is not a new phenomenon, nor is the gap between human rights 
law and U.S. immigration detention and deportation practices is shrinking. In fact, U.S. 
immigration policies are increasingly punitive and discriminatory and are more in 
violation of international law today than they were even twenty years ago. Congress 
continues to expand the list of crimes that subject noncitizens to detention and 
deportation while it simultaneously reduces the avenues for relief from deportation and 
reduces the legal ways through which immigrants can enter the country. U.S. 
immigration policies, rather than converging with human rights laws, are continuing to 
further diverge from international law. 
 The legal community has advocated for immigrant rights by calling on the United 
States government to amend its immigration policies so that they are more in line with 
international laws. Unfortunately, the United States government continues to promote 
detention, deportation and increased militarization of the border as the primary means 
through which it regulates immigrants. Furthermore, immigration courts, the BIA, federal 
circuit courts and the Supreme Court, refuse to acknowledge international law in 
immigration proceedings. Immigrants cannot use international law to challenge their 
detention or their deportation. Immigrants cannot use international law to challenge the 
disparately adverse impact immigration policies have on immigrants of color. Simply put, 
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international law is not the solution to the human rights crisis facing immigrants in the 
United States. 
 The next chapter will explore international law from a different perspective. 
Instead of promoting international law as the key to challenging U.S. detention and 
deportation policies, the next chapter will illustrate how international law played a key 
role in the development of the current immigration system in the United States. Although 
the judiciary rarely uses international law today, the Court very frequently cited to 
international law to justify federal power over immigration regulation and to justify the 
denial of constitutional rights and protections to immigrants both inside and outside of 
the territorial United States. International law, instead of promoting immigrant human 
rights, actually facilitated the exclusion of immigrants from the protection of the 
Constitution.  
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CHAPTER VI 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY: POWERS INHERENT IN SOVEREIGNTY TO JUSTIFY 
FEDERAL PLENARY POWER OVER IMMIGRATION  
 
1. Introduction 
 
International human rights law has been hailed by those in the academic 
community as the solution to the rights crisis immigrants face in the United States today; 
however, international law is not a viable solution for immigrants currently facing 
mandatory detention and deportation. Although it is clear that the United States is 
violating international law in the way it treats immigrants and the way it enforces its 
immigration policies in general, the U.S. continues to detain and deport immigrants in a 
way that directly violates human rights laws. Even though the U.S. is in stark violation of 
their obligations under the ICCPR, CAT and the Refugee Convention, immigrants are 
unable to use international human rights laws in their immigration proceedings. 
Immigrants cannot challenge the validity of their detention or their impending 
deportation under these international laws and immigrants in the United States cannot use 
international law to challenge the way they are adversely impacted by immigration 
policies. 
Rather than proclaim that international law is the answer to the rights crisis that 
immigrants face in the United States today, this section will instead discuss the role 
international law has played in contributing to the development of the current 
immigration system, where immigrants are virtually excluded from asserting 
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constitutional rights in immigration proceedings. The United States used international 
law to help create an immigration system where immigrants have few constitutional 
rights, where the federal government has almost exclusive control over immigrants and 
immigration policy and where the legislative and executive branches operate outside of 
the Constitution. Instead of using a traditional enumerated powers analysis to justify 
congressional and executive action in the realm of immigration regulation, the Court 
instead looked to international law and principles of sovereignty to not only justify 
expanding federal power over immigration regulation, but also to justify excluding 
immigrants from the constitutional protections afforded to U.S. citizens. 
This section discusses the role international law played in the historical 
development of U.S. immigration policy and how the government used international law 
to take rights away from immigrants while simultaneously justifying expansive 
legislative and executive power over immigration policy. The government used 
international law and sovereignty very strategically; principles of sovereignty justified 
enhanced federal power over immigrants and those same principles also justified denying 
constitutional rights to immigrants in immigration proceedings.  
Today, U.S. courts use international law sparingly. However, international law 
was a driving force in the early development of the federal plenary power over 
immigration. International laws relating to sovereignty and powers inherent in 
sovereignty led the Court to develop the plenary power doctrine. The plenary power 
doctrine still operates in full force and requires extreme judicial deference to any and all 
congressional and executive decisions regarding immigration policy. Under the plenary 
power doctrine, immigrants are excluded from most constitutional protections in 
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immigration proceedings and the denial of due process to immigrants facing detention 
and deportation was a direct result of the Court’s use of international law in early 
immigration case law. 
As the federal government was attempting to expand its authority to regulate 
immigration and to justify taking constitutional rights away from immigrants, the 
government was also working to expand its authority over Native American tribes and to 
justify taking rights away from Native Americans as individuals. The case law during this 
period in history, where the government was looking to expand federal power over 
immigration and over Native American territory, rationalized this expansion of power 
and denial of rights in much the same way. The Court used principles of sovereignty to 
justify asserting federal authority over immigrants and used those same international 
principles in order to justify taking rights and land away from Native Americans.  
The Court also used principles of sovereignty to exclude both Native Americans 
and immigrants from asserting their constitutional rights against the government. The 
Court employed membership theories, in conjunction with international law, to deny 
Native Americans and immigrants constitutional protections; the Court determined that 
both groups were outside of the social contract between the government and the people, 
and therefore, neither group could assert claims against the government for violating their 
constitutional rights. The Court’s decisions regarding Native American land rights and 
constitutional rights directly influenced the Court’s decisions regarding immigrant rights. 
Conceptions of sovereignty found both in case law relating to Native Americans and 
immigration in general led directly to the development of an immigration system that is 
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“estranged from public law, where the Constitution operates in full force.”358 Unlike 
public law, immigration law has developed into a separate legal system, where 
immigrants have very few, if any constitutional rights. 
 This section will trace international law’s contribution to the creation of the 
federal plenary power over immigration. In exploring the historical roots of international 
law in immigration policy, this section will also explore how the plenary power doctrine 
and principles of sovereignty were used by the Court and the federal government to 
justify the denial of constitutional rights to Native Americans and how early nineteenth 
century Native American case law relates to immigration law and policy today. The 
government used international legal principles of sovereignty at a time when it was trying 
to exert power of groups of people it deemed “racially inferior,” “unassimilable,” a threat 
to national security and ultimately, to groups seen as the “other.” Because the Court used 
principles of sovereignty to expand federal power over “undesirable” immigrants and 
also over Native Americans, it is important explore the use of sovereignty in both Native 
American and immigration case law. The cases build on each other and treat both 
immigrants and Native Americans in much the same way: excluded from membership in 
the American polity and subject to absolute federal control. 
 
2. Sovereignty Defined 
 Sovereignty can be defined as a set of international rules that dictate how a nation 
state can and should interact with other nation states.359 Sovereignty also defines a 
government as a nation state. There are certain powers inherent in sovereignty that all 
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nation states possess, simply by their status. According to Emer de Vattel, an eighteenth-
century philosopher and legal scholar famous for his work in international law, “all 
nations possess certain powers inherent in their existence as nations. These powers [are] 
defined, shared and recognized by all members of the family of nations and were 
essential to a nation’s identity as an independent state.”360 Vattel further explained that a 
nation’s “[s]overeign powers were not subject to any external or positive constraints, save 
the rights of other sovereigns under international law, and any effort to limit these powers 
would undermine the nation’s independence and equal status in the international 
community.”361 Vattel’s work influenced many American legal scholars and jurists in the 
late nineteenth century. 
 Sovereignty can be an amorphous concept, however, in this context, sovereignty 
refers primarily to a “recognized set of international rules regarding the definition and 
authority of a nation-state and its interactions with other states.”362 Sovereignty, 
according to its legal definition in international law, is an essential element of 
statehood.363 This definition of sovereignty widely influenced American jurisprudence in 
the area of immigration regulation and Native American relations, in particular Fifth 
Amendment Takings of Native American land. The Court repeatedly relied on Vattel and 
other international legal philosopher’s conceptions of sovereignty and the rights and 
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powers inherent in sovereignty to define federal power over immigrants and Native 
Americans in the nineteenth century. 
 According to international law, a nation has the sovereign power to exclude 
foreigners from entering the country and it also has power over foreigners already 
admitted into the country. Both of these powers derive from the powers inherent in 
sovereignty. The nation, as a sovereign entity, has the power to exclude, as well as the 
power to defend itself from threats to security and it has the power to enforce and uphold 
its domestic laws. Through the power to exclude immigrants, the nation is exercising its 
inherent powers of exclusion and power to defend itself; a nation can keep those it deems 
dangerous or a threat to national safety out. A nation’s power over immigrants already 
admitted into the country involves the power to defend and the power to enforce or 
uphold domestic laws. International law dictates that a nation has the power to expel 
those immigrants who have broken a law or who are in some way a threat to security. 
 Although principles of sovereignty provide that nations have the power to protect 
themselves from immigrants seeking to enter, that power is not absolute; the nation 
cannot simply treat immigrants in any way it sees fit. According to Vattel, the sovereign 
“cannot, without particular and important reasons, refuse permission, either to pass 
through or reside in the country, to foreigners who desire it for lawful purposes.”364 In 
other words, in order to exclude an immigrant from entry, the sovereign must have a 
valid and lawful reason for denying entry. Vattel also expressed the sovereign state’s 
obligation to immigrants it admits; a nation, upon admitting immigrants, “engages to 
protect them as his own subjects, and to afford them perfect security, as far as depends on 
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him.”365 International law thus requires the sovereign to protect admitted immigrants and 
requires that exclusion of immigrants be based on particular and substantial reasons.366 
 
3.  Social Contract and Membership Theories 
 Theories of membership and social contract were used in conjunction with 
international laws of sovereignty to restrict the rights of Native Americans and 
immigrants and ultimately led to the development of the plenary power doctrine and the 
immigration laws in place today. Membership theory or social contract theory is still used 
as a means to deny constitutional protections to certain groups of people who are not 
considered part of the “national community.” It is thus important to analyze how 
membership theories played a role in the development of the plenary power doctrine and 
ultimately how conceptions of membership were used to deny rights to immigrants and 
Native Americans. 
 On a basic level, social contract theory or membership theory considers “whether 
an individual is one intended to be protected by the Constitution.”367 It emphasizes a 
contractual relationship between the federal government and the people of the United 
States. The people of the United States consent to be governed and the national 
government agrees to uphold the people’s individual rights as laid out by the 
Constitution. In other words, the Constitution is a contract between the national 
government and the people, whereby the people consent to be governed by the national 
government, so long as the national government does not infringe upon individual 
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freedoms explicitly defined in the Constitution. If an individual is a party to the contract, 
he is an intended beneficiary of the contract and can assert his constitutional rights 
against the government. However, if an individual is not a party to the constitutional 
contract, the government is free to act outside of the contract’s restraints (can infringe 
upon individual constitutional rights without repercussions).368 
Membership theory attempts to define who is a party to the contract. The 
language of the Constitution refers to “we the people.” However, that particular phrase is 
not explicitly defined and thus “we the people” can be defined broadly or very narrowly. 
For example, “we the people” could be broadly defined as including any person who is 
physically present within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. That would 
mean that any individual, regardless of citizenship, who is physically within the United 
States, is a party to the social contract and the government is constrained by the 
Constitution. Conversely, “we the people” could be narrowly defined to include only 
citizens physically present within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. That 
would mean that any noncitizen is outside of the social contract and is not an intended 
beneficiary of the Constitutional contract. Thus, the government is not restricted by the 
Constitution in its treatment of immigrants and immigrants, because they are not 
beneficiaries, are not entitled to claim constitutional protects that other beneficiaries to 
the Constitution can assert. 
Social contract and membership theories played a central role the development of 
U.S. immigration law and policy. In the late-nineteenth century, when the Court was 
establishing the limits of the federal plenary power, membership was defined narrowly. 
During this period, “social contract approaches resolved the question of membership in 
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favor of a white, male, Protestant vision of the national identity. Entitlement to 
constitutional protection was determined on the basis of the ascribed characteristics of 
race, gender, nationality, and religion.”369 Because Anglo-Saxon, Christian heritage was 
the ideal for membership in the American community, membership was used to deny 
constitutional protections to “non-white” immigrants and Native Americans. The denial 
of rights was justified because these groups were not intended beneficiaries of the social 
contract; they lacked membership and therefore, did not have the same rights as 
members.370 
Native Americans and immigrants were denied access to constitutional 
protections because they were “outside” of the U.S. Although physically present within 
the territorial United States, Native American tribes were sovereign and individual Native 
Americans, therefore, owed their allegiance to a sovereign other than the United States. 
Similarly, immigrants were excluded from membership because of their connections to 
other sovereign nations. For those immigrants seeking to enter the United States, they 
faced an additional hurdle to membership because they were not physically within the 
country. By defining immigrants and Native Americans as non-members or “outside” 
whether literally or figuratively, the government was better able to justify increasing 
federal control over these two groups. And because both groups were not members of the 
United States, they had no rights to challenge the government’s authority through the 
Constitution. 
Racism and xenophobia were also central to the Court’s definition of who was 
excluded from membership in the national community. In early nineteenth century case 
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law, the Court was very open with its racist and discriminatory opinions of Native 
Americans and immigrants (of color). Both were considered by the government and 
much of the predominantly white American public to be “barbaric,” “uncivilized,” 
“unassimilable,” a “danger” to national security and innately “inferior.” Nativism and 
racial discrimination were prevalent in court opinions, congressional debates and within 
the public sphere generally. Laws enacted during this time were openly justified by 
racism and ultimately upheld by the courts. The overt racism and xenophobia during this 
period directly influenced the membership debate over whether to allow Native 
Americans and immigrants to become part of the social contract. Because Native 
Americans and immigrants were considered racially inferior and because both groups 
were considered to be “outside” of the sovereign United States, both groups were denied 
membership in the American polity and therefore denied vital constitutional protections. 
 
4.  From Limited, Enumerated Powers to Inherent Plenary Power: Using 
International Law and Conceptions of Sovereignty to Justify Federal Plenary 
Power 
 When the Framers drafted the Constitution, they envisioned a government that 
was shared and divided.371 In order to prevent authoritarian control, power was divided 
between the federal government, the states and the people. To keep the federal 
government’s power in check, its powers were not only divided among three branches, 
the judicial, legislative and executive, but its powers were also limited to those powers 
expressly granted to it by the Constitution.372 The Court in McCulloch v. Maryland 
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explained these constraints on the national government’s power as limited and 
enumerated; the government may only exercise the powers explicitly granted to it by the 
Constitution and only “those implied powers ‘necessary and proper’ to the exercise of the 
delegated powers.”373 All powers not expressly delegated by the Constitution to the 
federal government were powers reserved to the states and to the people of the United 
States.374 
The perception of sovereignty, at the time of framing, was collective; sovereignty 
was divided and shared between the three branches of the federal government, the states, 
and the people.375 In giving the federal government authority to act only through the 
powers expressly granted to it by the Constitution and only those implied powers 
necessary and proper to exercise the powers expressly delegated to the government, the 
framers intended to limit the federal government’s power.376 This vision of collective 
sovereignty faltered as interactions between the U.S. and other foreign nations became 
more frequent. The Constitution was largely silent as to the specific powers the federal 
government had with regard to foreign relations.377 Because the government could only 
act where the Constitution authorized government action, the federal government looked 
to sources outside of the Constitution to justify its actions in the realm of foreign 
relations.    
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 The Court resorted to international legal principles of sovereignty as a way to 
avoid the question of whether it was acting within the Constitution’s boundaries. Over 
time, the Court justified increasing the federal government’s power over what it labeled 
“foreign” or “external” relations through incorporating customary international law into 
its constitutional analyses.378 Sovereignty was used as a way to rationalize giving more 
power to the federal government, power that the language of the Constitution did not 
explicitly grant to the government. The original vision of the national government as one 
of enumerated powers evolved into a vision of a national government that, because of its 
status as a sovereign nation state, had absolute authority in all of its external relations.379 
When the government acted in the international sphere, it acted through powers outside 
of those granted to it in the Constitution itself. 
 International customary law and principles of sovereignty as justification for 
expanding federal power beyond the Constitution directly influenced U.S. immigration 
policy. The Court used international legal principles of sovereignty to not only enable the 
national government to act in the international realm, but also as a way to limit the 
Constitution’s applicability to individuals within the nation’s borders.380 Native 
Americans and immigrants were severely and negatively impacted by the Court’s 
willingness to resort to international conceptions of powers inherent in sovereignty as the 
justification for government action.381 International law was used to justify taking Native 
American land and denying citizenship to Native Americans. International law was also 
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used to justify excluding and expelling “undesirable” immigrants (a term which applied 
only to immigrants of color from developing nations). This is significant because both of 
these groups were considered racially, culturally and religiously inferior and both groups 
were denied citizenship and thus denied the constitutional protections afforded to 
citizens.  
The Court’s willingness to use international legal principles of sovereignty to 
justify disparate treatment of Native Americans and “undesirable” immigrants was 
greatly influenced by racist and nativist perceptions of Native Americans and Asian 
immigrants. Because both of these groups were considered culturally different, 
“unassimilable,” and a threat to American Anglo-Saxon culture, the Court was less 
concerned with their individual constitutional rights.382 Because the Court was less 
concerned with protecting Native American and immigrant rights, the Court rationalized 
a huge expansion of federal power in the realm of Native American relations and 
immigration law. That rationalization led to the current immigration system and 
continues to influence the further denial of immigrant rights in the United States. 
 The Court’s willingness to rely on international customary law in its justification 
of granting the federal government extra-constitutional power led to the development of 
the plenary power doctrine. 383 The plenary power doctrine has greatly influenced U.S. 
immigration law and has justified, and continues to justify, the denial of constitutional 
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protections to immigrants. The plenary power doctrine gives the legislative and executive 
branches of the federal government ultimate authority to enact immigration laws. The 
doctrine represents a stark contrast with the enumerated powers doctrine, articulated by 
the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819, because it allows the federal government to 
act where the Constitution is silent. Although the doctrine developed as a way to justify 
government action with respect to international or foreign affairs, the doctrine was 
ultimately used to deny constitutional protections to certain groups (namely immigrants 
and Native Americans) within the borders of the U.S. 
By 1936, the Court had fully developed the plenary power doctrine. In United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court articulated, for the first time, the three 
key elements of the doctrine: First, the federal government has extra-constitutional 
powers that derive, not from the Constitution, but rather, from international law; second, 
because these powers are extra-constitutional, there is relatively little constitutional 
constraint; and third, the courts have a limited ability to review “legislative or executive 
decisions that extend from that power.”384 The Court used a theory of inherent powers, 
derived from international legal conceptions of sovereignty and sovereign power, to 
divide the Constitution into two parts: internal and external powers.385 The Court applied 
the traditional enumerated powers doctrine only to internal, domestic relations, while it 
found that external powers were extra-constitutional – meaning not limited by the 
traditional restraints on federal power.386 Instead, limits on federal power when the 
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government exercised its external powers came from “concepts of sovereignty shared, 
recognized and defined by the community of nations. The traditional enumerated powers 
analysis applie[d] only to U.S. domestic, internal relations.”387 
 The plenary power doctrine and its three key components: extra-constitutional 
source of government power, absence of substantive constitutional limitations on that 
power, and judicial deference to the executive or legislative branches, was derived from 
early nineteenth century case law.388 The development of this doctrine demonstrates how 
the United States used international legal principles of sovereignty, specifically, well-
established powers like the sovereign power to exclude, the sovereign power to defend 
and the sovereign power to enforce domestic law. The Court’s use of sovereignty and 
international law demonstrate how international law helped to create the current 
immigration system and helps to explain why individuals facing deportation have few 
constitutional rights.  
Not only did the Court resort to sovereignty as a means to justify denying 
constitutional rights to Native Americans and immigrants but it also used principles of 
membership to limit the ability of Native Americans and immigrants to challenge laws as 
unconstitutional.389 Theories of membership were combined with international principles 
of sovereignty to exclude Native Americans and immigrants from the American polity 
and thus exclude them from the scope of the Constitution. The Court “described both 
Native Americans and immigrants as aberrant states, existing within but apart from the 
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nation.”390 The Court, in developing the plenary power doctrine, also relied on 
membership theory to justify denying constitutional rights to immigrants and Native 
Americans. Thus international rules regarding sovereignty and theories of membership 
worked in conjunction to justify unbridled federal power over Native Americans and 
immigrants and to justify removing Native Americans and immigrants from the reach of 
the Constitution.391 
 
5. Principles of Sovereignty and Membership Theory to Justify Denying Rights 
to Native Americans 
Early nineteenth-century case law established that federal control over Native 
Americans came from inherent powers of sovereignty as well as Native Americans’ 
“inferior” status.392 Because Native Americans were excluded from the American polity 
due to their status as a “sovereign” entity, the Court justified expansive federal power 
over Native Americans through the treaty power, war power and power to regulate 
interstate commerce.393 Because Native American tribes were equated with “foreign 
states” and because the Constitution explicitly granted the federal government power to 
act through the three powers of war, treaty and commerce, the federal government had 
large control over Native American tribes as an entity.394 However, the Constitution was 
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silent as to Native Americans as individuals – did Native Americans have individual 
constitutional rights?395 
 The Court denied Native Americans membership in the American polity due to 
their status as “savage” or “barbaric” and because of their “inferiority” and inability to 
assimilate.396 Because of their perceived inferior status, Native Americans were openly 
denied rights that “civilized” white citizens held, like the right to own property and the 
right to vote.397 The Court justified this denial of rights through international legal 
principles of sovereignty, and the sovereign right deriving from discovery.398 The Court 
also found that Native Americans were an “incomplete” sovereign; the tribes were 
heavily dependent on the U.S. government and therefore were treated as wards of the 
state. According the Court, as incomplete sovereigns, dependent on the United States 
government, Native American tribes were subject to greater federal control. Rather than 
look to the war, treaty and commerce power to justify denying property rights to Native 
Americans, the federal government used principles of sovereignty under international law 
as a justification for expanding federal power over Native Americans as tribes and as 
individuals.399  
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 Interestingly, although the Court determined that Native American tribes were 
sovereign, the Court later denied Native American tribes the right to sue in U.S. courts.400 
The Court, in the Cherokee Cases, denied the Cherokee Nation the right to sue in federal 
court, and found that even though the tribe “had the character of a state, the tribe was not 
a foreign state” and thus not subject to U.S. jurisdiction.401 This decision, which explicitly 
denied Native tribes the status of a “foreign state” within the meaning of Article III of the 
Constitution, was based on the premise that Native Americans were dependent on the 
government. Justice Marshall explained the relationship between Native Americans and 
the government as “that of a ward to its guardian.”402 Native Americans were sovereign, 
but they were an incomplete sovereign due to their dependence on the U.S. government. 
This dependence justified the “stronger” sovereign’s power over the “weaker” sovereign. 
This distinction put Native Americans in a state of limbo – they were neither citizens of 
the United States, nor were they a separate sovereign, entitled to all the rights inherent in 
sovereignty under international law.403 
 The Court further excluded individual Native Americans from Constitutional 
protections in Elk v. Wilkins. In that case, the Court interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which granted citizenship to all persons born in the United States, as 
applying only to those persons who, at the time they were born, were completely subject 
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to U.S. jurisdiction.404 As the Court had previously held that Native American tribes were 
sovereigns (albeit “incomplete” ones), Native Americans were not “completely” subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction at birth.405 According to the Court, although Native American tribes 
were physically within the jurisdiction of the United States, Native Americans born in the 
United States did not qualify for citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment because 
they were “distinct political communities.”406 The Court heavily emphasized Native 
Americans’ sovereign and autonomous status in order to justify denying birthright 
citizenship.407  
 The decisions in McIntosh, the later Cherokee cases, and Elk v. Wilkins relied on 
principles of sovereignty to both justify federal power over Native Americans, while at 
the same time, justifying the denial of constitutional rights to Native Americans. In 
United States v. Kagama, the Court further excluded Native Americans from the 
protection of the Constitution and further expanded the federal government’s power over 
Native Americans. The Court, in Kagama, established the first prong of the plenary 
power doctrine – the government, as a sovereign nation, has powers inherent in 
sovereignty; and therefore, “Congress has inherent sovereign power to govern the [Native 
American] territories.”408 According to the Court, these federal powers originate, not from 
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the powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution, but from powers 
inherent in the United States’ status as a sovereign nation.  
 In Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, the Court expanded federal plenary power over 
Native Americans in Kagama, and held that Congress’s exercise of that power was not 
subject to review by the courts.409 This extension represents the third prong of the plenary 
power doctrine – limited judicial review of legislative and executive decisions. According 
to the Court, “[t]he power existing in Congress to administer upon and guard the tribal 
property, and the power being political and administrative in its nature, the manner of its 
exercise is a question within the province of the legislative branch to determine, and its 
not one for the courts.”410 The Court, in classifying federal power over Native American 
land rights as administrative and political in nature, justified the federal government’s 
denial of land rights to Native Americans and at the same time, established limited 
judicial review of those decisions.  
After Kagama and Cherokee Nation, it was well-established that Congress and the 
executive held broad powers over Native American affairs; those powers originated not 
from the Constitution, but rather, from international legal principles of sovereignty, and 
those powers were subject to minimal, if any judicial review. While the Court did 
recognize some constitutional constraints on legislative power over Native Americans, 
the Court held that “Congress has ‘wide discretion’ in determining what was reasonably 
essential, and ‘its action, unless purely arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect 
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by the courts.’”411 So long as Congress’s exercise of its power “does not go beyond what 
is reasonably essential” to protect the Native Americans and is “not purely arbitrary, but 
founded on some reasonable basis” Congress has authority to act and those actions will 
be given wide judicial deference.412 
 The Court’s decisions regarding Native Americans and congressional power over 
Native American affairs influenced the development of immigration law and policy. In 
the cases discussed above, the Court began to use international law to justify extensive 
federal control over a group of people who were labeled as “ racially inferior,” 
“barbaric,” “unassimilable,” and beholden to a sovereign other than the United States. 
This case law developed in a time where immigrants were also experiencing 
discrimination and a denial of their basic constitutional and human rights. The Court, in 
later cases concerning immigrants, built on the principles outlined in Kagama, Elk v. 
Wilkins, and Cherokee Nation to justify excluding immigrants from constitutional 
protection and to justify expanding federal power, with little judicial deference, over 
immigration regulations. In both the Native American case law and immigration case 
law, the court used international legal principles of sovereignty to exclude immigrants 
and Native Americans from membership in the American polity, and thus from vital 
constitutional protections. 
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6. Principles of Sovereignty and Membership Theory to Justify Denying Rights 
to Immigrants 
 International law and principles of sovereignty and sovereign power were 
prominent in nineteenth century case law regarding immigration and the federal 
immigration power.413 The Court “ultimately took the position that international law gave 
nations absolute power to exclude aliens seeking admission and to deport aliens no longer 
deemed admissible.”414 This reliance on extra-constitutional, inherent sovereign power 
largely explains why immigrants today do not have constitutional protections in 
immigration proceedings. The federal government’s near-absolute control over 
immigration policy, and the judicial deference through which the Court analyzes 
immigration regulations, are a direct result of the Court’s use of international law in early 
nineteenth century immigration cases. 
 The Constitution is relatively silent as to whether the federal government has the 
power to regulate immigration. Although the Naturalization Clause references Congress’s 
authority to “establish a uniform rule of Naturalization,” this clause has been understood 
to refer to issues of citizenship, not to the admission or expulsion of noncitizens.415 
Similarly, the Migration Clause, although it suggests that Congress has the power to 
prohibit migration of people, it does not explicitly refer to federal authority to regulate 
migration; most understand the Migration Clause to refer to the regulation of the slave 
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trade only.416 The foreign commerce, treaty and war powers are the only other federal 
powers, explicitly referenced in the Constitution, which could be extended to 
immigration regulation more broadly.417 These three powers: the war, treaty and 
commerce power, were initially used to justify early federal regulation of immigration. 
Because immigration was tied to labor, regulating immigration fell under the power to 
regulate foreign commerce. The Constitution’s silence as to the federal immigration 
power is ultimately what led the Court to reach to international law in order to justify 
federal control over the admission and expulsion of immigrants. This use of international 
law, and sovereignty in particular, had a profound impact on immigrant rights and forms 
the foundation of current U.S. immigration policies. 
 In the early stages of federal immigration regulation, the commerce power and the 
taxing power were the primary justifications for federal power over immigration. For 
example, between 1875 and 1886, the Court consistently held that the federal government 
had the authority to impose head taxes on newly arriving immigrants and that the federal 
government also had the power to inspect immigrants upon entry.418 During this time, the 
Court used an enumerated powers analysis, locating the federal power immigration in 
federal power to regulate foreign commerce. In upholding the federal government’s 
authority to impose head taxes on immigrants and in denying the states that authority, the 
Court relied only on the Constitution.419  
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 It wasn’t until Chae Chan Ping v. United States that the Court began to look 
outside of the Constitution to locate the federal government’s power to exclude 
immigrants from entering the country. Chae Chan Ping was not just an immigrant seeking 
entry, but he was seeking re-entry; he had already been admitted to the United States and 
had left the country only briefly. Chae Chan Ping thus involved more than the 
government’s power to tax or inspect immigrants upon entry; the case involved the 
government’s power to exclude. In order to justify excluding Chae Chan Ping, the Court 
would need to find a new rationale for excluding returning immigrants. 
In the government’s brief, the Solicitor General used international law to argue 
that Chae Chan Ping should be excluded from reentry. The government quoted Vattel in 
its argument, suggesting that international law allowed the government, as a sovereign 
nation, to exclude immigrants outside of the country from entering the country.420 
According to the government, because Chae Chan Ping was outside of the territorial 
United States, the government, as a sovereign nation and endowed with all the rights of 
sovereignty, had the ultimate power to exclude him from entry.421 The government further 
argued that the right to exclude “arose from government collective powers over foreign 
relations, which embraced the full sovereign powers enjoyed by independent states.”422  
 Ultimately, the Court sided with the government, invoking international principles 
of sovereignty in order to justify the government’s exclusion of Chae Chan Ping. 
According to the Court, international law and powers inherent in sovereignty allow a 
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nation the sole authority to prohibit anyone from entering its borders.423 In the opinion, 
Justice Field wrote: 
[T]he United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or 
citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent 
nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute 
independence and security throughout its entire territory. The powers to declare 
war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign 
commerce...are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the 
constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, 
more or less, the conduct of civilized nations.424 
 
According to Justice Field, the federal government’s immigration power was a 
central component of sovereignty, a power held by all sovereign nations: 
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging 
to the government of the United States, as part of those sovereign powers 
delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the 
judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be 
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one... 
 
The Court, thus located the government’s immigration power, not in the 
Constitution itself, but in international legal principles of sovereignty. As in Kagama, the 
Court found this federal power to be inherent in international law and inherent in 
sovereignty.425 Further, the Court explained that this power, inherent in sovereignty, was 
to be given limited judicial review. According to the Court, because the power to exclude 
immigrants was a political one, Congress’s exercise of that power was “conclusive upon 
the judiciary.”426 
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The government...is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the 
powers shall be called forth; and its determinations, so far as the subjects affected 
are concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers... 
 
Not only did the Court reference the sovereign right to exclude people at the 
border but it also referenced a nation’s sovereign right to defend itself and the sovereign 
right to self-preservation.427 Justice Field explained: 
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and 
encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly 
all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such 
aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its 
national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The 
government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and 
security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers 
shall be called forth...If, therefore, the government of the United States, through 
its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race 
in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and 
security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual 
hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects.428 
 
Overt racism and xenophobia were key components of the Court’s decision to 
deny Chae Chan Ping reentry. Because of the intense anti-immigrant sentiment, directly 
primarily at the Chinese and other Asian immigrants, the Court looked to international 
law in order to justify exclusion of Chinese and Asian immigrants. Although the Court 
had used the commerce clause to justify exclusion of Asian immigrants up until this 
point, the power to exclude Chae Chan Ping and others like him was too broad to be 
justified by the commerce clause alone.429 Thus, the Court reached to principles of 
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international law and sovereignty to exercise a power that was beyond the scope of the 
Constitution.430  
Although the Court concluded that sovereign powers, derived from international 
law, allowed the federal government to exclude immigrants, the Court did not explain 
how the enumerated powers doctrine limited this federal power, or whether it even 
applied.431 The Court, in choosing not to rely the Constitution but instead on international 
law, radically changed the way the Court approached federal immigration regulation.432 
In the cases that follow Chae Chan Ping, the Court continues to use international law and 
sovereignty as a justification for expanding federal power over immigration regulation. 
The Court repeatedly references the sovereign right to exclude and the right to defend as 
the key powers inherent in sovereignty that justify exclusion of immigrants.  
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court extended the federal government’s 
power over immigration regulation and further eroded immigrant rights. Unlike Chae 
Chan Ping, Nishimura Ekiu involved an immigrant seeking entry into the United States 
for the first time. Under the Immigration Act of 1891, immigration officials had near-
unlimited authority to deny an immigrant entry and that decision was to be final, subject 
to only limited administrative judicial review.433 Nishimura was denied entry and she 
challenged the constitutionality of the Act.434 Interestingly, in challenging the 
                                                
430 Id. 
 
431 Id. 
 
432 Id. at 134. 
 
433 Id.  
 
434 Id. 
 
 151 
constitutionality of the Act, Nishimura did not challenge Congress’s authority to exclude, 
but rather, she challenged whether deference to the executive and limited judicial review 
of the decision to exclude was consistent with due process.435  
As in Chae Chan Ping, the government’s brief cited Vattel and the government 
argued that the federal government, as a sovereign nation, had the power to exclude.436 It 
also argued that because Nishimura was physically outside of the territorial United States, 
she was not entitled to due process under the Constitution.437 The government, in essence, 
was arguing that because Nishimura was physically outside of the U.S., she was not 
entitled to constitutional due process protections. She was not a member to the contract, 
and as such, she could not claim its benefits. The Court agreed, stating: 
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the 
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the 
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases 
and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe...In the United States, this 
power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has 
committed the entire control of international relations...438 
 
 In addition to relying on powers inherent in sovereignty as the sole justification 
for excluding Nishimura and denying the traditional Constitutional due process 
protections to immigrants seeking entry at the border, the Court again reaffirmed the 
extreme level of deference the judiciary should give to Congress and the executive: 
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have 
never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicil or residence within the United 
States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted 
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to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative 
and executive branches of the national government. As to such persons, the 
decisions of the executive [and of Congress], are due process of law.439 
 
 The Court had thus enunciated all three prongs of the plenary power doctrine: the 
source of the government’s power to regulate immigration was inherent and came from 
international law, there would be very limited judicial review of congressional and 
executive exercise of this inherent power, and individual due process protections would 
not limit this power.440 The federal government’s power to regulate immigration and to 
exclude immigrants was no longer constrained by the Constitution and the specific rights 
delineated therein. The Court rationalized the government’s control over immigration 
through international law and rights inherent in sovereignty. The government’s power is 
not limited by individual due process rights, nor are Congress’s or the executive’s 
decisions subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As the Court explained, “the decisions of the 
executive [and Congress] are due process of law.”441 
 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court used international law to extend the 
denial of constitutional due process protections to an immigrant legally and physically 
present in the United States. While Nishimura Ekiu involved an immigrant outside of the 
territorial United States, seeking entry into the country for the first time, Fong Yue Ting 
was an immigrant who was lawfully present in the country as a lawful resident.442 And 
unlike Chae Chan Ping, who the court treated as an immigrant seeking entry, even though 
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he had previously been admitted to the United States, Fong Yue Ting was both physically 
present and legally admitted. However, the Court was able to justify denying Nishimura 
and Chae Chan Ping entry because it held that Congress and the executive were 
authorized to exclude them based on powers inherent in sovereignty. But Fong Yue Ting 
presented a different issue: whether Congress could expel an immigrant who was not 
only physically present within U.S. territory, but who had also been legally admitted as a 
resident.  
Nonetheless, the Court extended the inherent powers analysis to Fong Yue Ting, 
stating that “the right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or 
upon certain conditions, in war or in peace [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every 
sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence, and its 
welfare.”443 In the opinion, Justice Gray pointed solely to international law and powers 
inherent in sovereignty as the basis for this broad federal power.444 According to the 
Court, international law was the sole location of this power; the federal government’s 
immigration power was not located in the Constitution, nor was any attempt made to 
reference the Constitution’s grant of this power to the government.445 Because the source 
of this power was derived from international law and principles of sovereignty, the 
government’s immigration power was subject to very limited judicial review and 
superseded individual rights to due process.446 
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CHAPTER VII  
FINAL THOUGHTS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1. Initial Thoughts 
 
 Throughout the process of researching and writing this thesis, I have struggled 
with the rigidity of immigration law and the near-absolute denial of human rights to 
immigrants in the United States. The racist foundations of U.S. immigration law have led 
to a system where the executive and legislative branches have complete control over the 
lives of immigrants. The federal government rationalizes its harsh treatment of 
immigrants by claiming that current policies protect the American people and American 
way of life from criminals and terrorists. The government claims its treatment of 
immigrants and denial of rights is legitimate and necessary to protect national security 
and the public. The government claims its immigration policies have nothing to do with 
race and everything to do with security and upholding the rule of law. 
 In reality, U.S. immigration policies further the racist tendencies of the ‘white’ 
American public. Although current immigration policies are facially race neutral, the 
laws are designed to oppress immigrants of color – primarily immigrants from Latin 
America and those of Muslim or Arab descent. Even though Congress, the executive, 
political leaders and many in the American public claim that stricter immigration laws are 
not racially driven, the ‘crackdown’ on ‘illegal’ immigration targets immigrants of color. 
Mexico and Latin America are repeatedly referenced in the ‘illegal immigration’ debate 
and proponents of stricter immigration enforcement intend to target Arab and Muslim 
immigrants because of their ‘ties’ to terrorism. Intense racial discrimination underlies the 
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immigration debate in the United States, even though proponents of strict immigration 
policies pretend their aims are not racially motivated. 
I chose to write a thesis on immigrant rights in the United States because I believe 
that immigrants are more powerless than most other disadvantaged groups. Immigrants in 
the United States have fewer civil and political rights than U.S. citizens and immigrants 
also have fewer economic and social rights than U.S. citizens. Immigrants who have not 
naturalized cannot vote in federal elections and therefore have little say in the laws the 
government passes or in who is elected to represent them. Many immigrants are denied 
access to social services like Medicare, Medicaid, or Social Security because of their 
status. Additionally, many immigrants’ movements are restricted; they must be physically 
present within the United States for certain, very delineated time periods in order to keep 
their legal status. These requirements prohibit immigrants from leaving the country for 
extended periods to visit their families and their native countries. 
Immigrants who are undocumented face even more difficulties because of their 
‘illegal’ status. Undocumented immigrants are completely powerless in American 
society. Not only do they lack the power to vote and the ability to apply for social 
services, but undocumented immigrants have no voice at all. Undocumented immigrants 
live in the shadows of society: they have no rights, no ability to protect themselves, 
because they aren’t ‘supposed’ to be here. They live in constant fear that they will be 
reported to immigration authorities and they are often the scapegoats for society’s 
economic and social problems. Anti-immigrant sentiment is particularly virulent during 
times of economic strife and undocumented immigrants are easy targets because they 
have no ability to defend themselves. 
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Without the ability to vote or the ability to voice their opinions in any meaningful 
way, immigrants, both documented and undocumented, are forced to abide by the laws 
that the rest of society dictates. Immigrants have no ability to influence immigration laws 
or immigration policy, and must simply abide by the laws that Congress and the 
executive enact. Not only do immigrants have virtually no voice in immigration law and 
policy, but the historical development of immigration policy has led to a body of law that 
is nearly exempt from judicial discretion. Immigrants cannot exert their limited political 
power to fight for their constitutional rights in the context of immigration law, nor can the 
judiciary analyze immigration laws under a traditional constitutional rights analysis. The 
system today prevents immigrants from challenging the constitutionality of immigration 
laws and prevents the courts from overturning immigration laws because of their 
discriminatory or racist underpinnings. 
Furthermore, the sharp rise in detention and deportation of immigrants has 
profound impacts, not only for those individuals who face detention and permanent 
banishment, but also for their families. The federal government uses detention and 
deportation to enforce and regulate immigration into the United States. The focus on 
crime and punishment, combined with the focus on militarization of the border, has 
created a system in which immigrants have few rights and human rights abuses are 
prevalent. The way immigrants are treated in the United States is a major cause for 
concern. Militarization of the border has created a human rights crisis: immigrants are 
literally dying as they try to cross the border into the United States. Immigrants in 
immigration detention face severe abuse and the majority of those in detention do not 
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need to be there. Deportation separates families and leads to a repetitive cycle of 
unauthorized entry and re-entry. 
As the immigration policies in the United States are so rigid and so immune from 
judicial discretion, immigration scholars and legal advocates look outside U.S. domestic 
law to international laws in their attempt to bring constitutional or human rights to 
immigrants in the United States. Much of the initial research I found centered primarily 
on the international laws that apply to immigrant rights and in particular, the conventions 
the U.S. has signed and ratified. Many scholars also pointed to other international 
conventions such as the CRC or the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers 
and their Families in their analysis of international law and U.S. immigration policy. 
Regardless of whether the focus was solely on international conventions the U.S. has 
signed and ratified or whether it was on international human rights laws more broadly, 
the majority of the literature laid out the international laws and pointed to the many ways 
in which U.S. immigration policies violated those laws. 
The consensus in the literature was clear: U.S. immigration policies are in direct 
violation of fundamental international human rights laws. Even more importantly, the 
United States is in direct violation of several treaties that it has signed and ratified, 
including the Refugee Convention, which it not only signed and ratified, but also signed 
into domestic law. The U.S. is violating the right to liberty and the right to be free from 
arbitrary detention, the right to be free from torture and CIDT, the right to family and the 
right to privacy, and several fundamental refugee rights. This list simply refers to the 
violations of treaties that the U.S. has signed and ratified. International legal scholars 
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have pointed to many other violations of fundamental rights under treaties that the U.S. 
has not signed or ratified.  
Studying international law, especially in the context of how international law can 
or does influence U.S. jurisprudence, is often frustrating. The United States does not give 
much weight to international law, unless it can use international law to its advantage. 
Although the U.S. has signed and ratified international treaties, it rarely incorporates 
those laws into its domestic law and policy. Rather, when the United States signs and 
ratifies a treaty, it often declares the treaty non-self-executing, which means that should 
any provision of the treaty conflict with U.S. domestic law, U.S. domestic law trumps 
international law. This process, quite obviously, renders international laws relatively 
meaningless in the context of the domestic judicial system. Where international human 
rights laws conflict with domestic laws, domestic laws are the ultimate authority. 
This refusal to give weight to international law, especially international human 
rights laws, makes it difficult for individuals or advocates to argue in court that the 
United States should comport with its obligations under international law. Where a treaty 
has been declared non-self-executing, U.S. courts do not have to analyze domestic laws 
through the lens of international law. Such is the case with domestic immigration laws 
and international human rights laws that pertain to immigrant rights. Where U.S. 
immigration policies conflict with human rights under treaties like the ICCPR or CAT, 
U.S. domestic law reigns supreme. U.S. immigration policies, in particular detention and 
deportation policies, directly conflict with U.S. obligations under international law. 
However, as the majority of those treaties are not self-executing, domestic laws are the 
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sole source of authority in immigration proceedings and any proceedings that challenge 
the constitutionality of particular provisions of immigration law. 
 
2. Incorporating Attorney Perspectives into Discussions of International Law 
and U.S. Immigration Law  
Although the immigration literature is clear that U.S. immigration policies violate 
international law, I found it lacked a very valuable perspective: immigration attorneys 
and other practitioners who work within the immigration system. The literature I 
encountered was mostly theoretical and abstract and I wanted to analyze the issue from a 
more practical perspective. In order to add to the literature on international law and 
immigration, I interviewed immigration attorneys to gain a better understanding the rights 
crisis facing immigrants in the United States. I wanted to research U.S. detention and 
deportation policies through experience and I wanted to include the viewpoints of 
practicing attorneys in the field.  
I accepted an internship with a non-profit in Arizona that provides legal services 
to immigrants in immigration detention. While I did not specifically choose Arizona, it 
was a prime location to conduct my research. Arizona not only shares a physical border 
with Mexico, but Arizona also has a long and complicated history of anti-immigrant 
sentiment. It had recently ramped up that anti-immigrant sentiment through the passage 
of Arizona Senate Bill (SB) 1070 – a bill designed to target ‘illegal’ immigrants through 
racist enforcement of immigration laws. SB 1070 was enacted to penalize undocumented 
immigration from Mexico and Latin America and its force was directed at Latino 
immigrants and communities. Because Arizona is such a hotspot for anti-immigrant 
sentiment, nativism and discrimination, advocates for immigrant rights in Arizona are 
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working on the front lines, so to speak. Arizona was, therefore, the perfect place to 
research anti-immigrant sentiment, international law and human rights violations in U.S. 
detention and deportation policies. 
From the first day of my internship, I could see that international human rights 
law had little, if any relevance to immigration law and immigrant detention in practice. 
International law is not useful because immigration courts do not recognize international 
law as binding authority. Immigration proceedings are based on statute and there is little 
judicial discretion involved in deportation proceedings. In order to advocate for an 
immigrant facing deportation, one must cite directly to the INA, the statutory code that 
governs all immigration proceedings. The INA is comprehensive and lengthy; if there is 
no relief under the INA, there is no relief from deportation period. International law is not 
even a factor in the IJ’s decision. In the words of one attorney, “immigration law is so 
complex, there’s no room for international human rights laws. They are going to laugh at 
you, if you mention [international law] in a motion or to a judge.”447 
 In fact, all of the non-profit attorneys expressed the futility of using international 
law in immigration proceedings. They referenced the court’s treatment of international 
law as persuasive, non-binding authority and how “that puts international law really low 
on the totem pole in terms of precedent to follow.”448 Although many of the attorneys 
thought it would be beneficial for immigrants if the U.S. were to incorporate terms of key 
international treaties into immigration laws, they didn’t believe “that international law 
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[would] necessarily be a huge motivating factor to the courts in deciding cases ever.”449 
Furthermore, several attorneys discussed the very real possibility of “getting laughed out 
of court” for using international law in any argument in front of an IJ. 
 I heard again and again from the nonprofit attorneys that, although they believed 
the U.S. should incorporate international human rights standards into immigration law 
and police, international law simply had no relevance in immigration proceedings. As an 
intern, even I could see how futile international laws were to immigrants facing abusive 
detention conditions or immigrants seeking to challenge their deportation. The lack of 
judicial discretion doesn’t allow an IJ to consider international law in his or her decision 
to deport or detain someone. The rigidity of the laws and strict statutory code also make it 
virtually impossible for international law to play a role in immigration proceedings. 
Additionally, the sheer numbers of immigrants arriving at the detention centers in 
Arizona on a daily basis and the heavy workload of all nonprofit attorneys and staff make 
it almost impossible to incorporate new legal strategies, especially those as outside-of-
the-box as using international laws and conventions to challenge immigrant detention or 
deportation. The attorneys are struggling just to argue for an immigrant’s release under 
the complexities of the INA and attempting to argue for immigrant rights under 
international law is unrealistic. There is such a high demand for free legal representation 
that nonprofit attorneys are inundated with cases. Fighting for immigrants under domestic 
law is hard enough with so few resources and so many people who need legal help. 
The nonprofit attorneys had so few resources that they were unable to fully 
represent the majority if immigrants in need of legal services. Because such a large 
number of immigrants need legal help but cannot afford legal services and because the 
                                                
449 Id. 
 162 
nonprofit has limited resources, the vast majority of immigrants had to proceed without 
an attorney, or pro se. What this meant was that although there was an attorney or other 
staff member working on a pro se case, the immigrant would still have to appear in court 
and represent him or herself. The attorneys could help with forms, legal briefs, bond 
petitions and other essential court documents, but there were not enough resources for 
every single immigrant to have full legal representation. The result is that most 
immigrants in detention fight their detention and their deportation on their own. 
 
3.  Widespread Human Rights Abuses in Immigration Detention Centers 
 
The utter widespread human rights abuses within U.S. detention centers makes 
the futility of using international law as a mechanism to fight for immigrant human rights 
even more frustrating. Having researched international laws and standards relating to 
detention before beginning my internship, I was amazed at the level of human rights 
abuses prevalent in the detention centers. The prevalence of such extreme abuses of 
human rights and the true lack of accountability for those abuses caused me to question 
even further the applicability of international law to U.S. immigration policy. 
Arizona is a border state and because of that, many immigrants held in Arizona 
detention centers are refugees and asylum-seekers. There are many areas of Latin 
America and specifically Mexico, where violence is high and people are displaced 
because of that violence. A large number of detainees that I worked with through my 
internship were asylum-seekers and the majority had experienced extreme violence. 
Although the Refugee Convention is clear that asylum-seekers, especially those who have 
survived or witnessed severe violence, should not be detained period, it is U.S. policy to 
detain all asylum-seekers and refugees until they have a credible fear interview with an 
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asylum officer. The wait period for most was between three and six months. For someone 
who has witnessed the murder of his family or for someone who has been subjected to 
extreme torture, confinement in a detention center can be detrimental to his physical and 
emotional wellbeing.  
 The detention centers themselves were like prisons. In fact, most of the detention 
centers housed immigrants alongside criminal convicts. Because so many immigrants are 
subject to detention, immigrants were even held in county jails because detention centers 
were too crowded. The environment in the detention centers was completely 
indistinguishable from federal prison: immigrants wore prison jumpsuits, their freedom 
of movement was continuously restricted, they had limited time outdoors, limited access 
to the telephone or the internet, were subjected to ‘count’ each day, and some were even 
shackled during their immigration proceedings.  
Conditions inside the detention centers were also appalling. In fact, one of the 
detention centers was not climate controlled. In Arizona, when the temperatures can 
exceed 120 degrees, lack of air conditioning can be dangerous and even deadly. That 
same detention center had no actual outdoor area for immigrants or criminal detainees. 
The ‘outdoor’ area consisted of a chain link fence ceiling in a small corner of the 
building. To try and distinguish immigration detention from prison or other forms of 
imprisonment is absurd. Trying to explain to immigrants in detention (some of whom 
were transferred directly from jail or prison) that they aren’t imprisoned or in jail, that 
they are only ‘detained’ is impossible. They are imprisoned and they feel as though they 
are being treated like criminals.450 
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 Access to proper health care was minimal. With such high numbers of asylum-
seekers fleeing torture and persecution, detention facilities should have an established 
system in place to provide medical treatment, either physical or psychological treatment. 
However, most immigrants had little or no access to mental health support like a 
counselor or therapist. Many immigrants had severe physical and mental disabilities from 
the torture they were subjected to before arriving at the border. The medical services 
available for immigrants was inadequate and most did not receive any treatment 
whatsoever for their extreme post-traumatic stress or anxiety. Even more disturbing than 
the lack of medical services was the use of segregation. Segregation was used as a 
punishment for immigrants who ‘misbehaved’ and it was also used for immigrants who 
expressed suicidal thoughts or who showed signs of depression.  
 
4.  Widespread Human Rights Abuses and the Irrelevance of International Law 
for Immigrants Facing Deportation 
  With all of the human rights abuses within the detention centers and the 
irrelevancy of international human rights laws in immigration proceedings, I found it 
difficult to reconcile the academic literature with what I was seeing and experiencing at 
the nonprofit. Although I had originally planned to discuss the intricacies of international 
law and how those laws could be applied and implemented in U.S. immigration law and 
policy, most of my interviews centered around the attorneys’ frustrations with 
immigration law and their more discouraging cases. As I heard from the attorneys about 
the cases that most disturbed them, I questioned even further how international law could 
help immigrants in the United States. 
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 One attorney recounted the story of a detainee he was working with who was 
seeking protection from the United States under CAT: 
He was granted protection under CAT and won it before the IJ. The government 
reserved appeal [and] kept him detained while the appeal was going on. He won 
his appeal and thought that he would get released but he is still detained. Now 
DHS is trying to deport him to another country and they are keeping him detained 
while that is going on. He is seven or eight months past the time he actually won 
his case the first time. There is nothing we can do aside from writing letters to 
ICE begging they release him.451 
 
Often, if a torture survivor is seeking protection under CAT and the government 
cannot deport him back to his native country (where he will face almost certain torture or 
death) DHS instead tries to deport him to another country. In this particular case, the man 
seeking protection won in front of the IJ and again in front of the BIA. Although ICE has 
ultimate authority to release him from detention, it will not allow his release. Because 
ICE has discretion and refuses to exercise it, this man, who has faced severe torture, is 
confined in a prison-like setting for the foreseeable future, even though he could be 
released at any time. 
ICE’s refusal to exercise its wide discretion to release immigrants who do not 
need to be detained is another frustration for many attorneys and advocates working in 
immigration law. The social services coordinator at the nonprofit explained the refusal to 
exercise discretion and total lack of accountability was one of her biggest frustrations: 
ICE has the discretion to release anybody that shouldn’t be in detention. And the 
way they use that discretion does not line up, or there is this big black hole that 
‘we do what we want, when we want because of security and confidentiality 
reasons.’ It creates a really unsafe situation for people in custody and after they’re 
released. It’s a horribly managed agency. And I believe that the vast majority of 
people in ICE custody do not need to be detained, but they are. Detention is not 
needed. But it’s already so ingrained, not just in our way of thinking, but in our 
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legal system, our enforcement system, that this is the way we deal with 
immigration.452 
Another attorney expressed her frustration with ICE discretion and its refusal to 
exercise its wide discretion to release immigrants from detention. In particular, she 
expressed her concern for the cases where the detainee had a health issue: 
One of my clients had cancer and he was in [detention] because his ex-wife had 
called the cops and turned him, saying he had committed fraud. And he hadn’t 
really, but being in [detention] for months trying to prove he didn’t commit fraud 
– [ICE] wouldn’t let him out. [When they found out] he had cancer, they 
immediately let him out because they didn’t want to deal with him. They refused 
to let him out, but then found out he had cancer and didn’t want to pay for his 
treatment. Those are the most frustrating cases to me – making the client or even 
us jump through hoops because they have so much power.453 
 
ICE more often than not declines to release an immigrant who obviously posed no 
danger to the community and had sufficient ties to demonstrate he was not a flight risk. 
Although ICE has the discretion to release anyone, ICE does not use that discretion and 
immigrants who should not be in detention for varying reasons are detained for months 
and even years. Immigrants have no recourse to challenge ICE’s refusal to exercise 
discretion under domestic immigration laws. Nor can immigrants use international laws 
to challenge their detention in front of an IJ at a bond determination hearing.  
Although an immigrant could potentially challenge his detention outside of the 
immigration process, through human rights proceedings with the IACHR for example, for 
the large majority of immigrants in detention, that possibility is an unlikely one. First, 
although the United States is a member of the OAS and therefore subject to its 
jurisdiction, the government does not have to release an immigrant who successfully 
challenges his detention through the IACHR. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
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most immigrants in immigration detention cannot afford legal representation even for 
their immigration proceedings. The inability to afford legal representation and the 
government’s authority and refusal to incorporate international law into its immigration 
policies, leaves the vast majority of immigrants in detention without any recourse in the 
international realm. 
 It’s not only asylum seekers and refugees who are experiencing human rights 
abuses. Immigrants who have been convicted of crimes, often minor crimes, face 
mandatory detention and deportation. For one attorney, her most discouraging case 
involved a ‘criminal alien’ who was an LPR and had been detained for over four years 
when she met him: 
He had two shoplifting convictions: one was for stealing a pair of tennis shoes and 
the other for stealing a coat from a homeless guy. He didn’t have to serve time on 
either of those. He was just somebody who was kind of a loner in the world. He 
worked in the fields, moved around a lot and he didn’t have a community or a 
family and so no one submitted really anything for his cancellation application. 
And so he lost his case and was still detained the last time I checked. We 
managed to get his bond reduced to the minimum but it looked like the family 
was going to have a hard time paying. That was a really hard case, I cried for 
three days straight. I never cry in this job but for some reason it really struck a 
chord. It was so sad and just so wrong and it seemed to really sum up everything. 
All of the permanent residents that we see have varying degrees of records and 
just unfair it is how we decide who gets to stay and who doesn’t. I think the judge 
just saw him as a loser who didn’t have any family and didn’t have anyone who 
cared about him and who had committed crimes.454 
 
 This story is all too common and throughout my internship I saw many similar 
cases of long-term LPRs who had committed a crime and faced mandatory detention. 
Even for those who did have strong families ties, some could not fight their deportation 
because the crime, under the INA, was labeled as an ‘aggravated felony.’ Others, 
although they had strong families ties, were forced to remain in detention because their 
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crime was a CIMT. And still others, who were eligible for bond but their families could 
not afford to pay it.  
 Another attorney expressed her frustration at the arbitrariness of the immigration 
system:  
I had one client who did have a money laundering conviction, but I was looking 
into the case to see what argument could be made [about the classification of his 
conviction under the INA]. But he was older, in his 70s and he had a hard time 
understanding, you could tell. He was just mentally slower. I don’t think he fully 
understood everything that was going on, even though I tried to explain it to him. 
And he also had a heart condition. We were trying to see the record of conviction, 
to see what was there in his criminal background. And the next thing I knew, he 
was deported and I don’t know what happened. I don’t know if he took a deport 
or if he ever got the record of conviction. But the last time I talked to him, I told 
him to get his record of conviction. Sometimes not knowing what happens to 
these people is kind of rough. And again, it’s the way he was treated, being older, 
not really understanding what was going on.455 
 
 These stories demonstrate the complexity of the U.S. immigration legal system 
and the lack of accountability and unfettered discretion of the government. Immigrants in 
immigration detention face abusive treatment and degrading detention conditions. They 
cannot challenge their detention successfully because there is so little judicial discretion 
in the detention system. Although ICE has discretion to release any immigrant who is not 
facing mandatory detention, ICE rarely exercises that discretion and when it does, it does 
so arbitrarily. The bond determination process is also arbitrary, with the IJ’s setting bonds 
at absurdly high levels or arbitrarily revoking bonds. ICE also sets bonds arbitrarily, 
without taking into account the flight risk or danger the individual poses to the 
community. 
 These stories also demonstrate the insignificance of international law in 
immigration proceedings on a practical level. Although academics continue to argue that 
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the United States must incorporate international human rights standards into its detention 
and deportation policies, the United States has yet to do so. The government continues to 
advocate for harsher immigration policies as a means to deter future immigration and to 
regulate immigration.  Advocates working directly with immigrants and attorneys who 
help immigrants who cannot afford legal services place absolutely no emphasis on 
international law as the solution to the rights crisis facing immigrants in the United States 
today.  
 
5. Final Thoughts 
 
 My internship with this immigration nonprofit and the interviews I conducted lead 
me to conclude that international law is not key to restoring rights to immigrants in the 
United States. Through this internship, I found that while the academic world focuses on 
international human rights laws, those advocating for immigrants on the front lines do not 
see international law as the solution to this human rights crisis. This realization led me to 
question how international law and immigration law fit together. Rather than write about 
international law in the way that others in the academic community have written about it, 
I chose to write about how international law contributed to the immigration problem. 
 My only real conclusion is that immigration laws in the United States are broken. 
I chose not to promote international law as a solution and chose instead to focus on the 
complex racial and xenophobic underpinnings of the current U.S. immigration policies. 
In this historical account, international law and conceptions of sovereignty helped justify 
the development of the immigration system in the United States today. The current 
immigration policy in the U.S. was built on racist foundations. Sovereignty and powers 
inherent in sovereignty were used to create today’s immigration policies. The U.S. 
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government continues to pick and choose when to use international law based on whether 
it can use international law to its advantage.  
Through analyzing international law as part of the problem, I hope to shift the 
discussion away from international law to something else. We need to seek alternative 
solutions to the immigration ‘problem’ in the United States. Instead of claiming that the 
solution (international law) is there and we just need to implement it, we must change the 
discourse through which we argue for immigrant rights in detention and deportation 
proceedings because in the real world, immigration attorneys are not using international 
law to argue for immigrants’ human rights. 
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APPENDIX 
ATTORNEY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. Why did you decide to get involved with this non-profit agency? 
2. What are some of your more frustrating experiences working in immigration law? 
3. Where do you see immigration law in the future? 
4. How do you think U.S. immigration policies could incorporate international human 
rights law? 
5. What does a typical case look like? 
6. Tell me about some cases that have troubled you or left you feeling discouraged. 
7. If you could change one thing to make immigration law work better in the justice 
system, what would it be? 
 172 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
ANNE ORFORD, A jurisprudence of the limit in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 
(Anne Orford ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). 
 
Barbara MacGrady, Resort to International Human Rights Law in Challenging 
Conditions in U.S. Immigration Detention Centers, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 271 (1997). 
 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, art. 16, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 
23 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1031. 
 
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION (Harvard Univ. Press 2007). 
 
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About 
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1890 (2000). 
 
Daniel Kanstroom, Dangerous Undertones of the New Nativism: Peter Brimelow and the 
Decline of the West in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT 
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 300 (Juan F. Perea ed., New York Univ. Press 1997). 
 
Dawn Marie Johnson, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies 
for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477 (2001). 
 
Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to 
Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243 (2013). 
 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN 
AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (New York, Russell Sage Foundation 2002). 
 
Eleanor Acer & Jake Goodman, Reaffirming Rights: Human Rights Protections of 
Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Immigration Detention, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
507 (2010). 
 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 
Gwynne Skinner, Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in the 
United States, 16 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DIS. RES. 270 (2008). 
 
Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on Immigration in the United States: 
Detention and Due Process 11-33 (2010). 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102-
23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 173 
 
Interview with B., in Ariz. (July 26, 2013). 
 
Interview with C., in Ariz. (July 26, 2013). 
 
Interview with E., in Ariz. (July 26, 2013). 
 
Interview with M., in Ariz. (July 26, 2013). 
 
Interview with T., in Ariz. (July 26, 2013). 
 
JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER AND BEYOND: THE RISE OF THE ILLEGAL AND 
THE REMAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BOUNDARY (2d ed. New York, Routledge 2010). 
 
Julia Preston, Latinos Said to Bear Weight of Deportation Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/us/latinos-said-to-bear-weight-of-deportation-
program.html. 
 
Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the 
Constitutional Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2004). 
 
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, & Sovereign Power, 
(bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1635 2006). 
 
Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something 
Borrowed, Something Blue in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-
IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 165, (Juan F. Perea ed., New York Univ. 
Press 1997). 
 
Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic 
Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998). 
 
Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There 
a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000). 
 
Melissa Cook, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 293 (2003). 
 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
(2002). 
 
TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA, IMMIGRATION NATION: RAIDS, DETENTIONS, AND 
DEPORTATIONS IN POST-9/11 AMERICA (Paradigm Publishers 2012). 
 
 174 
TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA, DUE PROCESS DENIED: DETENTIONS AND DEPORTATIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (Routledge 2012). 
 
Tanya Golash-Boza, Obama’s Unprecedented Number of Deportations, counterpunch, 
Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/01/25/obamas-unprecedented- number-
of-deportations/ 
 
Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After 
September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005). 
 
Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New 
Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003). 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force 
(April 22, 1954). 
 
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards 
relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012) 
available at http://www.UNHRC.org/refworld/docid/503489533b8.html. 
 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
 
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 
 
